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CAN WE MAKE IT RAIN ?

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WITH the steady movement of our population westward the flood of immigration has ascended the valleys of our western rivers, and is now rapidly spreading out over the vast stretches of unwatered prairie land which comprise the great plains of the western portions of Nebraska, Kansas, the Dakotas, Wyoming, and Montana, the Llano Estacado of Texas, and the arid plateaus of the mountain States and territories.

As civilization pushes its way further into the semi-arid regions, the subject of irrigation and artificial means of procuring a sufficient water-supply grows in importance, and forces itself, whether or no, upon the attention of the country at large ; for, as prospers the western farmer, so, to a large degree, prosper both the West and East.

If moderately watered, the great plains and the table-lands of the Cordilleras would afford more valuable lands for the production of cereals and fruits than the entire area of all lands under cultivation in the States east of the Mississippi, while, if droughts in the valley of the Missouri and upper Mississippi could be prevented, the productiveness of those regions would be vastly increased.

In many of the valleys and hilly districts of the West exten-
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sive systems of irrigating dams and canals have been constructed at an expense of many millions of dollars, by which thousands of miles of land have already been reclaimed from drought and converted into farms and plantations of marvellous productiveness. In the valley of the Pecos River, in New Mexico, a region which was considered but a desert until a few years ago, it is not an uncommon achievement to produce four crops of vegetables in a season by means of the artificial-irrigation systems. Such results are also obtained at many points on the famous Staked Plains, wherever a small garden is put under cultivation, and irrigated by means of bored wells and windmill pumps. For these prairie lands are richly fertilized with deposits of phosphates and vegetable decay, the accumulations of centuries, which have not been washed out by frequent heavy rains, as is the case in other localities.

Irrigation is successfully employed in many valleys and mountainous regions; but no system has yet been devised which could be introduced upon the plains on an extensive scale without very great expense, since there is no opportunity for constructing elevated dams and reservoirs upon the level prairie lands.

If, then, this vast territory, which might be so prolific, is ever to be utilized for anything more than furnishing a meagre subsistence to a few head of cattle to the square mile, some method different from any now in practice must be introduced to provide for a sufficient and regular watering of the land. It has been in view of such facts as these that scientists have at various times advanced the proposition of producing rainfall in times of drought, and in arid regions, by artificial means. Various methods have been suggested; but nearly all have aimed to produce rainfall by the same general means, viz., by mingling currents of air differing considerably in temperature and humidity, and so causing the moisture to be condensed and finally precipitated by the cooling of the warmer current, and the consequent lessening of its capacity for holding moisture in suspension. It is believed that nearly all rainstorms originate in this manner, as is stated by Professor Silliman in his "Principles of Physics," page 656, as follows: "Rain is generally produced by the rapid union of two or more volumes of humid air differing considerably in temperature; the several portions, when mingled, being incapable of absorbing the same amount of moisture that each would retain if

they had not united. If the excess is great, it falls as rain ; if it is slight, it appears as cloud. The production of rain is the result of the law that the capacity of air for moisture decreases in a higher ratio than the temperature."

A large part of the water which falls on this country as rain, watering our crops and feeding our great rivers, comes to us in the great equatorial current, which arises far to the southwest over the Pacific Ocean, from which it receives its great burden of moisture, and, flowing to the northeast, bears it directly over the most arid portions of our country and Mexico. However, as it flows on over these regions uninterrupted and undisturbed, it seldom precipitates its moisture until it meets the polar current, which flows over the Eastern States in a southwesterly direction. This current is invariably much cooler, and whenever it comes in collision with the warm, moisture-laden current from the southwest, clouds begin to form from the condensation, and precipitation of rain generally follows.

If in some way the equatorial current can be deflected into cooler currents while passing over the arid regions of the Southwest and West, rain should follow almost as surely as in any other locality. The problem seems to resolve itself into the question, "Can this be done, and if so, how most economically?"

As long ago as the time of Plutarch it was "a matter of current observation that unusually heavy rains fall after great battles," and it is not impossible, according to the theory of the commingling of air currents, that such rains might have been produced by the great battles of ancient times. Let ten thousand Greeks march into battle chanting their "pæans" and shouting their "allallas," beating time meanwhile on their shields, while a hundred thousand Persians are advancing against them, continually shouting their terrible battle-cries ; then let the great armies rush together with the tumult of clashing swords and shields, the fierce shouting of the multitudes, the hoarse death-cries and shouts of victory, and surely the sound waves rising from such a din will literally shake the heavens, and are capable of producing no insignificant effect among the volatile currents of the upper air. Moreover, the heat generated from the struggling masses and the moisture evaporated from their perspiration would exercise a decided influence in disturbing the equilibrium of the atmospheric conditions.

In 1837, Professor Espy, at that time a well-known scientist, proposed a method of compelling nature to loose the moisture which she holds suspended aloft. His plan was to kindle great fires which would produce a powerful upward current of hot air, and this, "rising to a great height, where, owing to the diminished pressure, it would expand, by the expansion would be cooled, thereby condensing and eventually precipitating its moisture."

The Australian Government proposed in 1884 to make a test of Espy's theory; but when Mr. H. C. Russell, the government astronomer of New South Wales, demonstrated that it would require 9,000,000 tons of coal burned daily to increase by 66 per cent. the rainfall at Sidney, where the average humidity is 73, the project was forthwith abandoned.

Long before Espy's time, the facts had already been noticed that heavy artillery-firing was frequently followed by rain. Napoleon was the first man who is reported to have noted this phenomenon, and he took advantage of its regular occurrence in ordering the manœuvres of his troops.

Later, during the Franco-Prussian War, which opened in the summer of 1870, the fact that rain fell after battles was again brought to notice and widely discussed by European scientists. A letter published in the New York *Evening Post* of October 5, 1870, from which the following extract is taken, shows that much attention had been given to the subject on the other side of the Atlantic. The letter is dated Frankfort-on-the-Main, September 14, 1870.

"Since the commencement of actual hostilities between Germany and France—that is, from about the first week in August to the present time—we have had in this part of Germany scarcely a day without rain, generally continuous, and often accompanied with thunder-storms. This phenomenon has called the attention of the German press to the subject, and some valuable historical facts connected therewith have been brought to light; and there appears to be little doubt, judging from the data on hand, that many storms and rains which we have had in Germany for the past six weeks—a most unusual thing at this season here—have been brought on by the cannonading and firing of small arms in Alsace and Lorraine."

During our late Civil War the same phenomenon repeatedly occurred, and came to be one of the factors in the case to be considered by a general when planning his movements on the eve of an engagement.

In 1870, contemporaneously with the publications concerning

the rains in France and Germany, Mr. Edward Powers, of Delavan, Wis., a civil engineer of wide experience and observation, published a collection of most interesting statistics concerning the sequence of rainstorms after battles, in a volume entitled "War and the Weather." Mr. Powers had been convinced early in the Civil War not only that the concussion of heavy cannon-firing produced rain, but that such a result might be effected at any time without unreasonable expense, considering the value of rain in times of drought.

From the statistics published in Mr. Powers's book, it is found that heavy rains followed almost every engagement of any importance during the Civil War, and, so far as can be ascertained, the same phenomenon was common during the Mexican War upon the arid cactus plains of that country.

A notable instance of its occurrence during the Mexican War was at the battle of Buena Vista, fought on the 22d and 23d days of February, 1847, in the midst of the dry season in that region. The facts, as they occurred on the second day of that battle, as related by Brevet Major-General H. W. Benham, of the United States Engineers, are as follows:

Between 8 and 10 A.M. the artillery was engaged in heavy firing, and between 11 and 12 o'clock a "most violent rain" fell. In the afternoon the cannonading was resumed, and in about two hours after it ceased "another violent shower of rain fell." "And what I consider the *satisfactory proof*," says General Benham, "that this was caused by the shocks to the atmosphere produced by the cannon-firing, is that no rain had fallen in that vicinity for many months previously—I was told six or eight months—and none fell, *as I know* was the case, for three or four months after the battle, as I continued at that position."

The battles of Palo Alto, the siege of Monterey, Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec were all fought during the dry season, which in Mexico is very severe, and each of these battles was followed by heavy rains. In his little book, "War and the Weather," Mr. Powers mentions 198 battles of the Civil War, including every battle of importance so far as the writer of this article has discovered, which were immediately followed by rain, as he has definitely ascertained. These storms were generally heavy, but varied somewhat in proportion to the magnitude of the engagements.

One or two extracts from letters received by Mr. Powers from army officers concerning the subject of "War and the Weather" may be of interest as showing the opinion which was held on the subject by those who had the best of reasons to remember the rains, which often served to render their route of march an unfathomable quagmire, or chilled them as they lay in bivouac after an exhausting day of fighting, or possibly on the field of battle among the wounded.

STATE OF MAINE, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, }
AUGUSTA, December 12, 1870. }

MY DEAR SIR: My Adjutant-General has sent me your letter referring to the effect of heavy firing on the atmosphere leading to storms and rain. It is a most interesting matter. The *fact* of such sequences (if they may be called so without begging the question) I have often noticed. Certainly a heavy storm of rain occurred after the great battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Bethesda Church (Cold Harbor), Petersburg, Five Forks, etc.; and often, I well remember, in what we called small engagements (though they would be called battles in Europe), such as the fight on the "Quaker Road," March 29, 1865, for a late instance, in which there was a sharp, concentrated fire of infantry and artillery for a couple of hours, a very heavy rain would surely follow. This fact was well noticed, and is well remembered by many a poor fellow who, like myself, has been left lying, desperately wounded, after such engagements—for these rains are balm to the fever and anguish of the poor body that is promoted to the list of "casualties." I am sure that you will find my testimony confirmed by the recollections of every soldier.

(Governor) JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN,
Late Brev. Maj.-Gen. Commanding 1st Div., 5th Corps.

BLOOMINGTON, ILL., December 13, 1870.

MY DEAR SIR: In reply to your favor of the 10th, not only has it been my experience that rain follows soon after every heavy cannonading, but that this was very generally conceded and understood in the army, and acted upon by the soldiers in preparing for it after every battle. I remember, particularly, that in the garrison at Lexington, Mo., when water could not be had, it was urged by myself and other officers encouraging the men to hold out for a few hours, and that the cannonading would bring rain to quench their thirst; and it did bring rain, but it found us without means to catch it in sufficient quantities. There are large numbers of soldiers in your city who will remember this circumstance and the wringing of their blankets to get water.

The inauguration of Governor Hahn at New Orleans was accompanied by cannonading and the noise of musical instruments and anvils, infantry firing, etc., and was soon followed by very heavy rain. When the rebel ram ran by the city, the cannonading, only for a few minutes, was followed by rain. The passage of the forts at Mobile Bay, the bombardment of Fort Gaines, afterwards of Fort Morgan; again of Spanish Fort and Blakely; the landing of our troops at Pascagoula and firing of a few shots with field-pieces on the shore; the battle of Sterling Farm, and the fighting at Atchafalaya River, were followed in a few hours by heavy rains.

I was with the first troops that passed down the river (Herron's Division, Thirteenth Army Corps), after the surrender of Vicksburg, to Port Hudson. We found it very muddy there (July), and also at Yazoo City, when taken by our troops, July 12, 1863. Everybody remembers that there was no difficulty in keeping *moist* at Vicksburg.

Soon after we crossed the Boston Mountains (Arkansas) we found a light breeze blowing against the mountains from the opposite side. We had some artillery firing—say thirty or forty rounds—near Lee's Creek, early in the morning, with a clear sky. Here I remember that it was urged by some of our officers that artillery should not be used on the small number of the enemy's cavalry that were in front of us, for the reason that *it would bring on rain*, and thereby retard us in pursuit of the enemy. We got the rain in less than two hours. After the firing after the capture of Van Buren also we got rain in a few hours.

It is possible that I know of an instance where there was heavy firing that was not followed by rain, and that the matter may have escaped my notice.

There are other instances where I know it did occur, but deem it unnecessary to cite them, as I have given you the cases of most importance, and which attracted my attention.

Truly yours,

(General) J. McNULTA.

HIRAM, O., Oct. 28, 1870.

DEAR SIR: In answer to yours of the 22d, I have to say that, while I did not take such observations as a scientific experiment requires, I did observe the frequent occurrence of heavy showers very soon after the battles in our late war. It was a matter much talked of in the army, and there was a general impression that the atmospheric disturbances produced by heavy cannonading hastened or created showers. I remember that heavy showers followed after the battles of Shiloh, Stone River, Shelbyville, and Chickamauga. But while these coincidences are curious and interesting, they are chiefly valuable from the fact that they challenge the attention of scientific men, and may lead to a discovery of the causes which will prove valuable to our knowledge of meteorology.

Very truly yours,

(General) J. A. GARFIELD.

The occurrences of the phenomenon of rain after battles were far too regular to be explained as simply coincidences, and, taken with the similar occurrences during the Mexican War and those in other foreign countries, constitute almost unquestionable proof of Mr. Powers's theory that rain can be and is produced by the concussions of cannonading.

Believing that the subject of artificial rainfall offered the possibilities of immense benefit to mankind, Mr. Powers purposed to interest the public in the matter sufficiently to obtain an

investigation by the government. And to secure this end he spent a large part of his time and income for over twenty years, influenced only by motives of philanthropy and expecting no personal benefits, as may be seen from the following extract from his book published in 1870 : "The art of regulating the weather to some extent, if such an art should ever be acquired, is not one on which a patent could ever be obtained, nor would the business be one in which a monopoly could ever be exercised by an individual. . . . The experiments, when made, as eventually they surely will be, should be made at the public expense, for it is the public who would be benefited in the event of their success."

As early as 1874 a number of public men, including General William T. Sherman, General James A. Garfield, General John A. Logan, the Hon. C. B. Farwell, and others, became greatly interested in the project of producing rain by cannon-firing ; but the expense which it was estimated would be entailed by the first experiments was so great that Congress took no action in the matter. The following estimate of the cost of the first two experiments was made by Mr. Powers, who proposed that two hundred siege-guns, which lie idle in the United States arsenal at Rock Island, Ill., be taken to a suitable locality in the West, and one hundred rounds be fired from them in each operation :

ESTIMATE.	
Mounting 200 siege-guns, at \$10 each.....	\$2,000
Railway transportation for same, at \$40 each.....	8,000
40,000 blank cartridges, at \$2.50 each.....	100,000
50 tons of hay for wadding, at \$12 per ton.....	600
10,000 electric primers, at \$150 per M.....	1,500
Electric batteries and insulated wire.....	500
Services of 10 men, 26 days, at \$2.50 per day.....	650
Services of 600 men, 26 days, at \$1.50 per day.....	23,400
Rent of ground for experiments.....	250
Return transportation of guns to arsenal.....	8,000
Dismounting and putting guns away at arsenal.....	2,000
Add 10 per cent. for contingencies.....	\$146,900
	14,690
Total.....	
Estimated cost of each experiment.....	\$161,590
	80,795

Of course, if the Department of Agriculture had a regular system of properly equipped stations established throughout the West, the cost of an operation would be greatly diminished, but even then a good rain produced according to Mr. Powers's plan would cost not less than \$20,000.

In 1880 General Daniel Ruggles, a resident of Fredericksburg, Va., suggested that, instead of the use of cannon on the ground, the firing of explosives raised high into the upper air strata

by means of balloons be employed. General Ruggles obtained a patent upon this plan, although a description of the same scheme had been published throughout the country several years before, being copied from a New Zealand newspaper, the *Mimmora Star*, in which the following item appeared in the fall of 1876: "Ferdinand Hatermann has been promulgating a new scheme in Hortham for producing rain. He asks that the district join in constructing a number of balloons seven feet in diameter. He proposes to fill these with sufficient gas to carry them into the regions of the rainy clouds, and in each of the balloons a canister of powder. When sufficiently high in the air, he would light them by means of fuse, and the explosion, say of a score of charges going off at once in the midst of the rainclouds, would, he thinks, break them. Whether anything more than smoke would result remains to be proved."

By this plan of raising the explosives used and discharging them among the currents which it is desired to affect, great economy of force is obtained, and the expense of producing the effect which a great battle would produce upon the upper-air currents is very much diminished.

In 1890 the Hon. C. B. Farwell and others who were interested in the subject brought the matter before Congress and obtained an appropriation of \$2,000 for use by the Department of Agriculture in investigating the possibilities of the artificial production of rainfall, and the last Congress added \$7,000 to this amount for a series of practical experiments. While the matter was before Congress, Senator C. B. Farwell, Secretary of Agriculture J. M. Rusk, and others interested, consulted, concerning the best methods and materials to be employed, with Dr. Claud O. O. Rosell, a chemist of the Patent Office, and the writer, who proposed that, instead of weighting down the balloons employed with a load of dynamite or other explosives, the balloons themselves be inflated with a highly explosive gas, such as a composition of hydrogen in two parts and oxygen one part, which mixture produces one of the most violent explosives known to science, and by employing which smaller balloons can be used, saving largely on the expense of apparatus and also on the cost of the explosives.

Later the writer consented to a request from the friends of the project that he take personal charge of the investigations and experiments, and was appointed a special agent of the Department

of Agriculture for that purpose. Several months were spent in preliminary investigations of the novel subject, and in planning and constructing apparatus, devising methods of operation, and gathering the requisite materials.

On the fifth day of August our party arrived at Midland, Texas, a small station on the Texas and Pacific Railway, situated on the Llano Estacado, or Staked Plains, in a region which had been suffering from a severe drought of several months' duration, and a lack of good rains for several years. A drive of twenty-five miles over the dry prairie, bearing little vegetation but scattered clumps of grass and low mesquite bushes, with here and there a cactus, brought us to the "C" Ranch, where, by the invitation of the owner, Mr. Nelson Morris, of Chicago, the first series of experiments were to be performed. The ranch is a typical Texan ranch of some 300,000 acres, supporting about 15,000 cattle and employing twenty cowboys. Our party, which included Dr. Claude Rosell, Mr. Edward Powers, Professor George E. Curtis, of the Smithsonian Institution, Mr. John T. Ellis, of Oberlin College, and five other specialists and assistants, was very comfortably quartered at the ranch-house, and every facility was afforded which the ranch possessed for carrying on our work. Nevertheless, a number of very serious difficulties and obstacles were encountered, some of which could not be easily surmounted. Chief among these may be mentioned, first, the remoteness of the ranch from any point where necessary supplies could be obtained; second, the very heavy winds which blow over the plains of western Texas almost constantly at a velocity of eighteen to twenty-five miles per hour, and render the manipulation of balloons a task of great difficulty; third, the strongly alkali drinking water obtained from the wells of the Staked Plains, which placed nearly every member of the expedition on the sick-list at various times, in spite of the fact that all the drinking water was treated with acids to precipitate the alkali or counteract its effect.

However, in spite of these difficulties a series of experiments were performed which, if they were not on quite so extensive a scale as will be employed in a few weeks in a locality where the conditions are less adverse, yet yielded results that were as interesting and valuable as could be expected from the first experiments under any conditions.

Our party is now temporarily scattered, and the specialists

who had charge of the investigations in the different lines have not yet had time to send in their various reports, so that it is not possible at this early date to make a report which will be of much scientific value; but a simple description of the operations and statement of the results can be given, which will be of much interest to the general reader.

We began operations with the following apparatus and materials: Sixty-eight explosive balloons 10 and 12 feet in diameter, having a capacity of 525 and 940 cubic feet each, respectively; three large balloons for making ascensions; 20,000 pounds of iron borings and 16,000 pounds of sulphuric acid, together with generators and fittings for manufacturing 50,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas; 2,500 pounds of powdered chlorate of potash; 600 pounds of binoxide of manganese, with fifty retorts and suitable furnaces and fittings for generating 12,000 cubic feet of oxygen gas.

Material for making 100 strong cloth-covered kites was also brought from the East, as well as the ingredients for manufacturing several thousand pounds of rackarock powder and other high explosives. The party was also well supplied with electrical and meteorological instruments and apparatus.

The plan of operation was somewhat as follows: Three lines were to be formed, each some two miles in length, and placed about one-half mile apart. The first line to the windward was to consist of a large number of ground batteries, where heavy charges of dynamite and rackarock powder would be fired at frequent intervals. The next line to the rear was to consist of a number of kites flown to a considerable height by electric wires, bearing dynamite cartridges suspended from them, to be fired high in the air. The third and main line was to consist of explosive balloons which would produce terrific "air-quakes" at intervals of one to two hours throughout the day or during the continuance of the operation. In actual practice at the "C" Ranch, the first line of explosives was operated as proposed, and on days when the other lines were not in operation explosions were made along this line to keep the weather in an unsettled state. The kites were found to be very difficult of operation in the prevailing high winds, which were constantly breaking the sticks of the kites or parting the electric wires by which they were flown. This line was therefore not operated to the extent pro-

posed. The balloon line was carried out as planned, though the explosions were separated by somewhat greater intervals than were at first intended. The purpose was to imitate the effects of a great battle as nearly as possible, and in this I consider that we succeeded admirably.

The first operation was made on August 9. At this time the balloon apparatus had not been set up, and only the first line of ground explosions was brought into action. The ground batteries were operated for about an hour, beginning at 5 P.M. August 9, and reopened again for a shorter time at about 7 P.M. The weather was clear on the 9th, and the barometer stood at its normal height at 7 P.M. At noon of the 10th clouds began to gather directly over the ranch, and during the afternoon and the evening a very heavy rain fell,—nearly two inches,—transforming the roadways into rushing torrents and every hollow of the prairie into a small lake.

The next important operation was performed on August 18; the explosions having been begun on the evening previous, a large quantity of oxyhydrogen gas was used in the balloon explosions, while the ground batteries were kept in almost constant action for twelve hours. The morning had dawned clear and beautiful, and neither the appearance of the atmosphere nor the readings of the instruments gave any indication of aught but the fairest weather. This state of the weather continued until late in the afternoon, when heavy clouds gathered and *formed* in the south and west, and at 5 P.M. the operators of the ground batteries, which had kept up their roar until that time, were forced to run for shelter through a drenching rain, which fell in torrents for two and a half hours over the entire southern and eastern portion of Andrews County and most of Midland County and those to the south and west of it.

Late in the evening the writer drove in to Midland Station, a distance of 25 miles, and it is safe to say that six or eight miles of the road traversed was flooded under four to forty inches of water.

The final operation of this series of experiments was begun at 11 A.M. on the 25th day of August. At 3:30 P.M. of that day the barometric curve indicated a pressure of 26.93 inches, which is slightly below the normal for that hour at this elevation and locality, where the barometer generally reads "very dry." The wet- and dry-bulb psychrometer indicated a relative humidity of only 16, with the dew-point at 42 degrees.

The wind blew from the southeast (the usual direction) at a velocity of 18.8 miles per hour. The sky was clear, except for a few very light, scattered cumulus clouds, which were estimated, by the movements of the balloons, to be at a height of more than two and one-half miles.

Seven balloons, mostly of the large size, were sent up in this operation. Two 10-foot balloons were exploded by means of electric cable at a height of 1,000 feet, but the explosions of the larger balloons were too terrific to be risked at so close a proximity, and they were therefore fitted with fuses timed for two to six minutes and allowed to attain altitudes of from one to three miles before exploding.

The manner of operating the balloons was to fill them first to one-third their capacity by attaching them by pipes to a number of retorts containing chlorate of potash and a small quantity of binocide of manganese. When these retorts were passed through the flames of gasoline furnaces set up in a large adobe workshop, the potash, being decomposed by the heat, gave off oxygen very rapidly. The balloon was then attached to the hydrogen generators and the inflation was completed with hydrogen. The hydrogen apparatus consists of three large tanks half full of water, with half a ton of iron borings in the bottom, into which sulphuric acid is slowly decanted. The acid rapidly decomposes the water into its gaseous elements and the iron takes up the oxygen, leaving the hydrogen free to pass through a wash-barrel into the balloon.

While the balloons were being filled and exploded a tremendous "cannonading" was in progress all along the ground batteries, and late into the night this firing was continued along a line a mile and a half in length.

At 11 P.M. the firing ceased, and our weary party immediately retired for the night. At 3 A.M., however, the heavy rolling of thunder disturbed the sleepers, and, looking out to the west and north, heavy banks of cloud were seen advancing, almost constantly lighted by most brilliant lightning. An hour later the rain began to fall in torrents on the ranch, and did not cease till 8 A.M. The northern portions of this county received the most thorough watering they have had for the past three years, and the reports from incoming cowboys indicate that the storm extended over many hundreds of square miles.

Besides these three heavy storms which occurred after the principal operations, not less than nine showers of much less importance fell during the sixteen days of our experiments; a most extraordinary occurrence in this locality, and especially at this season of the year. That these results were not produced at an excessive expense of material may be seen from the fact that in the entire series of experiments only two tons of iron, one ton of acid, one-fourth ton of potash and manganese, and one ton of rackarock powder and other explosives were consumed, none of which are expensive materials.

In the opinion of the writer the experiments clearly demonstrate—

First, That the concussions from explosions exert a marked and practical effect upon the atmospheric conditions in producing or occasioning rainfall, probably by disturbing the upper currents.

Second, That when the atmosphere is in a “threatening” condition—which is frequently the case in most arid regions without any rain resulting—rain can be caused to fall almost immediately by jarring together the particles of moisture which hang in suspension in the air. This result was repeatedly effected during our operations, the drops sometimes commencing to fall within twelve seconds from the moment of the initial explosion.

It also seems probable to the writer that the immense amount of frictional electricity generated by the concussions and the mingling of opposing currents of air may have considerable influence in the formation of storm-centres by producing a polarized condition of the earth and air, and so creating a magnetic field which may assist in gathering and so condensing the moisture of the surrounding atmosphere.

Altogether, considering the great difficulties under which we labored, the results of our first experiments have been exceedingly gratifying and encouraging to the advocates of the theory that rain can be produced at will by artificial means, and the further tests of the theory which will soon be made at El Paso, Texas, will be watched with great interest.

ROBERT G. DYRENFORTH.

To THE uncritical observer the possible achievements of invention and discovery seem boundless. Half a century ago no idea could have appeared more visionary than that of holding

communication in a few seconds of time with our fellows in Australia, or having a talk going on *viva voce* between a man in Washington and another in Boston. The actual attainment of these results has naturally given rise to the belief that the word "impossible" has disappeared from our vocabulary. To every demonstration that a result cannot be reached the answer is, Did not one Lardner, some sixty years ago, demonstrate that a steamship could not cross the Atlantic? If we say that for every actual discovery there are a thousand visionary projects, we are told that, after all, any given project may be the one out of the thousand.

In a certain way these hopeful anticipations are justified. We cannot set any limit either to the discovery of new laws of nature or to the ingenious combination of devices to attain results which now look impossible. The science of to-day suggests a boundless field of possibilities. It demonstrates that the heat which the sun radiates upon the earth in a single day would suffice to drive all the steamships now on the ocean and run all the machinery on the land for a thousand years. The only difficulty is how to concentrate and utilize this wasted energy. From the standpoint of exact science aërial navigation is a very simple matter. We have only to find the proper combination of such elements as weight, power, and mechanical force. Whenever Mr. Maxim can make an engine strong and light enough, and sails large, strong, and light enough, and devise the machinery required to connect the sails and the engine, he will fly. Science has nothing but encouraging words for his project, so far as general principles are concerned.

Such being the case, I am not going to maintain that we can never make it rain.

But I do maintain two propositions. If we are ever going to make it rain, or produce any other result hitherto unattainable, we must employ adequate means. And if any proposed means or agency is already familiar to science, we may be able to decide beforehand whether it is adequate. Let us grant that out of a thousand seemingly visionary projects one is really sound. Must we try the entire thousand to find the one? By no means. The chances are that nine hundred of them will involve no agency that is not already fully understood, and may, therefore, be set aside without even being tried. To this class belongs the project of producing rain by sound. As I write, the daily journals

are announcing the brilliant success of experiments in this direction ; yet I unhesitatingly maintain that sound cannot make rain, and propose to adduce all necessary proof of my thesis. The nature of sound is fully understood, and so are the conditions under which the aqueous vapor in the atmosphere may be condensed. Let us see how the case stands.

A room of average size, at ordinary temperature and under usual conditions, contains about a quart of water in the form of invisible vapor. The whole atmosphere is impregnated with vapor in about the same proportion. We must, however, distinguish between this invisible vapor and the clouds or other visible masses to which the same term is often applied. The distinction may be very clearly seen by watching the steam coming from the spout of a boiling kettle. Immediately at the spout the escaping steam is transparent and invisible ; an inch or two away a white cloud is formed, which we commonly call steam, and which is seen belching out to a distance of one or more feet, and perhaps filling a considerable space around the kettle ; at a still greater distance this cloud gradually disappears. Properly speaking, the visible cloud is not vapor or steam at all, but minute particles or drops of water in a liquid state. The transparent vapor at the mouth of the kettle is the true vapor of water, which is condensed into liquid drops by cooling ; but after being diffused through the air these drops evaporate and again become true vapor. Clouds, then, are not formed of true vapor, but consist of impalpable particles of liquid water floating or suspended in the air.

But we all know that clouds do not always fall as rain. In order that rain may fall the impalpable particles of water which form the cloud must collect into sensible drops large enough to fall to the earth. Two steps are therefore necessary to the formation of rain : the transparent aqueous vapor in the air must be condensed into clouds, and the material of the clouds must agglomerate into raindrops.

No physical fact is better established than that, under the conditions which prevail in the atmosphere, the aqueous vapor of the air cannot be condensed into clouds except by cooling. It is true that in our laboratories it can be condensed by compression. But, for reasons which I need not explain, condensation by compression cannot take place in the air. The cooling which results in the formation of clouds and rain may come in two ways.

Rains which last for several hours or days are generally produced by the intermixture of currents of air of different temperatures. A current of cold air meeting a current of warm, moist air in its course may condense a considerable portion of the moisture into clouds and rain, and this condensation will go on as long as the currents continue to meet. In a hot spring day a mass of air which has been warmed by the sun, and moistened by evaporation near the surface of the earth, may rise up and cool by expansion to near the freezing-point. The resulting condensation of the moisture may then produce a shower or thunder-squall. But the formation of clouds in a clear sky without motion of the air or change in the temperature of the vapor is simply impossible. We know by abundant experiments that a mass of true aqueous vapor will never condense into clouds or drops so long as its temperature and the pressure of the air upon it remain unchanged.

Now let us consider sound as an agent for changing the state of things in the air. It is one of the commonest and simplest agencies in the world, which we can experiment upon without difficulty. It is purely mechanical in its action. When a bomb explodes, a certain quantity of gas, say five or six cubic yards, is suddenly produced. It pushes aside and compresses the surrounding air in all directions, and this motion and compression are transmitted from one portion of the air to another. The amount of motion diminishes as the square of the distance; a simple calculation shows that at a quarter of a mile from the point of explosion it would not be one ten-thousandth of an inch. The condensation is only momentary; it may last the hundredth or the thousandth of a second, according to the suddenness and violence of the explosion; then elasticity restores the air to its original condition and everything is just as it was before the explosion. A thousand detonations can produce no more effect upon the air, or upon the watery vapor in it, than a thousand rebounds of a small boy's rubber ball would produce upon a stone wall. So far as the compression of the air could produce even a momentary effect, it would be to prevent rather than to cause condensation of its vapor, because it is productive of heat, which produces evaporation, not condensation.

The popular notion that sound may produce rain is founded principally upon the supposed fact that great battles have been followed by heavy rains. This notion, I believe, is not confirmed

by statistics ; but, whether it is or not, we can say with confidence that it was not the sound of the cannon that produced the rain. That sound as a physical factor is quite insignificant would be evident were it not for our fallacious way of measuring it. The human ear is an instrument of wonderful delicacy, and when its tympanum is agitated by a sound we call it a "concussion," when, in fact, all that takes place is a sudden motion back and forth of a tenth, a hundredth, or a thousandth of an inch, accompanied by a slight momentary condensation. After these motions are completed the air is exactly in the same condition as it was before ; it is neither hotter nor colder ; no current has been produced, no moisture added.

If the reader is not satisfied with this explanation, he can try a very simple experiment which ought to be conclusive. If he will explode a grain of dynamite, the concussion within a foot of the point of explosion will be greater than that which can be produced by the most powerful bomb at a distance of a quarter of a mile. In fact, if the latter can condense vapor a quarter of a mile away, then anybody can condense vapor in a room by slapping his hands. Let us therefore try slapping our hands, and see how long we must continue before a cloud begins to form.

What we have just said applies principally to the condensation of invisible vapor. It may be asked whether, if clouds are already formed, something may not be done to accelerate their condensation into raindrops large enough to fall to the ground. This also may be the subject of experiment. Let us stand in the steam escaping from a kettle and slap our hands. We shall see whether the steam condenses into drops. I am sure the experiment will be a failure ; and no other conclusion is possible than that the production of rain by sound or explosions is out of the question.

It must, however, be added that the laws under which the impalpable particles of water in clouds agglomerate into drops of rain are not yet understood, and that opinions differ on this subject. Experiments to decide the question are needed, and it is to be hoped that the Weather Bureau will undertake them. For anything we know to the contrary, the agglomeration may be facilitated by smoke in the air. If it be really true that rains have been produced by great battles, we may say with confidence that they were produced by the smoke from the burning powder rising into the clouds and forming nuclei for the agglom-

eration into drops, and not by the mere explosion. If this be the case, if it was the smoke and not the sound that brought the rain, then by burning gunpowder and dynamite we are acting much like Charles Lamb's Chinamen who practised the burning of their houses for several centuries before finding out that there was any cheaper way of securing the coveted delicacy of roast pig.

But how, it may be asked, shall we deal with the fact that Mr. Dyrenforth's recent explosions of bombs under a clear sky in Texas were followed in a few hours, or a day or two, by rains in a region where rain was almost unknown? I know too little about the fact, if such it be, to do more than ask questions about it suggested by well-known scientific truths. If there is any scientific result which we can accept with confidence, it is that ten seconds after the sound of the last bomb died away, silence resumed her sway. From that moment everything in the air—humidity, temperature, pressure, and motion—was exactly the same as if no bomb had been fired. Now, what went on during the hours that elapsed between the sound of the last bomb and the falling of the first drop of rain? Did the aqueous vapor already in the surrounding air slowly condense into clouds and raindrops in defiance of physical laws? If not, the hours must have been occupied by the passage of a mass of thousands of cubic miles of warm, moist air coming from some other region to which the sound could not have extended. Or was Jupiter Pluvius awakened by the sound after two thousand years of slumber, and did the laws of nature become silent at his command? When we transcend what is scientifically possible, all suppositions are admissible; and we leave the reader to take his choice between these and any others he may choose to invent.

One word in justification of the confidence with which I have cited established physical laws. It is very generally supposed that most great advances in applied science are made by rejecting or disproving the results reached by one's predecessors. Nothing could be farther from the truth. As Huxley has truly said, the army of science has never retreated from a position once gained. Men like Ohm and Maxwell have reduced electricity to a mathematical science, and it is by accepting, mastering, and applying the laws of electric currents which they discovered and expounded that the electric light, electric railway, and all other applications of electricity have been developed. It is by applying and

utilizing the laws of heat, force, and vapor laid down by such men as Carnot and Regnault that we now cross the Atlantic in six days. These same laws govern the condensation of vapor in the atmosphere; and I say with confidence that if we ever do learn to make it rain, it will be by accepting and applying them, and not by ignoring or trying to repeal them.

How much the indisposition of our government to secure expert scientific evidence may cost it is strikingly shown by a recent example. It expended several million dollars on a tunnel and water-works for the city of Washington, and then abandoned the whole work. Had the project been submitted to a commission of geologists, the fact that the rock-bed under the District of Columbia would not stand the continued action of water would have been immediately reported, and all the money expended would have been saved. The fact is that there is very little to excite popular interest in the advance of exact science. Investigators are generally quiet, unimpressive men, rather diffident, and wholly wanting in the art of interesting the public in their work. It is safe to say that neither Lavoisier, Galvani, Ohm, Regnault, nor Maxwell could have gotten the smallest appropriation through Congress to help make discoveries which are now the pride of our century. They all dealt in facts and conclusions quite devoid of that grandeur which renders so captivating the project of attacking the rains in their aerial stronghold with dynamite bombs

S. NEWCOMB.

CHILE AND HER CIVIL WAR.

BY CAPTAIN JOSÉ M^A. SANTA CRUZ, LATE COMMANDER OF THE
"HUASCAR."

CHILE had for more than half a century enjoyed peace and tranquillity within her borders, and her citizens, realizing that the uninterrupted progress and prosperity of their country were owing to this fact, were determined to maintain peace at any cost. They had before their eyes the example of their less fortunate sister republics in South America, whose slow development has been due to the instability caused by their frequent revolutions.

Mr. Balmaceda, who knew the Chilean citizens' inborn abhorrence of revolution, took advantage of it to abuse the powers conferred on him, and attacked the most cherished rights of the people, such as their right of public meeting, the liberty of the press, and their electoral right.

All our administrations under the rule of honest Presidents had been so free from corruption that we believed implicitly in the honesty and good faith of our magistrates; and it was not till we became convinced that Mr. Balmaceda was determined to name his own successor, in case he could not, even against constitutional provisions, perpetuate himself in office, that we came to suspect that his determination was prompted by his anxiety to screen himself from the exposure which would result in case his successor was freely elected by the people.

This insistence on the part of the President that he should name his successor was what led the different parties to unite against the President in order to insure to the people the free choice of their candidates.

The officers of the Chilean Navy, while they have always taken a deep interest in the welfare of their country, have always kept aloof from the ardent political conflicts. But there are

times when it is impossible for a citizen who loves his country to remain passive and indifferent, and the officers of the navy, whose principal duty it is to defend their country from the attack of foreign foes, felt on the 1st of January last that as the citizens of a republic they must defend her from the attack of her enemies from within. The constitution had been violated and trampled upon; it was their duty to uphold and defend it.

Our constitution provides that the strength of the naval and land forces must be fixed annually by Congress, and without such a law they can have no legal existence.

The President had deliberately closed Congress when it was assembled with the object of passing this law, and refused to summon it again for this purpose; and inasmuch as the law expired on the 31st of December, after this date neither the army nor navy could exist legally.

After the 1st of January those offending against military discipline were tried in accordance with the regulations, but the attorney general of the army gave a decision in which he declared that, inasmuch as the annual law had not been passed by Congress, these men could not be held by a military court.

The President endeavored to obtain from all the officers of the army their written pledges of unconditional support, and all who refused to give such pledges were imprisoned by order of Mr. Balmaceda. These officers then appealed to the Supreme Court, and the government did everything in its power to influence the court to deny its protection to these officers; but the purity of our judges was proof against such influence, and the court decided that the officers should be set at liberty, as they had committed no military offence, and at the same time sustained the attorney general by deciding that the army and navy had no legal existence.

The President, however, refused to obey the mandates of our Supreme Court, and closed it.

In the meantime the President issued a proclamation to the country, in which he declared that he would continue to spend the public moneys as he pleased, and would maintain the army and navy without the authorization of Congress. This was a direct violation of the constitution, and Congress, considering that this was one of the cases provided for in that instrument giving to it a right to declare the President incapable of holding

office, formally deposed him, and empowered Captain Montt, of the navy, to assume the command in order to reestablish constitutional order in the country.

A similar request was made to the army, but, unfortunately, Mr. Balmaceda had for a long time past been making his preparations for a *coup d'état*, and had imprisoned the leading officers who had not submitted to his dictation, and who would not lend their services to promote the ruin of their country.

The officers of the navy did not for a moment vacillate in obeying the orders of Congress. All they asked was that the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Deputies should establish themselves on board in order that they might act in conjunction with their commander in all that was necessary to secure the triumph of such a sacred cause.

In compliance with so just a petition, Señor Waldo Silva, vice-president of the Senate, and Señor Barros Luco, president of the Chamber of Deputies, came on board the fleet, and established a provisional junta, together with Captain Montt.

It was confidently believed that the army would join the navy in its patriotic efforts; and had this been the case, the President would have been forced to summon Congress to pass the necessary laws in order that the government might be conducted in a constitutional manner. Nothing, however, was further from the President's mind than the assembling of Congress: on the contrary he had determined to banish the most prominent leaders to Pascua Island, a Chilian possession 3,000 miles distant on the Pacific Ocean; and he had, with this in view, ordered the corvette "O'Higgins" to be fully provisioned and to hold herself in readiness to sail at a moment's notice, carrying away the leaders of Congress. This fact in itself produced the greatest indignation against the President, for the inviolability of Congressmen had ever been respected.

On the 7th of January the President published a manifesto in which he declared, without any attempt at concealment, that he would henceforth be a dictator, assuming all public power. He had little need to make such declaration, for he had practically been such from the 1st of January, when he had declared his determination to disburse the public funds according to his will.

Henceforth there was no respect for law and order; the

people's most sacred rights were everywhere violated; Senators and Representatives were thrown into prison, and those supposed to sympathize with the cause of Congress were subjected to the cruelest torture. The newspapers were closed; the right of meeting was not allowed to the citizens; the courts, the only guarantees of justice, were set aside, and martial law was proclaimed throughout the land.

It is not easy to imagine the indignation which these outrages produced in a country whose citizens had so long enjoyed the fullest liberty. Even those that had been to some extent indifferent were now aroused to the full significance of the calamity which had befallen their country through the vanity and criminality of a man whose head had been turned by the flattery of his partisans and by his evident desire to maintain his power.

The fleet which supported Congress was composed of the following vessels: the two ironclads "*Blanco Encalada*" and "*Almirante Cochrane*," the monitor "*Huascar*," the cruiser "*Esmeralda*," the corvette "*O'Higgins*," and the gunboat "*Magallanes*." The corvette "*Abtao*," at that time on a voyage of instruction for midshipmen, joined the fleet as soon as she arrived in Chili.

On the night of the 6th the "*Blanco*," "*Esmeralda*," and "*O'Higgins*" left the harbor of Valparaiso and went to Quinteros, twenty miles to the north, to join the "*Cochrane*" and "*Magallanes*," and there the fleet's support of Congress was ratified by all the crews.

The "*Huascar*" was left in Valparaiso because she was not seaworthy and was undergoing extensive repairs. On the following day an attempt was made by Balmaceda to restore her armament and to put her in a seagoing condition, in order, if possible, to make some resistance to the fleet.

Captain Montt saw that possession of her by the dictator might be a source of embarrassment to the fleet, and he therefore entered the bay, and, having manned a sufficient number of boats, she was taken and towed out, and, having been repaired, proved a most useful addition to the fleet, taking the port of Taltal and there obtaining funds as well as a good supply of arms and ammunition, which enabled the patriotic citizens of that place to form a battalion that was destined to lend the most efficient services in subsequent engagements.

There is probably no ironclad in existence which can boast such a glorious history as the "Huascar." She was originally constructed for the government of Peru. During an uprising in that country in May, 1877, she was taken by the insurgents, and, as the government was unable to capture her, it issued a decree calling her crew "rebels" and authorizing her capture. The "Huascar" seized some lighters of coal belonging to English citizens, and the British admiral, being advised of this, sent two English men-of-war, the "Shah" and the "Amethyst," to seize her. An engagement took place which was without result. During the engagement the "Shah" fired several Whitehead torpedoes against the "Huascar," which did not take effect, thus showing the difficulty of successfully using that instrument of war against a vessel in motion on the high seas. The "Huascar" successfully eluded her pursuers, and subsequently surrendered to the authorities.

In our late war with Peru and Bolivia she rendered efficient service, and was able to annoy our fleet, for, owing to her superior speed, she escaped capture at the hands of our slower ironclads.

Finally, at Angamos, she was entrapped and captured after a stubborn fight, in which she received forty-five eight-inch shells in her hull. This may be regarded as the first naval encounter between ironclads, and was useful for the lessons that could be derived therefrom, which were not without their application to future naval constructions. In the first place it showed that, although the upper compartments of the ship were entirely destroyed, she was able, after slight repairs had been effected, to make a voyage of 600 miles; it likewise demonstrated that the plan of a revolving turret such as she had was ineffective in rough seas. After undergoing repairs, she proved her usefulness to us in the future bombardments of the war.

Returning to our narrative of the civil war, we have to refer to the utterly unprepared condition of those favoring Congress. So unpremeditated a step found us without the elements of war, and the navy, though well equipped for a naval campaign, could not furnish our men with the elements of a campaign on land.

But nothing could daunt the courage of those who were fighting for the cause of freedom; they made the most of everything, and were able to undertake those movements on land which resulted so successfully and are a title of honor to our brave soldiers and sailors.

The movement was so unexpected that many of the officers who were on shore duty were in ignorance of it. The dictator did all in his power to prevent their joining the fleet, but most of them succeeded in escaping and joined the vessels.

The dictator, in order to prevent the army from joining the movement against him, trebled their salaries and appealed to them as against the navy, endeavoring to create a feeling of rivalry, such as has existed in many countries, by telling our soldiers that the men of the navy considered themselves superior to them.

The dictator had replaced the officers in command of the different regiments by those pledged to his support ; and our soldiers, although naturally brave, are unfortunately ignorant and docile and can be easily led.

A large number of the leading officers of the army, who had until then escaped imprisonment, managed to join the fleet, and to-day are leading our army.

From the first our expeditions by sea were fortunate, and we were able to obtain an abundant supply of provisions ; and everywhere men begged to be taken on board in order to fight in our cause. We were obliged to refuse many, because we had no arms to supply them with.

The want of muskets was the most serious difficulty we had to contend against, for, even counting some obtained in our expedition against Quinteros, we could muster only 400, including those on board the men-of-war. With this number we began our campaigns, and to-day we possess an army of more than 12,000 well-equipped men.

The transport " Amazonas " and the " O'Higgins " were sent to Coquimbo, the province where Balmaceda claimed unanimous support ; they landed sixty men and took possession of the whole province, thus enabling us to obtain an abundant supply of provisions and to form in two days the first constitutional regiment with the arms there found. Providence and the dictator were thus supplying our arms.

The " Cachapoal," one of our transports, went north and took possession of most of the ports on her way up. Everywhere our men were enthusiastically received, and the small garrisons stationed at those ports gladly changed their allegiance, and joined the ranks of those who were defending constitutional liberty in order to fight against the dictator and his tyranny.

The first serious encounter between our troops and those of the dictator took place on February 7 at Pisagua, where we gained a signal victory and took 150 soldiers, who that very day joined our ranks.

The next and most important event was the taking of Iquique, where our troops found about 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition which the troops of the dictator left behind in the hurry of their flight. This enabled us to fight the battle of Pozo Almonte, where our troops, although inferior in numbers, were able to obtain a magnificent victory, completely routing their opponents, thus leaving us in unmolested possession of the richest province in Chile.

We now organized our army and sent an expedition of 1,500 to take the province of Antofagasta, which was defended by 2,500 soldiers of the dictator, who took flight on the approach of our troops because the officers did not have faith in the men under their command; two companies deserted from the dictator's troops in order to fight on our side against the despotism which they abhorred.

Our next move was against Tacna, and there again at our approach the dictator's troops fled into Peruvian territory, where they gave up their arms. The troops that fled from Antofagasta escaped into the Argentine territory, having to cross the Andes twice in order to get back to the territory occupied by the dictator.

Being now in tranquil possession of three provinces, our government was formally organized on the 12th of April last at Iquique, in order that all our territory should be under one administration.

Soon after this we directed an expedition against the province of Atacama, where the troops of the dictator, following the examples of their companions in arms at Tacna and Antofagasta, made no resistance and fled to foreign territory.

It can be easily seen from the above that the Chilian soldiers under Balmaceda, brave as our soldiers are, appear to have made up their minds not to seriously oppose the advance of their brother soldiers that fight for liberty.

Being in undisputed possession of four provinces which it is impossible for Balmaceda to recapture, with a regularly-organized government, abundant revenues, and the enthusiasm of a people who are fighting in a good cause, Bolivia recognized our belliger-

ency, and we confidently believe that other governments will accord us "like recognition." To the people of the great country of freedom whose ancestors fought so bravely in defence of their threatened liberties, and who have ever given their generous sympathy to those who were struggling against tyranny and oppression, we confidently appeal, in the certainty that they will be no less generous in their sympathy for those of our countrymen who are to-day shedding their blood for the cause of freedom and good government.

AUGUST 9, 1891.

As some days will elapse before the publication of the above review of the situation in Chile prior to the fall of Balmaceda, I am indebted to the courtesy of the editor of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for being able to add a few words respecting the closing scenes of the struggle in Chile for the supremacy of right over might.

The apparent lull which succeeded the capture of the province of Atacama was owing to the necessity of organizing our army in Iquique; but unfortunately we had neither arms nor ammunition available.

The detention of the "Itata" in a port of the United States delayed our operations for nearly two months. In the meantime, however, our soldiers were being drilled with Manlicher rifles, of which we had a great number, but for which we had no ammunition.

On the 3d of July the transport "Maipu" arrived at Iquique with several thousand rifles, twenty-two cannon, four Krupp field batteries, and an immense amount of ammunition, not only for the arms she brought, but for the Manlicher rifles already in our possession. Iquique was wild with joy, and our approaching triumph was no longer problematical.

While the enthusiasm in Tarapaca was unbounded, and while our ranks might have been filled from that province alone, the Congress, always mindful of the requirements of the industries of the surrounding country, was constrained to refuse innumerable offers of service in our army. The province of Aconcagua, meanwhile, claimed the honor of furnishing two regiments, and asked only for arms. And it was owing to this that our first landing of troops was at Caldera, where a thorough organization of our

army could be made, and where we would be nearer the centre of operations and our objective point, Valparaiso. Furthermore, our being in Caldera obliged Balmaceda to reënforce his contingent in Coquimbo, thus weakening his own force in and around Valparaiso and Santiago.

Our preparations completed, our army embarked on the several vessels of war and transports, and made a successful landing at Quinteros, a small inlet twenty miles north of Valparaiso. It is impossible not to wonder at the courage—not to call it temerity—of an army of 8,000 men disembarking in that little port and ready and anxious to give battle to Balmaceda's 18,000 troops, apparently secure in their own intrenchments and officered by generals of well-tried experience.

The crossing of the river Aconcagua, under shelter of the guns of our vessels of war, made it evident to Balmaceda and his generals that we were in earnest, and they fell back on Valparaiso, near which city the bulk of their army was encamped.

During the following days there was much skirmishing, each side endeavoring to secure a vantage-ground, and then came the final battle, which is now part of history, and which gave us complete possession of Valparaiso, and twenty-four hours later of Santiago.

It was only when defeated that Balmaceda could reconcile himself to the fact that his much-vaunted popularity was a myth. Abandoned by his demoralized and mercenary soldiers, he and his late accomplices in the dictatorship succeeded in escaping from an outraged populace, and until now no one knows the whereabouts of the ex-President of Chile. Far from the scene of his early and honorable triumphs, in exile and in some foreign land, and tortured by remorse, he may pass the remnant of his life; and added to that remorse will be the crushing of his inordinate vanity and the never-dying remembrance of how he fell, like Lucifer, from his high pinnacle of power in a sovereign state to the lowest depths of ignominy.

SEPTEMBER 2, 1891.

JOSÉ M^A. SANTA CRUZ.

SPECULATION IN WHEAT.

BY B. P. HUTCHINSON.

SPECULATION in breadstuffs and grains has been, and is, the subject of a great deal of unreasonable legislation and sermonizing. There is a large class of would-be philanthropists who do not understand the facts or the first principles of what they are talking about. Now, in the first place, grain is a commodity, and every man has a right to buy and sell it. He has a right to buy it as cheap and sell it as dear as he can, and he must always buy and sell at the market price. This market price is the universal price all over the world on any given day, and no man or combination of men can stand up against it. They may take measures to influence it, but they cannot positively control it. It is too mighty, too immense. We can influence the water-power of Niagara; but let us find the man or men who can stop the cataract!

All operations in the grains benefit the grower, because they cause him to get his price paid sooner, and they are just as likely to put up prices as to depress them; therefore the average is maintained. But if there were no speculation, the farmers could only sell their grain to local buyers, who would be liable to get full and stop buying, and then the farmer would be compelled to wait for customers; and in the meantime a mortgage might be foreclosed on his farm, even while the wheat in his bins would more than satisfy the mortgage, if converted into cash. But speculation, flashing its news over the wires from one side of the world to the other, keeps the market always open to him. Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, practically lay down gold dollars on the threshold of the most remote barn in Dakota; and all this just because these cities furnish busy speculators, whose brains and knowledge command the moneyed resources of the whole

United States so far as wanted, and so far as every dollar is represented by standard grain at the market price, less a fair margin for the bankers.

Grain operations benefit the consumer also ; because when there is an excess of breadstuffs, a low price stimulates consumption and gives him a big loaf ; and when there is a deficit, a high price enforces economy and teaches him to eat more potatoes and esculent roots and less bread, and thus to give his neighbor a chance at the loaf. In plentiful times men are apt to waste flour. When there is a short crop, then speculation in the form of capital—provident, thrifty capital, the daughter of economy and the sworn enemy of wastefulness—steps in, takes the precious wheat, and says : “ Now each of you inhabitants of the planet can have your share, and as much as is good for you ; but these are times of dearth, and in order to keep you from using more than your proper share, the price must be raised on you.” This follows from a wise law of trade—which we cannot do away with, and ought not to try to do away with—that scarce things must be dear. Make the loaf small and dear if the crop is small ; then no one will waste it. Diamonds are small and dear, and no one wastes them ; but a man can fling diamonds into the sea with a better conscience than he can waste bread when the world is hungry.

We do not really know how wise capital is in dealing with food until we put an extreme case. Suppose there were but one bushel of wheat in the world, and a parcel of hungry men were fighting for it, to eat it, and thus ignorantly destroy the future food crops of the planet. Capital steps in and lays its hands on the bag and says : “ The price of this bushel of wheat is five hundred millions of dollars.” This disperses the small hungry mob, and saves humanity in its total. That bushel of wheat, if really the only surviving bushel, would be worth more than Manhattan Island with every building on it full of merchandise. This is an extreme case, but the principle holds good. Capital guards against waste and protects the future of the people. It is like a strong soldier with a shield guarding a city gate against marauders. And speculation is only another name for capital in active motion.

If the Russian Czar has forbidden the export of rye from his dominions, he is strictly within his rights, if he is indeed the father of his people, as he claims to be ; but this measure is tem-

porary. Other countries will get through the season without it, and their people will be encouraged to till more acres and raise more rye. Russia will have an unsold surplus and will have lost valuable customers. This is a general way of looking at it ; we do not know all the particulars. The report of the Czar's ukase has made richer every American farmer who has rye on hand, and also every miller and dealer who has it. And the bakers still furnish the usual-sized loaves of rye bread for five and ten cents. A number of worthy people have been benefited, and no one has been hurt ; at least in the United States. People who sold rye futures short have lost money, but that is a business risk, and if they do not grumble, the public is not called upon to shed tears over their losses.

I was connected with a big movement in grain in September, 1888. That movement raised prices and diminished the size of loaves until the next crop. There was a short crop in the United States and Canada that year ; wheat had been hammered down to seventy cents or thereabouts, during two or three years previous, and it seemed only fair to give the farmers a chance. The farmers did not get all the profit of the rise, but they got a good deal, probably their fair share. Labor must not grudge a division with capital. It takes capital to move and market the products of labor ; and both are entitled to receive wages.

I have studied this subject closely and for a long time ; and if farmers are hostile to boards of trade and futures, in my opinion they are mistaken. The speculator it is who is bitten and gets hurt nine times out of ten. Look back fifty years. How many have gone where the woodbine twineth, as "Jim" Fisk said. There is still one speculator, gigantic in schemes, though small of body, who, when his counsel asked him, "Well, how far do you want to go with this thing ?" replied : "To any extent that does n't land me in the penitentiary." What do you think of operations that just graze the door of the penitentiary ? But you cannot overissue grain. You must deliver or go broke. Dishonest dealings in grain are almost impossible, but many of the speculators fail to fulfill their contracts. The farmers do not lose by such men. A speculator fails and his margins are wiped out, but the owner of a thousand bushels of wheat has got his wheat, and wheat is still another name for cash at the board of trade.

When the operator overdoes things, the penalty follows closely. I once figured that under no circumstances could more than three millions of bushels of wheat be tendered to me on my contracts for September. On the last day of the month, over and above the three millions, came three hundred and thirty thousand bushels, and it was just this, and not the other, that seemed excessive. Wheat from St. Louis and from Detroit met that day and poured down on my shoulders! Mr. Cleveland paid me a fine compliment without intending to do so. Some Ohio men sent a delegation to Washington to get Harper, of the defunct Fidelity Bank, out of the penitentiary. "Ben" Butterworth (now secretary of the World's Fair) was spokesman. He said to the President: "Harper didn't do anything different from Mr. Hutchinson in September grain; he tried to corner the market." Mr. Cleveland looked at him. "Oh yes," he said, "I see a difference: Mr. Hutchinson used his own money, not that of depositors and stockholders. An owner differs from a trustee."

Let us look for a moment at conditions which must please every good American citizen, and tend to make him feel proud of his country. The farms of our great Northwest may not go on feeding Europe forever; they will be better employed in furnishing bread for the immense population that will occupy, before many years, the territory between the Mississippi and the Atlantic. The South will raise more wheat and corn ultimately, but, after all, the Northwest will always help feed the Southwest and the East.

Minneapolis is the great primary home market for choice wheat. That city turns out more barrels of flour than any other milling place of the world. Minneapolis now excels Buda-Pesth in eastern Germany (Austro-Hungary) as a flour-producer. Until lately Buda-Pesth was the star milling city of the planet; now Minneapolis eclipses her. Minneapolis was settled by New England men. One of the brightest and most famous of these millers, Charles Pillsbury, whose flour is equal to the best in the world, came from Swanzey, in Cheshire County, N. H., in which rustic old town Denman Thompson located the scenes of the "Old Homestead."

As to the outlook in all directions, leaving out Asia and Africa: the grain crops of Germany are short; France undoubtedly short; Great Britain will not reap an average; and Russia

short—not a usual amount for export. But I never yet have seen a short crop that was not disappointing to those who look for absolute famine. Unexpected supplies turn up in unlooked-for quarters. There are numbers of small and far-seeing farmers who secretly hoard grain against short seasons. These supplies will all come out this year and mitigate the dearth.

South America will have from the Argentine Republic a surplus of perhaps 30,000,000 bushels. For this Brazil would seem to be the most natural customer, but the Argentines are so deeply in debt to England and British traders are so powerful in Buenos Ayres that probably England will get it all. The United States will therefore continue to supply Brazil with flour, and she will pay with bills on London drawn at Rio. Our direct trade with Brazil mainly consists in paying her cash for coffee. Reciprocity does not yet amount to much as to Brazil.

The United States beyond all dispute has an enormous crop. At the time when I write these lines the wheat berry is beyond danger from frost, insect, or mildew ; and corn nearly so. Corn will not be an excessive crop. Oats are unusually heavy in weight ; they will average one-quarter heavier than last year. That is clear gain of nourishment, and therefore of value.

No one can accurately state how many bushels of wheat we shall export, but we can supply all deficiencies and money will flow freely to us from Europe, if we do not put our prices too high. There is such a thing as charging more for a loaf of bread than the average customer can pay. We must not forget that the working classes everywhere are the main consumers of bread ; and these people have only their wages to spend. We might, if excessively greedy of money, drive them to using substitutes, and that would be bad for both sides. In the interior of Cuba, San Domingo, and Brazil the poorer classes never see bread at all ; they make a cake of yucca or cassava roots, and that is their bread. It is a farinaceous food, and it answers because it *has* to answer. The Scandinavian peasants mix half flour and half ground tree-bark in their loaf. If we crowd them too hard, they can go through one season on one-quarter flour and three-quarters bark. These facts must be considered by our dealers and speculators.

Some of the reasons why we supply Europe are these : We have a new soil and plenty of acreage. We use implements that

cheapen the cost of production and make the labor of harvesting seem like the sport of the fairies in the story-book. A large farmer, for instance Oliver Dalrymple, who has a world-wide reputation, gets up early in the morning and starts from ten to forty reapers. The field may occupy from five hundred to five thousand acres, smooth and level. Each reaper cuts and binds. That field has a different look at evening. The farmer states that after the grain from these fields is threshed out it costs him about thirty cents a bushel, with a good yield. "Dollar wheat" at Minneapolis, or Lake Superior City, or Duluth, means a great deal to this farmer.

English syndicates have invested largely in flour-production in the Northwest. They are interested in the great Minneapolis mills, which are among the industrial triumphs of the nineteenth century. There are also syndicates that carry on the business of buying wheat throughout the back country, storing it in elevators, and sending it to the mills as needed. These syndicates are backed by practically unlimited capital; and since they always have money, or grain to show for their money, their credit is above question.

There is no doubt that gold will come to the United States from Europe in exchange for grain. Some writers say that Europe will send us goods instead of money; but goods are not legal-tender, and I do not see why we should take goods as payment unless we want such kind of payment. This money will permeate all the channels of business, create great prosperity, and stimulate all sorts of speculation, healthy and unhealthy. A great many people will have money who do not know how to use it; therefore they will lose it. These sums of money, as they are being tossed about hither and thither, will eventually become lodged in the hands of men who know how to get and to keep capital. The years 1891-92, with their wheat crop, will represent a memorable era in trade history.

B. P. HUTCHINSON.

NEW LIFE IN CHINA.

BY THE HON. JOHN RUSSELL YOUNG, FORMERLY UNITED STATES
MINISTER TO CHINA.

MUCH is written in these current days about China. Stories of misadventure, riot, and misfortune ; of secret societies ; of a revival of the Tae Ping rebellion ; of plots against the dynasty ; of the harrying of the poor devoted missionaries ; the sad lesson devolving upon them, as it has devolved upon many holy men who have gone before them—that those who follow the cross must, on occasion, bear the cross ; sporadic unrest throughout the empire ; appeals to domestic patriotism against the foreign devil ; and—what concerns the American more than anything else—the steady diminution of American influence, until the flag, which in the days of Burlingame had the prestige almost of a protectorate in Peking, which at one time was the dominant flag in Chinese commerce, has no authority beyond certain domestic offices at the consulates and legation. We may well ask what it means ! I should call it the awakening of the new life in China.

“The European war,” said John T. Delane, the late eminent editor of the *London Times*, at the close of the late conflict between Germany and France, “has minimized Continental events for a long time. Asia is now the field. The coming question will be Asiatic. It belongs to the next generation. I should advise my younger friends to bend their thoughts in that direction. It may come with the youngest and the oldest civilizations—the United States and China—face to face ! It may come with Russia as an important factor. But it will come, and there is more involved in its solution than in any apparent Continental issue now.”

The fading-away of American influence in China, our first immediate interest in studying these phenomena, is not to be viewed without concern. The failure of Russell & Co., the

latest news from China of special import to us, is not alone a mere commercial incident. The Russells went back to the early part of the century, to the time when Astor and Girard were in the China trade, when the East India Company was a political as well as a commercial power. From the Russell enterprises came some of the great fortunes of modern commerce. Because of their commercial genius the American flag has been seen in every part of China. They saved Chinese prestige when it was threatened by France. There was a time, and that not far away, when China would not have permitted the failure of this house any more than the English money power would have permitted the failure of the Barings. It was when China, pressed by French invasions in Annam, restless under German aggression at Swatow, fearing Russian encroachments on the Mongolian frontier, and apprehensive that England might make Port Hamilton, in the North, what Hong Kong had been so long in the South, saw in the United States the one strong power whose advice could by no chance be inimical to her interests, and in a venerable and far-seeing American house a commercial representative of American ideas.

I have seen no reason to attribute the Russell failure to the caprice or emergency of commerce. There are houses like those of the Barings and the Rothschilds that cannot be permitted to fail, at least for purely commercial reasons. The house of Russell belonged to this category. There were two influences only that could have destroyed it: one was the opposition of British interests; the other, the decay of American influence because of the indifference or animosity of China.

The antagonism of British interests is, I presume, to be expected in the East, at all events upon the theory that sentiment has no place in business. The student of our American financial system cannot fail to note the curious fact that while American policy, American money, and American financial influence have been concentrated upon the advancement of British commercial power in the West, British policy, British money, and British financial influence are prompt towards the destruction of American commercial power in the East. It was only the other day when the resources of the United States were strained and business embarrassed to save the London money market from the consequences of London follies in the Argentine Republic. And

yet at the time when the firm hand of New York was steadying the reeling credit of London the hand of London was tearing down the American flag from the last of our great establishments in the East. Under any just appreciation of what belonged to American prestige on the Pacific, with any reasonable protection from the government, with a fraction of the aid, moral and otherwise, which Great Britain bestows upon her interests all over the world, and especially in China, this disaster, political as well as commercial, would never have taken place.

Why should China have permitted what is for the present the extinction of American commercial influence in the East? In 1885 the American flag was on every coast and in every navigable stream of China, covering the largest commercial fleet in the East. That represented the good feeling between the two nations. Now it may be found, if at all, upon some poor forlorn petroleum tramp steamer edging its way towards unfriendly wharves. Let the answer be found in the fact that in our dealings with China we have maintained a policy of contumely which finally has awakened perhaps the last emotion to be aroused in the Oriental mind—the emotion of self-respect. Take the emigration question. There has never been a time when China would not have gone further to suppress emigration than our extreme friends in California could have demanded. We must, however, impugn the good faith of the Chinese in carrying out a policy which they themselves initiated and volunteered, and treat them in a manner that any other power would have regarded as an invitation to war. We must do this, and at the same time expect from China the benefits of amity and a complete harmonious understanding.

Let me illustrate our persistence in this strange, perverse policy. A recent Washington decree directs that any person of a presumably Chinese origin who does not possess certain tokens or papers shall be returned to China as “the country from which he came.” It was at one time within my personal knowledge, and I have learned of no official evidence to the contrary, that there was no record in any executive department of Washington of a Chinaman coming to the United States from China. From British possessions, like the Straits Settlements, where their kinsmen have lived for a century or two; from the Dutch colonies in Java; from Hong Kong, as much of a

British possession as Londonderry,—but in no instance from China. Have we any right, then, to send to China people who have abandoned that country and the protection of its flag? Would we return presumable Englishmen to Liverpool who had come to us from Havana or St. Thomas, because they were apparently of the Anglo-Saxon race? Would England permit it, or allow to pass without protest an executive order which, with the knowledge in executive departments that Englishmen did not come to the United States, could deport whoever were supposed to be Englishmen to Great Britain?

This may be a small, perhaps a technical, matter—a trifle to come between nations. But history shows that nations—wayward as women or children—are rarely disturbed except by small things. The trifle is the spark, and the spark soon becomes the flame. If there are reasons, the gravity of which I admit, which lead us to select the Chinese as the one Asiatic race that may not come to the United States; to welcome the Malay, the Arabian, the Hebrew, the Hindoo, the Japanese; to permit easy and unrestrained access, with special protection even, to the subtlest commercial intellects of Bombay and Constantinople, Jerusalem and Osaka, but to forbid those who come from Canton,—if such reasons exist, they may be explained, and with entire truth, as an indirect compliment to the intellectual power of the Chinese artificer and merchant. But having secured our restrictions and limitations, having done so with the assent of China, is there not every reason why we should maintain the closest political and commercial relations? The Chinese are our nearest neighbors. The ocean between us is not as wide as the ocean to Liverpool twenty years ago. China craves as necessities our cotton goods and petroleum. The cotton grows on our plantations; the petroleum comes from our caverns. There is no reason why the entire China trade, under a judicious system of political sympathy, might not be one of the most valuable assets in the sum of American maritime greatness. We have but to show China that we have no American interest in the East, aside from the Sandwich Islands, so near to us as the autonomy of her empire; that her independence is essential to our commercial strength in the Pacific; we have but to promulgate Monroe Doctrine in the East upon the lines laid down by Quincy Adams as pertinent to the Gulf of Mexico and the South American republics, to have

a moral weight in her destinies which no other power could hope to emulate or venture successfully to deny.

About the time the emigration business was coming to a head, and we were trying as well as we could to arrange the treaty of Mr. Trescot and Mr. Angell, we had our experiment with Corea. Since Solouque became Emperor of Hayti, with his Count of Marmalade, his Duke of Lemonade, and other fantastic creations, to the amusement of the cynical world, we have had no diplomatic travesty so grotesque as this in Corea. To us Corea should be as much a part of the Chinese Empire as Maine is a part of the United States. Our "treaty" with Corea was the transcript of an instrument dictated by the Chinese viceroy at Tientim. The convention itself recognized a dependence upon China as absolute as that of Massachusetts upon the republic. It was thought that Japan would be pleased to have Corea independent, or under her protectorate even, although I never knew a Japanese statesman who did not regard the ocean as a barrier as welcome against China as it is to England against the Continent. Russia was the only nation that could be served by an autonomous Corea, and the practical effect of the treaty was to place the United States in the position of an active instrument for the furtherance of Russian intrigue in Asia. This opinion, strengthened in China with so many abundant opportunities of observation, is confirmed by recent intelligence. A correspondent of the *New York Times*, writing from Shanghai on July 2, 1891, says: "Russian political agents have been steadily but secretly at work, for some time, throughout the entire peninsula, gradually preparing the people for the rule of the Czar"; and "Corea will pass from the list of the kingdoms of Asia and will become a province of the mighty Russian Empire."

When the substance of this proposed treaty was shown to me by Mr. Frelinghuysen in 1882, I expressed to that statesman the views I am now writing, and which I have never ceased to hold. In this opinion I was sustained by the illustrious authority of General Grant. The treaty, however, was signed precipitately, before I could reach Japan, and since then we have had no more difficult problem than this of Corea in our relations with China. The comedy of a mission to that country, of an actual legation there, of military experts to organize the Korean army, of a diplomatic adviser to direct the foreign affairs of the kingdom—all of

this would have been merry enough in one of the operas of Mr. Offenbach or Mr. Gilbert, or as a bit of *Soulouquerie* unrivalled ever since the poor old Haytian blackamoor with his *Lemonades* and *Marmalades* vanished amid undissuadable laughter. Amusing as it was, unhappily our relations with China were a most serious business. Whatever there was to us of negro minstrelsy and opera bouffe in our relations with Corea, to China it meant the shadow of the Great White Czar, moving towards a destiny ominous to China—moving under the inspiration and authority of the United States.

The policy of General Grant to which allusion is here made, and which governed the instructions with which I was honored by Mr. Frelinghuysen when I was in the diplomatic service, was based upon a careful study of the eastern question amid advantages such as no other foreigner ever enjoyed. It was a policy developed after careful study and confidential conversations with the Prince Regent and ministers of China, the Emperor and ministers of Japan. It was my privilege to be present at these interviews, and to know how deeply the ex-President was impressed by what he heard and saw. "What I would give," he said to me one afternoon at Enriokwan, as, walking in the gardens of the Emperor, we looked out upon the sea, "—what I would give to have known ten years ago what I know to-day!" What might he have given indeed, and what might America have given, had the just, intrepid policy towards the eastern nations which the genius of Grant evolved from the political conditions of the Pacific found fruition and encouragement, or been governed by his firm, enlightened will! In that lay the solution of the emigration question upon terms that would have satisfied all reasonable interests, no matter how conflicting; the maintenance of that commercial supremacy so necessary to our Pacific empire; the peaceful trending, under enlightened guidance, of the surplus populations of the Middle Empire towards the vast islands and continents wherein they could have the opportunity our own races have found in America and Australasia. There would have been no *Soulouquerie* in Corea, no hauling down the flag from our great establishments in the East. Hand in hand the oldest and the youngest of civilizations could have pursued their destiny, the genius of antiquity resting upon and strengthened by the genius of youth.

I presume this will be called a dream, even if it comes from the calmest and strongest head known in these modern American days. What General Grant, however, expressed in the freedom and vividness of personal intercourse, was spoken no less in public addresses wherein he weighed every word. "America," he said in one public speech, delivered to a company of Oriental noblemen, and memorable for the impression it made at the time, "—America has great interests in the East. She is your next-door neighbor. She is more affected by the eastern populations than any other power. She can never be insensible to what is doing here." "America has much to gain in the East; no nation has greater interests; but America has nothing to gain except what comes from the cheerful acquiescence of the eastern people and insures them as much benefit as it does us. I should be ashamed of my country if its relations with other nations, and especially with these ancient and most interesting empires in the East, were based upon any other idea."

And, again, upon an occasion even more memorable, when taking leave of the Emperor of Japan, General Grant addressed His Majesty in these weighty words: "It is my sincere desire to see Japan realize all possible strength and greatness, to see her as independent of foreign rule or dictation as any western nation now is, and to see affairs so directed by her as to command the respect of the civilized world." The importance attached to this declaration by General Grant may be inferred from the fact that before seeing the Emperor he wrote his speech. I was with him at the time and read these words from his manuscript.

If, therefore, it be a dream, it was that of an intrepid, original, wise man, impressed with what he saw, with the new and strange conditions surrounding Oriental life, its perplexities and its hopes, its helplessness as that of childhood, its strength with the matured wisdom of many centuries; now and then bursting upon you with an appalling sense of knowledge and power. He had seen India and what men of our race have done in the forging of that vast empire. He had seen Egypt and what the same men were trying to do in that strange, mysterious, pathetic land. He had seen that, for every material advantage given to India, something of artistic, spiritual value—higher, perhaps, than material advantage—had been taken away. He had seen the art, the poetry, the culture, the sen-

timent of ingenious races stamped out under the influence of the sword and the spinning-jenny; he had seen how an empire was governed in Calcutta and Bombay for dividends and pensions in London; he was to see the swift progress in Japan of a "civilization" which might in time be a blessing, but thus far had shown only the symptoms of a disease; and he respected, as no one who looks deeply and sympathetically into the matter can fail to respect, the proud reserve of China, which prefers the traditions of the ages to the experiments of a day, which will not exchange the morals of Confucius for those of the *London Times*, and whose civilization when it moves will do so with the slow strength of the glacier, and not the turbulence of the rushing stream.

The beginning of the new movement in China, the awakening of the new life which, to my mind, underlies so many of the sporadic conditions of present unrest in the empire, may be attributed to the influence and personal character of Li Hung Chang, the Viceroy of the northern provinces, and virtual Prime Minister. From his Yamen come the ideas which slowly permeate the empire. When I was familiar with China, Tientsin, the home of the Viceroy, was ever the centre of a unique and progressive authority. The atmosphere of the Viceroy's Yamen was different from that of Canton, Foo Chow, Wuchang, or elsewhere. To pass from Hankow to Tientsin was like coming from China of the middle ages to what one might call the China of the nineteenth century. The personal qualities of the Viceroy had much to do with it. "I have seen," said General Grant to me on one occasion, "four great men in my journey—Bismarck, Beaconsfield, Gambetta, and Li Hung Chang. I am not sure that Li is not the greatest of the four." A friendship—I might say an intimacy—with the Viceroy for some years confirmed with me an opinion akin to this of General Grant. A strong, positive, dominant nature, with a firm will, an irascible temper, he had seen much of the foreigner, and—what the earnest Chinaman never thinks of doing—had adjusted the perspective, as it were, between his own and foreign lands. He had governing qualities. The soft, tranquil nature, the morrow and ever the morrow temperament which marks the Oriental, was foreign to him. Unlike any other Chinese statesman whom I then knew, he believed in war and in preparation for war. The one question which seemed to interest him was the military possibilities

of the empire. The one ruler who impressed his imagination was Grant, because he saw in him the soldier. Although a singularly accomplished man, and in times of peace assured of advancement even in China, where education means promotion, he had risen by arms and believed in arms. Almost the first wish he ever expressed to me was that the American government would allow him to send some Chinese lads to Annapolis and West Point, and it was hard to explain that the doors to these academies might open to Japanese and young gentlemen from South America, but not to Chinamen. It was his assured purpose, he told me, to have in China schools modelled upon the West Point and Annapolis principles, and he had gone so far as to have selected some point on the Yangtze near Nanking for the military and Chefoo for the naval station.

The incentive to these purposes was the war with France. This sad, mournful business, known in France as "the Tonquin incident," did more than any other agency to bring about the new life in China. I had bitter feelings on the subject at the time of the war, but I feel that I am speaking the better opinion of France when I say that nothing could have been more unfortunate for the republic. In every respect so causeless, so selfish, so much a violation of the elementary principles of international honesty, so indefensible from any point of view, its injustice sank deep into the Chinese mind, and injured every foreign interest in the empire. The fatuity of the French was shown in nothing so much as in sending as one of their representatives, with special plenipotentiary powers, a gentleman who had "won distinction in Egypt." To suppose that a political education acquired among the fellaheen of the Nile and Levantine merchants would avail against the subtle rulers of a most patient people, of a race upon whom the severest blows of conquerors who had almost conquered the world had made no more impression than so many blows upon the impalpable waves, foreshadowed the discomfiture of France. Although with the moral support of Germany, upon the astute Bismarck theory that the more Frenchmen there were in the swamps of Tonquin the fewer there would be on the Rhine; with the strong support of England, based upon the masterful, earnest character of England's great minister, Sir Harry Parkes; with Russia in sympathy, the paw of the bear slowly moving prone towards Corea,

with no aid but the indirect moral support of the United States, to whom the autonomy of China was of more concern than the political exigencies of Jules Ferry,—France was worsted. With that victory came the renaissance. I remember the eloquent fervor with which Li Hung Chang on one occasion summed up the situation ; remember well his arraignment of foreign policies towards China, his resentment even towards American opinion,—the only time his temper ever led him upon that theme,—and his resolution to work without pausing until when China spoke it would be as other nations—with the hand on the hilt of the sword.

It was my duty about this time to make a tour of the open ports of China and inspect the consulates. There were public reasons—as much as any others the temper shown by the Viceroy—why special courtesies should be interchanged with the minor officials in the empire. The late Admiral John Lee Davis accompanied me, to that end, on board of the “Enterprise” man-of-war. At Canton, Foochow, Hankow, and other points there were functions given by us in honor of viceregal and other authorities. When possible, these assumed the form of a reception on board the man-of-war, men at general quarters, a drill, an inspection of the ship. Thus we would show something of our naval armaments, what discipline could do, what China perhaps might have to fear in the event of war. Among other such exhibitions was one at Shanghai before Li Hung Chang, at which His Excellency assisted for a couple of hours, and was shown every naval possibility. At Ningpo we entertained an official, his grade subordinate to that of a Viceroy, an amiable and able mandarin who studied the drill of the “Enterprise,” and heard with satisfaction the admiral’s exposition of the functions and the power and sweep of his artillery. We returned the call in state—admiral and staff in full dress—and were received with those delicate attentions which the Chinese know so well how to bestow. Ceremonies well under way, the mandarin asked the admiral if he would like to inspect the Chinese troops and see them drill. An infantry battalion was put through the manual of arms ; English the word of command, English tactics, the drill elaborate and minute, embracing all that was required of an infantry soldier. To the eyes of the writer, a layman, nothing seemed more perfect as a bit of mechanism, alertness, skill, obedience, intelligence—a human machine, as the drilled battalion

should be. To the admiral it came as a revelation. "To think," he said to me afterwards, "that I actually gave that Chinaman a drill on board my ship to show how the thing was done, and now he gives me a drill to show me that his soldiers know more than my people could teach them." This, Admiral Davis said, was the most impressive incident he had seen in China.

What that conscientious and distinguished officer saw at Ningpo, what made this morning drill in the quadrangle of a Chinese Yamen impressive, was this: Here before him was the unit. Here around him were the infinite possibilities to which that unit might multiply. The military unit in Germany, in France, in the United States—we know what may come of that. But what imagination dare conceive to what this Chinese unit might grow from the infinite resources of this prodigious empire, once that its faculty of growth turned, like that of its neighbors, towards war?

Some of the possibilities of this military unit, as we saw it, may be understood when we remember the part the ancestors of these soldiers have played in the affairs of men. When England was resting under papal interdicts and King John was content to be a papal vassal, the armies of Genghis Khan were surging over China where Li Hung Chang now reigns; over Honan and the countries of the Upper Yangtze; over Shangtung, the cradle of Confucius, to threaten India, and hold Asia Minor. Under another chief of the same race, even his grandson, Timour, Persia and Asia Minor were conquered, Syria occupied, Moscow threatened, India invaded, Delhi taken, and even Europe menaced with invasion. The two most important events since the Christian era—that is to say, the Mongol invasion under Genghis Khan in the thirteenth and of Timour in the fourteenth century, with, among other consequences, the Turkish occupation of eastern Europe—had an illustration in the Yamen of Ningpo. They were of the seed from which had come the harvest of terror, conquest, and rapine. The soldiers whose bearing and drill excited the wonder of an American admiral were of the race which had marched from Peking to the Danube. Behind them were over four hundred millions. The admiral felt the presence of a military power that could well become greater than that of combined Europe—of a power which, unlike that of Europe, was dis-

turbed neither by dynastic troubles nor the abrasions of contending races, but homogeneous, docile, brave, with the same religion, manners, and customs, serving the one master, not with that perfunctory sentiment in some countries called loyalty to a flag, and in others loyalty to a family, but serving him as a master, sacred, supreme, to them the Lord of the universe, the very Son of Heaven.

Truly, as Mr. Delane said, "The coming question will be Asiatic. It belongs to the next generation." "It may be that the oldest and the youngest of civilizations, face to face, America and China, will settle it, or it may come in some other form." Come it will! And no one could have stood in that quadrangle at Ningpo without feeling that again, as before, Europe might anticipate from Asia another of those movements which have changed the face of empires and menaced the dignity of civilization.

JOHN RUSSELL YOUNG.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE YACHT.

BY LEWIS HERRESHOFF.

ABOUT ten years ago it became painfully evident to the American yachtsman that the style of craft then in general use was not the best form for speed or for desirable qualities of safety and reliability in manœuvring.

It is true that "the skimming-dish" had served and still serves an excellent purpose, for it fills local demands that no other style of vessel will answer, namely, in navigating shallow bays and inlets that may be found on our coast, from which the deeper yacht would be wholly barred.

It must also be said in favor of the old American type of yacht that its first cost was not more than half of the present lead-laden structure, and had the recently-adopted form been earlier in style, many would have been constrained to forego the pleasures and healthful recreation of yachting. It may be said in excuse of the general use of a class of vessel now thought undesirable (in addition to low cost) that the large deck and roomy cabin afforded gave a degree of comfort not found in later designs, and the remarkable infrequency of stormy weather and rough water on our entire coast during the yachting season allured our yachtsmen into the prolonged use of a style of vessel now known to be in essential qualities vastly inferior.

In England, yacht-designing has developed under wholly different conditions both as to the state of the surrounding water and the rules governing the classification of yachts in racing; there "beam" has been heavily taxed, while here no restriction has been placed on the width of our racing craft.

Stormy, rough seas wash the coast of the British Isles, and but a small expanse of really inland protected waters can be found that afford sufficient sailing or cruising ground.

The result, then, has been that the forms of yachts in England and America became as unlike as the conditions by which they are surrounded. In the following table the general dimensions of the extreme type of two English and two American yachts are compared; and this also shows the difficulty of classification of English and American yachts for racing, and, indeed, of any comparison of desirable qualities :

	Designer.	Length over all.	Breadth.
		W. L.	Draught.
"Fannie".....	Richmond..... 1874.	73' 8"	23' 3"
"Tara".....	J. Beavor-Webb....	66' 7"	6' 0"
"Chittywee".....	J. Ash..... 1882.	66' 02"	11' 6"
"Climax".....	Wheeler.....	31' 5"	12' 0"
		28' 3"	4' 9"
		26' 2"	7' 0"
			13' 0"
			2' 6"

The performances of the English cutter "Madge" in our waters brought the first realization of the fact that we were on the wrong track. The cutter "Clara," also from England, repeated and emphasized the work of the "Madge," so that when the "Genesta" challenged for the famous Queen's cup, it appeared very probable that she might carry it home.

At this juncture Burgess appeared, and saved our reputation in yachting circles by the splendid work of his "Puritan"; and when her performance was repeated by his "Mayflower," the tide of new designing set in, and the success of the compromise model was assured; and when the "Volunteer" defeated the "Thistle" it was recognized to be the most remarkable feat in the history of yachting.

In the new type of yacht, which, after our successes in the three great international contests, was a "compromise" between the American and English design, are combined what are believed to be the best in each—a measure of the extreme depth of the foreign craft and the modified beam of the native yacht.

In the three years following the success of the "Volunteer," the 30- and latterly the 40-foot class were thoroughly exploited in a struggle to beat the "Minerva," the finest type of English cutter that ever visited our shores. She proved well-nigh invincible, but at last Burgess with his "Gossoon" broke the spell, and the "Minerva" was finally beaten. The current year,

however, has witnessed the climax of yacht-designing in the magnificent class of 46-footers, which have awakened more general and deserved interest than any equal number of craft have ever aroused either at home or abroad.

The interest in this class has been intense from its very conception, and as keel after keel was laid down, adding a new member to the number, speculation began to be heard on all sides as to the probable chances of winning.

Of the eight yachts added to the 46-foot class during the current year, four were designed by Burgess, and one each by Paine, of Boston, Herreshoff, of Rhode Island, Winteringham, of Brooklyn, and Fife, of Scotland. For the most part they possess no marked difference in general proportions, and as a rule adhere to old lines, presenting but slight modifications of form from the most successful boats of recent construction.

The centreboard, always considered an essential adjunct in an American racing craft, has nearly disappeared in this class of racers; but one yacht can boast of the honor, if honor it be, of perpetuating the old custom. But it must be said in her praise that she stands either second or third in her class, and so far the vexed question of which is the better for speed, a keel or a centreboard, is unanswered.

The centreboard possesses the inalienable advantage, which it always will continue to hold, of materially lessening the draught of water of the vessel that employs it. Were the same proportional depth found in the keel 46-footers as in yachts of the 90-foot class, their draught of water would be so abnormally great that they would be practically shut out of most of our popular harbors. It is thought, then, wise practice to retain the use of the centreboard in yachts of the largest class. In making a just comparison between the keel and the centreboard, it must be admitted that the form of keel now in use on the deeper-draught boats is so disposed in relation to the body of the vessel as to closely resemble a centreboard; in fact, the keel yacht of the most approved design has in effect a centreboard fixed in position and forming a part of the construction of the hull.

Nearly all the yachts built recently for racing have shown on the part of their designers too great a tendency towards the employment of abnormal power; that is, too much lead below and too much canvas above. They nearly all come too closely to the

appellation of "brute"—a justly-applied term, and very properly one of reproach. That design is most commendable which renders a given duty with the employment of a minimum of power. Power is a costly factor; it means a greater prime cost and increased expense of maintenance, less durability in hull and rigging, and, in the main, a want of seaworthy qualities.

The Paine production is further removed from success than any one of her sisters, mostly by reason of too great power and consequent difficulties in construction of hull and adjustment of rigging. The yacht "*Gloriana*," designed and built by N. G. Herreshoff, of Bristol, R. I., has attracted from the earliest stages of her construction the deepest interest among yachting circles in America, and a share of English comment has been bestowed upon her. Native comment was divided, and foreign condemnatory in its character.

The cause of this unusual degree of interest is found in the fact that the "*Gloriana*" presents a decided departure in form from rival members of the 46-foot class, and, indeed, from any recorded previous construction (save the craft that her designer built and tested in the latter part of 1890), and, judging by her performances in New York in June and at Newport in August, it must be admitted that a new vein has been struck in naval architecture, and one that must have its effect on future designing.

In general proportions (save length on deck) and size of sail-spread, the "*Gloriana*" holds a middle position in her class; her draught of water also is about the same as that of her sisters, and in shape her sails are somewhat lower and wider than the others. Therefore the difference between her and the rest of her class can be explained only by the peculiar lines of her hull, to describe which will be here attempted; but to set forth in words what comes within the rightful domain of drawing is not easy, and the patience of the reader is solicited.

The most apparent difference in the form of the "*Gloriana*," when compared with other yachts, is her abnormal overhang at both bow and stern, her length over all being 70 feet, and on the water-line 45 feet 4 inches, giving her a very marked character and a singular profile. Her unusual overhang is an unavoidable consequence of the elongation of the body, or bilge, of the yacht, by which she gains ability to carry weight of lead ballast and press of sail. Were we to examine the model of a yacht of the usual type,

we would find that the body, or bilge, comes to a gradual end near the bow, which part of the model is made fine and sharp so as to insure an easy entrance, while the bilge at the forward part of the hull is quite full above the water. At the water-line the form of the vessel is a long, easy curve, so that, so long as the vessel remains in an upright position and does not pitch or bury the bows, her entrance is as easily performed as is possible; but when by press of sail the vessel careens, or when she is met by waves that make her bury the bows more or less deeply, then lines more or less abrupt and full are made to form a part of the entrance of the hull. Such contact with wave after wave soon diminishes essentially the speed of the yacht, often to a very serious degree.

This unavoidable diminution of speed through bringing full lines in contact with water during pitching is exactly what the form of the "*Gloriana*" is specially designed to counteract. If an observer were to examine her model, he would see that the body extends the entire length of the hull. From the extreme end of the overhang forward to the end of her finely tapered stern, there is no visible part above water that appears to correspond to the entrance of the common type of model; yet below water her lines are easy and sharp to a degree. Where the fulness of the bilge rises from the water near the bow and reaches forward to the extreme point of the overhang, the water-line seems full when compared to the entrance of other yachts, and the casual observer might reasonably think that such an entrance would move with difficulty through the water; but were he to watch closely the course of the displaced water when the vessel is under way, the mystery of her motion would be in a measure revealed.

It is true that the "*Gloriana*" makes a fuss around her bows when in motion, but it is of a wholly different character from that of other-formed vessels, the surface of the surrounding water seeming to roll over and disappear beneath the flare of her full-lined bow. Close examination also shows that the wave which is rolled outward is not a solid mass, nor is it raised considerably in height above the surface of the surrounding water; and since the resulting waves thrown off by her passage are few in number and small in size, the fact of easy movement is absolutely verified.

The usual form of bow resembles a sharp wedge with nearly

vertical sides that push the water aside in a large wave, while the "Gloriana's" bow is a more bluff wedge, having greatly inclined or flaring sides, and seems to dispose of the water displaced by the hull in a manner that makes but little disturbance of the surface.

As the "Gloriana" careens there is a slight lengthening of her immersed body, which aids in speed-giving, but her increase of length at such times is far less than is popularly supposed; it is not more than two or three feet in fairly smooth water, but in rough water, at intervals and for short periods, a greater length of her overhang at both bow and stern is utilized.

Pitching and diving with the "Gloriana" are performed far differently from the usual way. Owing to the buoyant nature of her overhang she does not dive into the waves as deeply as is usual, and, as has been before stated, she immerses, when diving and pitching, lines that are no fuller than those when progress in smooth water is made. The effect is that the surface of the water is far less disturbed by her passage, resulting in not only well-maintained higher speed, but in far drier decks than one would find on board yachts of the common form. During the race of the New York Yacht Club in June last the hatches of a schooner yacht having a water-line length double that of the "Gloriana" were washed off, while the decks of the "Gloriana" were wet only by spray: not once did she take over solid (green) water.

Another most valuable quality resulting from this newly-devised form is the ease and certainty that are given to the action of the rudder, which result is reached in a rather obscure but interesting manner. All yachtsmen familiar with the working of wide vessels of our old type recognize the difficulty of steering when the yacht is reaching or sailing free from the wind; at such times it is often necessary to have recourse to mechanical aid, in spite of which it is no unusual thing to lose control of the vessel temporarily.

In vessels of the usual form, when driven by fresh winds, the water is piled up against the lee bow, and owing to the bluff part of the bilge being wholly or partly immersed, the water it displaces forces the bow of the boat strongly to windward, giving the vessel a tendency to "luff," or turn toward the wind.

This "luffing" influence of the lee bow must be counteracted by the rudder, resulting in labor for the helmsman and loss of

speed from a double reason—the obstruction caused by the piling-up of the water of displacement under the lee bow, and the drag on the boat by the rudder, seeing that it must be carried at an abnormal angle to produce the required effect.

In the “*Gloriana*” there is no such influence under the lee bow, or at most a greatly lessened one, the water of displacement being disposed of in such a manner that it does not push the bow to windward; and at all points of sailing, running, reaching, or close windward work, she is guided with the utmost ease, answering quickly to the slightest motion of the tiller, even though her lee rail be “awash” when reaching with a wind of twenty-four miles an hour.

The increased deck room afforded by the long overhang is a factor of great value in the management of a vessel; the bowsprit need not be so long nor the boom project so far over the stern, thus giving more easy access to outlying portions of the sails in the operations of reefing, changing, or furling.

A very snug but practicable cruising rig for ocean work could be set within the length of the deck-line, omitting wholly the use of the bowsprit; an advantage of unquestionable value in stormy seas.

Beside the means of healthy recreation that yachting affords, it has a value in schooling youth in the manly art of navigation, and, greater than all, it furnishes means of experiment to test the real value of diverse models and rigs. The present perfection of the world’s naval and merchant marine is without doubt a direct outgrowth of experiences gained in the construction and handling of yachts.

The new departure as embodied in the “*Gloriana*” is of such a character that many desirable qualities are given to the vessel besides an evident increase of speed; the form of the “*Gloriana*” affords a greater degree of seaworthiness and increased capacity to carry cargo, to which may be added many lesser advantages.

Since it has become an established fact that human ends are better served by the use of steam in the navigation of the great oceans as well as lesser waters, the question follows naturally, Do the principles involved in the design of the “*Gloriana*” apply in any degree to the requirements of steamships for naval or merchant service on the ocean, or to a steamer intended for coastwise or inland-water use? It may be answered that all her special points

would be of value in steam navigation in greater or less degree, and their adoption would be easy, adding little to first cost and nothing to maintenance.

It is demonstrated beyond doubt that in most conditions of sea a vessel having the model of the "Gloriana" would attain given results of speed with less power, which means the consumption of less coal; and if even a slight saving could be effected it would be an immense advantage, for the amount of coal now used in the new transatlantic steamers that perform the trip in less than six days is appalling. In the best forms of marine engines now in practice a daily consumption of 40,000 pounds of coal for a development of 1,000 indicated horse-power is required, and when, as in case of the large ships now in use, 15,000 to 18,000 indicated horse-power is required, it can easily be seen how desirable even a slight saving of coal would be. The same conditions that attend the pitching and diving of a vessel of the "Gloriana" type would be of prime importance to a steamer navigating stormy seas; higher speed could be maintained under such conditions, and drier decks would also result, thus affording a greater degree of comfort and safety to the passengers and crew. Owing to the elongation of the body of the vessel, a greater carrying capacity could be realized, and even in a part of the overhang some classes of freight might be carried.

The overhang could be objectionable only when in dock, by requiring more space, but at sea there is plenty of room for any degree of prolongation, and by the placing of suitable bulkheads at or near the usual water-line, the overhang would serve as an element of safety in collision with ship or ice, by protecting the immersed part of the hull in a more effectual manner than can be possible with the common form of bow and arrangement of bulkheads.

A steamship designed with a "Gloriana" bow would not present so strong an objection to turning as the deep, wall-sided bows of a usually-modelled vessel. She would not pile up a wave on the side towards which the ship is turning; thus affording far better control of the ship by giving ability to turn in a smaller circle than is now common. Many accidents have been caused by the sluggish manner in which steamships answer their helms.

Let us hope that a steam vessel embodying the "Gloriana" principles will soon be built, so that the widest scope may be given

to any improved design calculated to benefit the condition of those who journey by sea or follow it as a vocation, and the functions of trade promoted by the use of safe, speedy ships with a maximum of carrying capacity.

The subject of yacht-designing cannot be complete without some tribute to the great designer, Burgess, whose recent untimely death is deeply regretted in every circle where yachting is known and naval architecture studied. He entered the field of designing at a period when the science was at the lowest ebb, when the failure of our old type of yachts began to be recognized; he gave it his study, thought, and skill, and left it on a well-established foundation with his brilliant successes in the defence of the Queen's cup and his splendid contributions to our yachting fleet, which together stand as a noble monument to his memory. He died at the zenith of his success, the pride of his countrymen and in fullest honor and confidence of all yachtsmen.

Too much cannot be done by those who are interested in the progress of designing as applied to yachts, as well as all marine constructions, to foster the spirit of international contests for friendly supremacy.

The modification of design for yachts on both sides of the Atlantic during the last decade has been amazing, and now that the best designers are working more in accord as to rules that govern the conduct and classification of yachts in races, it is to be hoped that even more rapid improvement will be made in the near future. The following table shows how nearly the general proportions of the newest yachts coincide, the examples being taken from well-known designers in England and America:

	Designer.	Length over all.	Breadth.
		W. L.	Draught.
"Oweene"	Burgess..... 1891.	62' 0"	13' 4"
"Barbara"	Fife..... 1891.	45' 9"	11' 3"
"Gloriana"	Fife..... 1891.	63' 0"	13' 0"
"Gloriana"	Herreshoff..... 1891.	45' 9"	11' 8"
"Dragon"	Herreshoff..... 1891.	70' 0"	13' 2"
"Dragon"	Fife..... 1889.	45' 4"	11' 2"
			10' 3"
		45' 6"	8' 4"

At the foundation of international contests lies the Queen's cup. To it a debt is owed by naval science of incalculable value. It has done more than scores of industrious designers

could do if they studied their own work only and compared it with similar types. And from this famous trophy we still look for further influence in designing, and in the development of thought and practice in the noble art of naval construction.

If the conditions that surround the tenure of this wonderful cup be not such as to promote friendly international rivalry, then let the duty and wish of every spirited American yachtsman be to modify the "deed of gift" so that soon our transatlantic friends may visit us again, and stir us to yet better and higher work.

Let us place the cup within easy range of all the world, and if it be lost we shall have gained untold times its value in incentive to still greater improvement. But as we stand to-day as regards the Queen's cup, we can easily afford to be lenient, with a yacht like the "Gloriana" to defend it, and a corps of designers well attuned to the "high pitch" of the requirements of yacht-designing.

LEWIS HERRESHOFF.

DRUNKENNESS IS CURABLE.

BY JOHN FLAVEL MINES, LL. D.

ON A cold, stormy day in early April I alighted from the cars, a thousand miles from home, and made my way through a shower of sleet to the bare and gloomy hotel of a little prairie village in Illinois. Banks of snow were still scattered about, but the rain that fell continually for the next two weeks swept them away, and under the pressure of the clouds the village seemed to sink more deeply every day into the thick black mud. In all my campaigning, including the late war, I had never had such a keen sense of desolation. I was weary of the place in an hour, and wondered what could have induced me to go there.

A modern Ponce de Leon, I had started on a voyage of discovery for the fountain of renewed youth and restored manhood, against the persuasion of friends who wished me to wait and see how others fared ; in the teeth of physicians who told me that it was a deception and an old dream revamped ; and in opposition to the arguments of the medical superintendent of a fashionable "home" that fronts the waters of New York Harbor, who insisted that I would be throwing away my money. To my friends I replied that I could not wait an hour while there was a chance held out to hope. To the doctors I said nothing, knowing how physicians disagree. To the superintendent I answered : " You tell me now that I am the only person who can help myself in this matter ; if you had only told me this frankly the first day I met you, I would have saved the money paid to your institution." So I went my way alone, without faith, but with a tiny spark of hope kindled in my breast, not knowing what would befall me at Dwight. What I saw, heard, and experienced there is the best of all arguments for the treatment of the alcoholic appetite as a disease and for belief in its cure.

For twenty years I had been a victim to the disease of drink. It seized me at odd times, usually the most inopportune, and in spite of all my struggles would gain the temporary mastery. Months of peace might pass, but suddenly the fever would break loose and run riot in my veins, and I knew then that it must have its course. I have as much will-power as the next man, but my will was a straw in the grasp of this horror. Men who have not felt the clutch of drink as it sweeps through and possesses the whole system, have no conception of the agony of the struggle which the victim makes. There are no grander heroes under God's sunlight than the men who honestly fight against drink. I had battled for years, had gone voluntarily into exile in homes and asylums to escape my enemy, and only in late years recognized the fact that drunkenness was a disease, increased no doubt by indulgence, but for which a man was no more responsible than for a fever he had caught by exposure. I regret the disease. It has brought sorrow and loss to me for the years of my life that should have been most prospered. But it has not been the unalloyed curse that fanatics would persuade man to believe. Out of my sufferings the pictures drawn by Felix Oldboy have been wrought, and through struggles as fierce as death and blackness that was despair have come gleams of the sunshine of memory, painting the quiet old home in which the little lad sat by the side of his grandmother and her cat. If the present had been prosperous, I should not have carried my life into memories of the past. And so, as I believe, God sends compensation for the battle he gives each one of us to fight.

It was because I had found no permanent benefit from seclusion in an asylum or home, but rather the contrary, because I fretted against restraint that could be of no use to a periodical drinker, that I was ready to give a fair trial to the promise made me by Dr. Leslie E. Keeley, of Dwight, that he would guarantee me a cure for my disease. I told him that for more than two months my life had been one of entire sobriety, and asked him if he would undertake my cure under these circumstances. He replied that he would. It was something of an assurance to find that his experience of thirty years as a medical man, and for twenty years as a specialist in alcoholism, coincided with my experience as a sufferer. His ideas were common-sense. My own diagnosis told me that my trouble was a disease, and I felt that

it was an insult to medical science to suppose for a moment that no remedy could be found for it. I recalled my own experience with chills and fever. One autumn day in 1848 my stepmother asked me why I did not keep my teeth still. I told her that "I could not help it." It was a chill, and a violent fever followed. This took place in our home on St. John's Park in this city. Afterwards I had chills at school, in college, in the army, and at last, in May, 1868, on the very first day I took charge of a daily newspaper as managing editor, I had a chill, and then the attacks came on every day. I had taken quinine for twenty years, and was weary of it. So I went to a distinguished homœopathic physician in Albany, an old friend of my father, and asked him if he could eradicate the disease. He promised to do so if I would strictly obey his orders and not stop taking medicine until he said so. I promised, and for three months took his powders of arsenic and copper. Twenty-three years have passed and I have not had a touch of the disease since.

I mention this because dipsomania affected me in precisely the same manner. It came on at the most inopportune times, and apparently without cause. Friends never had anything to do with my drinking. I always had will-power enough to say "No" when the fever was not in my veins. When the attack came on, they could not keep me from indulgence in drink, for appetite was stronger than their will and mine too. Senseless people would ask: "Why do you drink?" I said always: "Because I cannot help it." That was the true reason and the exact state of the case. Foolish folk would go farther and say: "Look at me; I don't drink." As well might one say to a man whose face is scarred with the small-pox: "Why did you have the loathsome disease? Look at me; I never had it." Dr. Keeley treated me for dipsomania after the same fashion that the physician at Albany had followed. That Dr. Keeley is an allopathic physician made no difference to me, for I have none of the current prejudice about schools of medicine. He laid down the laws that I must follow, the time that I must stay, and insisted, as he does in all cases, on unqualified obedience while in his hands. But he gained my confidence not only by his diagnosis, but from the fact that he had brushed away at the start the musty, superstitious old cobwebs of bolts, bars, and restraints. The Keeley Institute was, and is, only an

office to which patients go for treatment and medicine. There are not even official boarding-places. The patient selects his hotel (there is a fine new one there now) or his boarding-place according to his taste and means, and is free to select his own company and amusements and to occupy his spare time as he sees fit. When I went to Dwight there were barely one hundred patients. When I left, at the end of six weeks, there were two hundred and forty under treatment. Now the number has reached five hundred. My comrades were lawyers, physicians, editors, merchants, three judges, the attorney-general of one of the new States at the West, an ex-Congressman, and an assorted lot of half a dozen State senators. Without exception they were the brightest body of men I ever met, and to say that they could meet and exchange views daily, without interference and restraint, and yet be made the victims of a fraud, is an insult to common-sense. There was no concealment, no jugglery, no suave or deceptive talk, but the simple medical treatment of our disease. As for me, it was a revelation to find that my manhood was respected from the outset, and that not only were there no school-boy "bounds" for our walks, but that in that primitive community the town marshal, with whom I lodged, never locked his front door at night.

The patient's first visit is paid to the office of Dr. Keeley, where his case is stated and where he receives a hypodermic injection in the upper left arm, and there is given to him a bottle of the bichloride-of-gold mixture, a dose of which is to be taken every two hours while awake. The hypodermic, called in Dwight the "shot," is the supporting medicine, which sustains the frame under treatment. Its preparation, and the form in which the bichloride of gold is made up for its special purpose, are Dr. Keeley's secret, and it is manifestly absurd for those not in the secret to pretend to criticise it. The treatment is administered four times a day, at 8 A.M., 12 noon, 5 P.M. and 7:30 P.M., and for three or four weeks usually, though sometimes a week or two longer, according to the personal diagnosis made by the doctor from day to day. If a new arrival needs whiskey, it is given to him in a bottle, and he can have more until his palate loathes it and he returns his unopened bottle to the doctor. From this point the work of his physical reconstruction begins. He finds that the treatment is not a mere tonic, as some have supposed. Sometimes his eyesight is affected, but only for a few days; in

some cases the memory is temporarily weakened ; in every case he becomes conscious of a feeling of lassitude and indifference to the outside world, as the gold searches into the weaker parts of his frame, and purifies and builds them up into new strength. Nor is this all. The treatment at Dwight removes such physical ills as are caused directly by drink. Dr. Keeley's programme promised this, but I had scarcely been able to credit it. As a matter of fact, I found myself relieved of twenty pounds of superfluous flesh, and am the better for it. Another patient, a native of this city, a relative of America's greatest prose-writer and bearing his name, came to Dwight on crutches, while I was there, suffering from partial paralysis caused by drink. In ten days his crutches were abandoned, and in four weeks he went away sound of frame, and with new life in his body and fresh hope in his heart.

The physical experience varies in different cases, but to each there comes at last a time when the patient discovers that all weakness and depression have vanished, and that the fetters of old appetites and habits have fallen away from him, and when he steps out of the darkness of the wilderness into the full light of day and knows that once more he has a man's strength to do a man's work among men. My own experience was somewhat rare, because I went to Dwight free from any direct effects of alcohol. I experienced no loss of memory or defection of eyesight, but after a week had passed I felt that if I had been anywhere else I would have had a return of the periodical appetite, and might have yielded to it because of my depression. I remember the terror this feeling gave me. As I stood in line, I said to Dr. Keeley: "I am glad that I came at this time. I think I have hit one of my periodical attacks, for I feel so blue and wretched that if I were in New York I should yield and drink." "And the boy," inquired the doctor, looking searchingly at me; "you wouldn't leave him?" "Of course not," I said; "I do not intend to drink, but I thought it right to tell you the symptoms." He bade me wait until the line of patients had gone through their treatment, then took me into his own office, poured out nearly half a tumbler of whiskey, with a little water added, and said: "Drink it." "What is it?" I asked. "No matter," was the reply; "drink it." I drank half of it and said: "Why, it's whiskey." "Drink it all," said Dr. Keeley. "When you need whis-

key, I would as readily give you that as anything else." I drank, went to dinner, went walking in the afternoon, and never thought of it again until I went back to the office at the regular hour. Nor did I want any more, nor want to take the two-ounce bottle of whiskey which was handed me at noon next day with injunctions to take the dose in about twenty minutes. That was the end of my drinking, and all that has passed my lips since the 31st day of January. Formerly a drink of whiskey would have set my brain on fire, and in an hour's time I would have walked ten miles to get the second one, and had it at all hazards. When I saw that it had ceased to make me its victim and slave, I could have cried for joy. I knew from that moment that the bichloride of gold had gotten the upper hand, broken the fetters of disease, and made me whole. Yet I was not entirely out of the woods. When this hour of temporary temptation had gone by, I passed through such an experience as is apt to follow a prolonged debauch, and for two weeks could scarcely eat or sleep. Then, suddenly, as if I had stepped out of the blackness of an African jungle into the quiet sunshine of Central Park, I broke out of my living tomb and knew that I was cured. The knowledge came to me like a benediction from heaven.

I had taken with me, for company, my son, a little lad who had not quite reached his sixteenth birthday, and who, as "Master Felix," is known to thousands who have never seen him. He saw and heard everything at Dwight. The stake was a large one to him, and he watched the process anxiously. When we came away, life had a new meaning for us both. He has had a happy summer, for he has never doubted, and has never had a fear, whether I was with him or absent. To him, as to me, the memory of that handful of white houses set among stately cottonwoods on the prairie, will always come up steeped with the fragrance of the May blossoms that first taught hope, and then impressed faith in the work that was doing.

Master Felix knew every patient there, and studied them all without prejudices. Elected an honorary member of the Bichloride of Gold Club, to which I had also been elected, he attended every meeting, and by a gift of books laid the foundation of the club library which was called by his name. His companions there and mine were Mr. Opie Read, editor of *The Arkansas Traveller*, ex-Congressman Tarsney, of Michigan, George Work, of New

York, Judge J. D. Thayer, of Warsaw, Ind., State Senator Rust, of Wisconsin, Captain Robert Ayres, late of the United States Army, a graduate of West Point and a veteran of the war, and many others who have given me permission to use their names, and who are sound and enthusiastic in the faith. They are all members of the Bichloride of Gold Club, at Dwight, a voluntary association of patients and graduates of the Keeley Institute, intended, like other clubs, for the convenience and benefit of its members. The number of its members enrolled in the books up to August 27 was 850, and of this total only six had come under discipline and had their names stricken from the rolls. Dr. Keeley guarantees a cure of 95 per cent. of his patients. The club keeps a paternal and watchful eye on all who go out from under its roof, and it reports a loss of less than 1 per cent. Those are from the ranks of men sent there unwillingly by parents or guardians, and in no case of men who voluntarily sought freedom from disease.

No one who has not been similarly cursed with the disease of drink can know the joy of the moment in which my cure came to me as a fact. I do not believe, I know, that I am cured, and am satisfied as to its permanency. I did not doubt twenty years ago that I was cured of the chills and fever; I did not doubt, when this last May came around with its blossoms of spring, that my cure was permanent, and that the appetite for drink was eradicated. I do not understand the processes, but I know the fact. Said Mr. George Work, of this city, who was one of my companions at Dwight, "I tell my friends that all I know about it is that I went to Dwight, and there Dr. Keeley cured me"; and as he said this I thought unconsciously of the blind man by the pool of Siloam, and his reply to the doubters who gathered around and tormented him. To all of us who suffered and have been healed it is a resurrection. As I passed along the streets a year ago, and was greeted by my friends, I knew that they looked upon me as a slave to habit. They knew how well I had fought, but they had no belief in my final victory. However strong and healthy I might appear at the time, they looked on me as doomed. I felt it and could see the pity in their eyes. I always moved among them as the gladiator of old Rome who, with the blue sky of Italia over his head, Cæsar before his face, and a shouting multitude surrounding him, knew that whatever

temporary triumphs he might win, the white sands at his feet would one day drink his blood. Always, as I walked among my fellows, the words of doom came to my lips, "Morituri te salutamus." To-day I meet my fellow man with open gaze, knowing that I have conquered the black lion of the desert; and my sense of freedom and happiness no man can paint.

The city of New York receives the sum of \$1,468,130 from license fees, or, as I might put it, for the privilege of making drunkards. Not one dollar of this money is expended for the purpose of saving the victims of drink. Is there anything in the facts that I have made known, to suggest that the city of my love, and to which I have devoted the best powers of my pen, has a duty to do in this matter?

JOHN FLAVEL MINES.
(FELIX OLDBOX.)

HAÏTI AND THE UNITED STATES.

INSIDE HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE MÔLE ST. NICOLAS.

BY THE HON. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LATE UNITED STATES MINISTER TO HAÏTI.

II.

AT A meeting subsequent to the one already described, application for a United States naval station at the Môle St. Nicolas was made in due form to Mr. Firmin, the Haïtien Minister of Foreign Affairs. At his request, as already stated, this application was presented to him in writing. The paper containing it is somewhat remarkable. It was prepared on board of the "Philadelphia," the flagship of Rear-Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, and bore his signature alone. I neither signed it nor was asked to sign it, although it met my entire approval. I make this statement not in the way of a complaint or grievance, but simply to show what, at that time, was my part, and what was not my part, in this important negotiation, the failure of which has been unjustly laid to my charge. Had the Môle been then acquired, in response to this paper, the credit of success, according to the record, would have properly belonged to the gallant admiral in whose name it was demanded, for in it I had neither part nor lot.

At this point, curiously enough, and unfortunately for the negotiations, the Haïtien Minister, who is an able man and well skilled in the technicalities of diplomacy, asked to see the commission of Admiral Gherardi and to read his letter of instructions. When these were presented to Mr. Firmin, he, after carefully reading them, pronounced them insufficient, and held that by them the government of the United States would not be bound by any convention which Haïti might make with the admiral. This position of Mr. Firmin's was earnestly and stoutly opposed by

Admiral Gherardi, who insisted that his instructions were full, complete, and amply sufficient. Unfortunately, however, he did not leave the matter in controversy without intimating that he thought that Mr. Firmin might be insincere in raising such an objection, and that he was urging it simply with a view to cause unnecessary delay. This was more like the blunt admiral than the discreet diplomat. Such an imputation was obviously out of place, and not likely to smooth the way to a successful proceeding, but quite the reverse. Mr. Firmin insisted that his ground was well and honestly taken.

Here, therefore, the negotiation was brought to a sudden halt, and the question for us then was, What shall be done next? Three ways were open to us. First, to continue to insist upon the completeness of the authority of Admiral Gherardi; second, to abandon the scheme of a naval station altogether; third, to apply to the government at Washington for the required letter of credence. It was my opinion that it was hardly worth while to continue to insist upon the sufficiency of the admiral's papers, since it seemed useless to contend about mere technicalities; more especially as we were now in telegraphic connection with the United States, and could in the course of a few days easily obtain the proper and required papers.

Besides, I held that a prompt compliance with the demand of the Haïtien Government for a perfect letter of credence would be not only the easiest way out of the difficulty, but the wisest policy by which to accomplish the end we sought, since such compliance on our part with even what might fairly be considered an unreasonable demand would make refusal by Haïti to grant the Môle all the more difficult.

I did not understand Admiral Gherardi to combat this opinion of mine, for he at once acted upon it, and caused an officer from his flagship to go with me to my house and prepare a telegram to be sent to Washington for the required letter of credence. To this telegram he, two days thereafter, received answer that such a letter would be immediately sent by a Clyde steamer to Gonaïves, and thither the admiral went to receive his expected letter. But, from some unexplained cause, no such letter came by the Clyde steamer at the time appointed, and two months intervened before the desired credentials arrived. This unexpected delay proved to be very mischievous and unfavorable to our getting the

Môle, since it gave rise among the Haïtien people to much speculation and many disquieting rumors prejudicial to the project. It was said that Admiral Gherardi had left Port au Prince in anger, and had gone to take possession of the Môle without further parley; that the American flag was already floating over our new naval station; that the United States wanted the Môle as an entering wedge to obtaining possession of the whole island; with much else of like inflammatory nature. Although there was no truth in all this, it had the unhappy effect among the masses of stirring up suspicion and angry feelings towards the United States, and of making it more difficult than it might otherwise have been for the government of Haïti to grant the required concession.

Finally, after this long interval of waiting, during which the flagship of Admiral Gherardi was reported at different points, sometimes at Gonaïves, sometimes at the Môle, and sometimes at Kingston, Jamaica, the required letter of credence arrived. The next day I was again summoned on board the "Philadelphia," and there was shown me a paper, signed by the President of the United States and by the Secretary of State, authorizing myself, as minister resident to Haïti, and Rear-Admiral Gherardi, as special commissioner, to negotiate with such persons as Haïti might appoint for the purpose of concluding a convention by which we should obtain a lease of the Môle St. Nicolas as a United States naval station.

It may here be remarked that the letter of credence signed by President Harrison and by the Secretary of State differed in two respects from the former and rejected letter under which we had previously acted. First, it charged me, equally with Admiral Gherardi, with the duty of negotiation; and secondly, it was an application for a naval station pure and simple, without limitations and without conditions.

Before presenting to Haïti this new letter, which had the advantage of being free from the conditions specified in the old one, the question arose between the admiral and myself as to whether or not we should begin our new negotiations, under our new commission, separate and entirely apart from all that had been attempted under the instructions contained in the old letter. On this point I differed with the admiral. I took the position that we should ignore the past altogether, and proceed according to

the instructions of the new letter alone, unincumbered by any terms or limitations contained in the old letter. I felt sure that there were features in the conditions of the old letter which would be met by the representatives of Haïti with strong objections. But the admiral and his able lieutenant insisted that the present letter did not exclude the conditions of the old one, but was, in its nature, only supplementary to them, and hence that this was simply a continuation of what had gone before. It was therefore decided to proceed with the negotiations on the basis of both the old and the new letter. Under the former letter of instructions our terms were precise and explicit; under the latter we were left largely to our own discretion: we were simply to secure from the government of Haïti a lease of the Môle St. Nicolas for a naval station.

The result is known. Haïti refused to grant the lease, and alleged that to do so was impossible under the hard terms imposed in the previous letter of instructions. I do not know that our government would have accepted a naval station from Haïti upon any other or less stringent terms or conditions than those exacted in our first letter of instructions; but I do know that the main grounds alleged by Haïti for its refusal were the conditions set forth in this first letter of instructions, one of which is expressed as follows: "That so long as the United States may be the lessee of the Môle St. Nicolas, the government of Haïti will not lease or otherwise dispose of any port or harbor or other territory in its dominions, or grant any special privileges or rights of use therein, to any other power, state, or government." This was not only a comprehensive limitation of the power of Haïti over her own territory, but a denial to all others of that which we claimed for ourselves.

But no one cause fully explains our failure to get a naval station at the Môle. One fundamental element in our non-success was found, not in any aversion to the United States or in any indifference on my part, as has been often charged, but in the government of Haïti itself. It was evidently timid. With every disposition to oblige us, it had not the courage to defy the well-known, deeply-rooted, and easily-excited prejudices and traditions of the Haïtien people. Nothing is more repugnant to the thoughts and feelings of the masses of that country than the alienation of a single rood of their territory to a foreign power.

This sentiment originated, very naturally, in the circumstances in which Haïti began her national existence. The whole Christian world was at that time against her. The Caribbean Sea was studded with communities hostile to her. They were slaveholding. She, by her bravery and her blood, was free. Her existence was, therefore, a menace to them, and theirs was a menace to her. France, England, Spain, Portugal, and Holland, as well as the United States, were wedded to the slave system which Haïti had, by arms, thrown off ; and hence she was regarded as an outcast, and was outlawed by the Christian world. Though time and events have gone far to change this relation of hers to the outside world, the sentiment that originated in the beginning of her existence continues, on both sides, until this day. It was this that stood like a wall of granite against our success. Other causes co-operated, but this was the principal cause. Of course our peculiar and intense prejudice against the colored race was not forgotten. Our contrast to other nations, in this respect, is often dwelt upon in Haïti to our disadvantage. In no part of Europe will a Haïtien be insulted because of his color, and Haïtiens well know that this is not the case in the United States.

Another influence unfavorable to our obtaining the coveted naval station at the Môle was the tone of the New York press on the subject. It more than hinted that, once in possession of the Môle, the United States would control the destiny of Haïti. Torn and rent by revolution as she has been and still is, Haïti yet has a large share of national pride, and scorns the idea that she needs, or will submit to, the rule of a foreign power. Some of her citizens would doubtless be glad of American rule, but the overwhelming majority would burn their towns and freely shed their blood over their ashes to prevent such a consummation.

Not the least, perhaps, among the collateral causes of our non-success was the minatory attitude assumed by us while conducting the negotiation. What wisdom was there in confronting Haïti at such a moment with a squadron of large ships of war with a hundred cannon and two thousand men ? This was done, and it was naturally construed into a hint to Haïti that if we could not, by appeals to reason and friendly feeling, obtain what we wanted, we could obtain it by a show of force. We appeared before the Haïtiens, and before the world, with the pen in one hand and the sword in the other. This was not a friendly and con-

siderate attitude for a great government like ours to assume when asking a concession from a small and weak nation like Haïti. It was ill timed, and out of all proportion to the demands of the occasion. It was also done under a total misapprehension of the character of the people with whom we had to deal. We should have known that, whatever else the Haïtien people may be, they are not cowards, and hence are not easily scared.

In the face of all these obvious and effective causes of failure, is it not strange that our intelligent editors and our nautical newspaper writers could not have found for the American Government and people a more rational cause for the failure of the negotiations for the *Môle St. Nicolas* than that of my color, indifference, and incompetency to deal with a question of such magnitude? Were I disposed to exchange the position of accused for that of accuser, I could find ample material to sustain me in that position. Other persons did much to create conditions unfavorable to our success, but I leave to their friends the employment of such personal assaults.

On the theory that I was the cause of this failure, we must assume that Haïti was willing to grant the *Môle*; that the timidity of the Haïtien Government was all right; that the American prejudice was all right; that the seven ships of war in the harbor of Port au Prince were all right; that Rear-Admiral Gherardi was all right, and that I alone was all wrong; and, moreover, that but for me the *Môle St. Nicolas*, like an over-ripe apple shaken by the wind, would have dropped softly into our national basket. I will not enlarge upon this absurd assumption, but will leave the bare statement of it to the intelligent reader, that it may perish by its flagrant contradiction of well-known facts and by its own absurdity.

I come now to another cause of complaint against me, scarcely less serious in the minds of those who now assail me than the charge of having defeated the lease of the *Môle St. Nicolas*; namely, the failure of what is publicly known as the Clyde contract. Soon after my arrival in Haïti I was put in communication with an individual calling himself the agent of the highly respectable mercantile firm of William P. Clyde & Co., of New York. He was endeavoring to obtain a subsidy of a half-million dollars from the government of Haïti to enable this firm to ply a line of steamers between New York and Haïti. From the first

this agent assumed toward me a dictatorial attitude. He claimed to be a native of South Carolina, and it was impossible for him to conceal his contempt for the people whose good will it was his duty to seek. Between this agent and the United States Government I found myself somewhat in the position of a servant between two masters : either one of them, separately and apart, might be served acceptably ; but to serve both satisfactorily at the same time and place might be a difficult task, if not an impossible one. There were times when I was compelled to prefer the requirements of the one to the ardent wishes of the other, and I thought as between this agent and the United States I should choose to serve the latter.

The trouble between us came about in this way : Mr. Firmin, the Haitien Minister of Foreign Affairs, had objected to granting the Clyde concession on the ground that, if it were granted and this heavy drain were made upon the treasury of his country, Mr. Douglass stood ready to present and to press upon Haiti the payment of the claims of many other American citizens, and that this would greatly embarrass the newly-organized government of President Hyppolite. In view of this objection, the zealous agent in question came to me and proposed that I should go to Mr. Firmin, in my quality of minister resident and consul-general of the United States, and assure him that, if he would only grant the Clyde concession, I, on my part, would withhold and refrain from pressing the claims of other American citizens.

The proposition shocked me. It sounded like the words of Satan on the mountain, and I thought it time to call a halt. I was in favor of the Clyde contract, but I could not see what I had said or done to make it possible for any man to make to me a proposal so plainly dishonest and scandalous. I refused to do any such thing. Here was my first offence, and it at once stamped me as an unprofitable servant. It did not seem to occur to this agent that he had made to me a shameful, dishonest, and shocking proposition. Blinded by zeal or by an influence still more misleading, he seemed to see in it only an innocent proposal. He thereafter looked upon me as an unworthy ally, and duly reported me as such to his master and to other influential persons. He could not understand my conduct as proceeding from other or better motives than that of over-affection for the Haïtiens. In his eyes I was, from that time, more a Haïtien than an

American, and I soon saw myself so characterized in American journals.

The refusal to compromise and postpone the just claims of other American citizens for that of his master's contract was not, however, my only offence. On obtaining a leave of absence from my post, in July, 1890, I, of course, as was my duty, called upon President Hyppolite before my departure for the purpose of paying to him my respects. This agent at once sought me and desired me to make use of this visit of mere ceremony as an occasion to press anew the Clyde contract upon the attention of the President. This I could not properly do, especially as I had on previous occasions repeatedly urged its consideration upon him. The President already knew well enough my sense of the importance to Haïti of this measure, not only as a means of enlarging her commerce and of promoting her civilization, but also as a guarantee of the stability of her government. Nevertheless, my refusal to urge in so unbecoming a manner a demand already repeatedly urged upon the attention of the Haïtien Government was made use of by this agent, to my injury, both at the State Department and with Mr. Clyde's firm. I was reported at Washington and to various persons in high places as unfriendly to this concession.

When at last it appeared to the agent that the government of Haïti was, as he thought, stubbornly blind to its own interests, and that it would not grant the contract in question, he called at the United States legation and expressed to me his disappointment and disgust at the delay of Haïti in accepting his scheme. He said he did not believe that the government really intended to do anything for his firm; that he himself had spent much time and money in promoting the concession; and as he did not think that Mr. Clyde ought to be made to pay for the time thus lost and the expense incurred by the delay and dallying of the Haïtien Government, he should therefore demand his pay of Haïti. This determination struck me as very odd, and I jocosely replied:

"Then, sir, as they will not allow you to put a hot poker down their backs, you mean to make them pay you for heating it!"

This rejoinder was my final destruction in the esteem of this zealous advocate. He saw at once that he could not count upon

my assistance in making this new demand. I was both surprised at his proposal and amused by it, and wondered that he could think it possible to get this pay. It seemed to me that Haïti would scout the idea at once. She had not sent for him. She had not asked him to stay. He was there for purposes of his own, and not for any purpose of hers. I could not see why Haïti should pay him for coming, going, or staying. But this gentleman knew better than I the generous character of the people with whom he had to deal, and he followed them up till they actually paid him \$5,000 in gold.

But compliance with his demand proved a woful mistake on the part of Haïti, and, in fact, nonsense. This man, after getting his money, went away, but he did not stay away. He was soon back again to press his scheme with renewed vigor. His demands were now to be complied with or he would make, not Rome, but Haïti, howl. To him it was nothing that Haïti was already wasted by repeated revolutions; nothing that she was already staggering under the weight of a heavy national debt; nothing that she herself ought to be the best judge of her ability to pour out a half-million of dollars in this new and, to her, doubtful enterprise; nothing that she had heard his arguments in its favor a hundred times over; nothing that, in her judgment, she had far more pressing needs for her money than the proposed investment in this steamship subsidy, as recommended by him; nothing that she had told him plainly that she was afraid to add to her pecuniary burdens this new and onerous one; and nothing that she had just paid him \$5,000 in gold to get rid of his importunities.

Now, while I was in favor of Haïti's granting the subsidy asked for in the name of Clyde & Co., and thought it would be in many ways a good thing for Haïti to have the proposed line of steamers for which a subsidy was asked, I had, and I now have, nothing but disgust for the method by which this scheme was pressed upon Haïti.

I must say in conclusion that, while, as already intimated, it does not appear certain that Haïti would have leased us the Môle on any conditions whatever, it is certain that the application for it was ill timed in more respects than one. It was especially unfortunate for us that the Clyde concession was applied for in advance of our application for a lease of the Môle. Whatever

else may be said of the Haïtiens, this is true of them: they are quick to detect a fault and to distinguish a trick from an honest proceeding. To them the preference given to the interests of an individual firm over those of the United States seemed to wear a sinister aspect. In the opinion of many intelligent persons in Haïti, had a lease of the Môle been asked for in advance of the concession to Mr. Clyde, the application for it might have been successful. This, however, is not my opinion. I do not now think that any earthly power outside of absolute force could have gotten for us a naval station at the Môle St. Nicolas. Still, to all appearances, the conditions of success were more favorable before than after the Clyde contract was urged upon Haïti. Prior to this the country, weary of war, was at peace. Ambitious leaders had not begun openly to conspire. The government under Hyppolite was newly organized. Confidence in its stability was unimpaired. It was, naturally enough, reaching out its hand to us for friendly recognition. Our good offices during the war were fresh in its memory. France, England, and Germany were not ready to give it recognition. In fact, all the conditions conspired to influence Haïti to listen to our request for a coaling-station at the Môle St. Nicolas. But instead of a proposition for a much-needed coaling-station at the Môle St. Nicolas, there was presented one for a subsidy to an individual steamship company. All must see that the effect of this was calculated to weaken our higher claim, and to place us at a disadvantage before Haïti and before all the world.

And now, since the American people have been made thoroughly acquainted with one view of this question, I know of no interest which will suffer and no just obligation which will be impaired by the presentation of such facts as I have here submitted to the public judgment. If in this my course is thought to be unusual, it should be remembered that the course pursued toward me by the press has been unusual, and that they who had no censure for the latter should have none for the former.

FREDERICK DOUGLASS.

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL,
EDITOR OF "THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW"
FROM 1864 TO 1873.

BY RICHARD HENRY STODDARD.

THE hand of death, which has struck down so many writers of distinction during the last decade, has struck down no one who has been more sincerely and widely lamented than Mr. Lowell. He belonged to the earlier race of American writers,—the generation which, beginning in the first years of the century, speedily eclipsed all who went before, and, overshadowing all contemporary lights, still eclipses all who have come after,—the generation of Hawthorne, and Emerson, and Longfellow, and of which, now that Lowell has gone, only two representatives remain. We lament him, not as we might have done a quarter of a century ago, when much of his work was still to be performed, but as we lament one who, giving all he had to give, has burdened us with a debt of gratitude which we are anxious to acknowledge, and added to our annals an illustrious name which we are proud to honor.

To say that we are more indebted to Lowell than to any of his famous peers is not to say that he was greater than they, but that his gifts were more numerous than theirs,—which is true, since to those which were the inheritance of his genius he added others from provinces that he made tributary to it,—and that he employed these gifts with a directness, a force, a knowledge, an adjustment of means to ends, which his contemporaries did not possess, and which is rare among men of letters. A poet, he was more than a poet; a critic, he was more than a critic; a thinker, he was more than a thinker; from beginning to end he was a man,—a man in every fibre and every feeling, right-minded, clear-minded, strong-minded, honest, honorable, courageous, resolute. He was this, and more, for to this there was superadded the something which makes the man the gen-

tleman, and the gentleman the man of the world. There was nothing provincial about him. No American writer was ever better and few were ever so well equipped for the profession to which he devoted himself with such sincerity and fidelity, such singleness of purpose and such unwavering determination. He was a scholar in the best sense of the word, possessed of a thorough knowledge of English literature and critically conversant with other literatures as well,—the classics of Greece and Rome, and the classics of Spain and Italy, France and Germany. A scholar, not a pedant, he mastered his learning, and it profited him in the large horizons which it disclosed to his spiritual vision, and the felicity and dignity which it imparted to his style. Gentleman and scholar in all that he wrote, there is that in his writing which declares a greater intellect than it reveals. He was more than his work. What this work was some of us may have forgotten in a measure, and others may never have known except in a casual, fragmentary way. But known or unknown, it is well that we should understand it in its entirety,—a duty which Mr. Lowell rendered easy, and a pleasure which he rendered inviting, not long before his death, by collecting a complete edition of his writings. Let us see what they are, and in order to do so let us read them chronologically, which is the best way, and, indeed, the only way, whereby the protean mind of a writer can be traced.

Mr. Lowell began his career with a volume of verse fifty years ago, and as he was only twenty-two it was necessarily immature and tentative. It determined two things, which may or may not have been perceived by its readers,—one, that the writer was a poet; the other, that he was like no other American poet. The master poet of the period—the one who was acknowledged before all others—was Bryant, and many were they who sought to wrap themselves in his mantle of meditation. Another was Willis, whose Scriptural pieces had a certain vogue; and another, Halleck, whose rhythmical rhetoric about Marco Bozzaris was being murdered by every schoolboy in the land. The popular poet, however, was Longfellow, whose “Voices of the Night” was published two years before Mr. Lowell’s first book. He was read by everybody, including the guild of minor rhymesters, who, failing to detect his poetic virtues, laid violent and clumsy hands on his poetic vices, chiefest among which were the pursuit of obvious sim-

iles (everything being like something else) and the promulgation of cheap didacticism. They raved, recited, maddened, till the land was filled with lesser Longfellows. Of these was not our young gentleman of Cambridge, who betrayed no familiarity with contemporary verse of home production, and not so much acquaintance with the imported article as was common among his countrymen. He was not a second-rate Campbell, a hirsute Hemans, or an undeveloped Wordsworth. The only English poet whom he seemed to have read with admiration was a young person named Tennyson, who had published two thin volumes about ten years before, and whose reputation was still to be made. To say that he was impressed by Tennyson is to say that he was impressed by whatever is most purely poetic in English verse, and was *en rapport* with its master spirits; the line to which Tennyson belongs going back through Keats to Milton, and Shakespeare, and Spenser, and Chaucer. The spell of the young Tennyson was on the young Lowell when he wrote "Threnodia" and "The Sirens," which were inspired by his lyrics, as "Irené," "To Perdita Singing," "Allegra," and "Rosaline" were copied from his portraits of ideal women.

Outside of these poems the feet of Mr. Lowell could not be tracked in the snow of other men's thoughts. He was as original as a young poet could be; for, consciously or unconsciously, every young poet is a follower of somebody, and his voice is an echo of some other voice; and he was nowhere so original as in "The Beggar," "The Heritage," "The Fatherland," and the song beginning "Violet, sweet violet!" What was not so original was the "Ode" in which the poet proclaimed the grandeur of his calling, mouthing about his mission in one or two hundred magniloquent lines, the sense of which was in inverse ratio to the sound, and which were crowded with images that were too splendid to be remembered. Like many another young poet, Mr. Lowell took himself too seriously. He pleased his readers, however, and probably more in this sonorous "Ode" than in his more poetical poems, for the thing which then called itself Taste in New England set strongly towards high resolves, earnest endeavors, divine dissatisfactions, and other transcendental trumpery, and away from genuine emotion and natural expression, of which there was no lack in Mr. Lowell's unstudied sonnets. What was most notable in his poetry at this time (apart from the poetry itself) was the simplicity, the grace, the accuracy, and the purity of its English,

which, like the English of Keats and Beddoes, was so perfect as to seem inevitable.

In Mr. Lowell's second volume, which was published three years later, there was less spontaneity and more preparation,—less of delight in the singing, but more of satisfaction in the song. Where before he had hesitated and doubted, he was now certain and confident. He tottered no longer, with his fingers in the hands of others, but stood up without help, stoutly and proudly, and went whithersoever he would. His horizon was enlarged and the spirit in his feet led him further and further. One has not to read many pages in this second book to see that the writer was maturing, that he thought with more precision and decision, and that his touch on the instrument was firmer and surer,—sometimes, perhaps, a little too firm and sure, for if he had gained in strength, he had lost in sweetness. There were new elements and activities here,—essays on stronger lines, ventures in broader fields. One was in the direction of dramatic writing, as indicated in soliloquy; another in the direction of story-telling, as outlined in the presentation of incidents or experiences. The first of these movements was manifested in "Prometheus" and "Columbus"; the second in "Rhœcus" and "A Glance Behind the Curtain." The form of poetic art at which Mr. Lowell aimed in "Prometheus" and "Columbus" was, if not discovered by, first cultivated by, Tennyson and Browning,—by Tennyson in "Ulysses," which was given to the world, we believe, in 1842, and by Browning in "Artemis Prologuizes," which was written two or three years later.

The intention of these poets, in the poems specified, was dramatic, but they cannot be said to have realized it in these poems, whatever they may have done in later ones, for, critically speaking, they are rather representative than dramatic, in that the writers have not succeeded in merging their own personality in the personality of their characters. It is not Ulysses who speaks to us in the grave, wise words which are so impressive, but Tennyson behind the mask of Ulysses. Neither is it Columbus who speaks to us, but Mr. Lowell, who has donned the garb of that daring old navigator. We listen to Columbus with respect, for his emotion is noble and his speech grandiose; and with a certain sense of satisfaction, for if he does not convince us that he will discover a world, he convinces us that his other self has discovered one in

the new-old world of English blank verse, which is to all other verse what the continent is to what it contains—the mountains that declare its grandeur, the forests that preserve its solitudes, the lakes that mirror its skies, and the rivers that wind their way seaward freighted with all its treasures. Before Mr. Lowell Bryant was the only American poet who wrote good blank verse : how many American poets have written it since ? His mastery of blank verse was magnificent, but it was faulty, since it was often careless and exuberant. Given a theme which demanded it, he was a good while in getting it well in hand, and when he did get it in hand, he was so jubilant with what was before him that he pranced, and curveted, and, digging his spurs in, began before the beginning. ~~“Rhæcus”~~ would have been a better poem than it is if he could have persuaded himself to sacrifice the first thirty-five lines which he wrote, which are not only not necessary, but wholly unnecessary, since they delay the reader, who, if he wants anything, wants the poem, and not the lesson which it is supposed to enforce, but which it should not enforce ; for if it be there, he should find it for himself, or, not finding it, should feel it, as he could not fail to do if the art of the poet were what it should be. That a poem should be a poem, and nothing else, was a truth that Mr. Lowell did not recognize, though he did not ignore it to the same extent as Longfellow, who was perpetually, while Lowell was only occasionally, didactic ; the difference being that the one sang his song and deduced his moral, while the other sang his moral and deduced his song. They liked that sort of thing in New England then, but it was not art, and never will be art.

There were qualities ^{in his} in this second book which revealed an active and fertile mind, a quick sympathy with and a clear comprehension of sorrow and suffering, a profound belief in the brotherhood of man, the recognition of high ideals in private and public conduct, courage of convictions and contempt for creeds, and, present everywhere, though rather felt than seen, an instinctive love of nature. Manifestations of these qualities (which the reader of this paper will kindly classify for himself), are “Hunger and Cold” and “The Landlord,” which fulfill the best requirements of poems for the people, that so many versifiers were trying to write then. ~~“The Search,”~~ “Extreme Unction,” “Above and Below,” “The Ghost-Seer,” “Bibliolatries,” “The

Dandelion," which was a worthy companion-piece to Emerson's "Humblebee," and the "Ode to France" (but that, however, was still to be written), which will bear reading after Coleridge's glorious ode to the same grand but unfortunate country and people.) In these poems, and others which belong to the same period, we have Mr. Lowell in the moods and limitations of his early manhood. He was serious rather than thoughtful, speculative rather than meditative. He felt more than he knew, and, writing from inspiration rather than deliberation, he was more fervid than finished. Words came to him before thoughts, and his eloquence outran his sense. He stammered in his haste, and, deficient in the musical sense, his harmonies were often harsh, and his melodies unmelodious. His songs did not sing themselves. He was austere, but not gracious; admirable, but not attractive. We acknowledged his strength, but did not love it; for, unlike that in the riddle of Samson, it did not bring forth sweetness.

In his next venture, "The Vision of Sir Launfal," Mr. Lowell's contributions to poetic poetry ended for a time. The longest poem that he had yet written, it was written with an enthusiasm which carried its readers away whether they would or not. It was a theme which might well have inspired the greatest poet, it was so noble in itself, and so suggestive of the noblest things, and its selection by Mr. Lowell was fortunate, for of all the poets of the time he was best fitted to receive it reverently and entertain it royally. To others a mediæval tradition, to him it was a poetic parable, the meaning of which was that, begin and end where it might in tradition, the Quest of the Holy Grail could, in poetry, begin and end nowhere but in the human heart. To discover this was to divine the original through the translation, and to identify it with the process of nature, which has nothing to do with morals, but everything to do with life. There may be faults in the letter of this glorious "Vision," but the spirit which held the hand that wrote the stanza on June is impeccable.

Up to this time, when he had reached his twenty-seventh year, Mr. Lowell was known to his countrymen only as a man with whom poetry had been a serious intellectual pursuit; they were now to know him as a man to whom poetry had become a strong satirical business, in which he revealed unexpected and extraor-

dinary powers. These powers were the growth of seeds which are inherent in every man of New England parentage, whether he knows it or no, and which were as vigorous then as when they were quickened to life at Concord and Bunker Hill. A poet, he was a patriot, which to be then was to be a politician also,—not in the vulgar sense, which was hateful to him, as to every man with whom politics mean principle, not party, but the noble sense which made Milton the Latin secretary of Cromwell. Not in the learned tongue, which, like Milton, he knew so well, nor in literary language, of which he was so skilful a master, but in the vernacular of the unlettered American rustic, did Mr. Lowell write “The Biglow Papers,” which reached and were understood by the people for whom they were written. They expressed their opinions upon topics in which they could not but be interested, and in words which were habitual with them,—in their simple, homely, downright, every-day speech. They were forcible with the common-sense which is uncommon, and with the humor which distinguishes great men who keep their eyes and ears open. But besides this common-sense and this humor, there were in “The Biglow Papers” a wisdom and a wit which were equally forcible and more rare; for if Hosea Biglow was in a certain sense a creation of genius, the Rev. Homer Wilbur, A. M., was absolutely such: a lesser writer might have evolved the supposititious poet, but only Mr. Lowell himself, in his happiest moods, could have created that prim, opinionated, pedantic, delightful old parson.

“The Biglow Papers” was followed, in the same year, by “A Fable for Critics,” which, begun as a squib, still remains a squib, though the cleverest in many ways in English literature. If one doubts this fact, he should read Suckling’s “Sessions of the Poets,” Hunt’s “Feast of the Poets,” and Byron’s “English Bards and Scotch Reviewers,” and he will doubt it no longer. As a consensus of poetical criticism on American authorship forty years ago it is witty and amusing, shrewd and far-sighted, playful but earnest, satirical but not cynical, and, bating a pet aversion or two, just and generous. But brilliant and versatile as it is, it is not a poem, and it was not until it was off his hands that Mr. Lowell put on his singing-ropes and was once more the poet he was born to be. He was then what he had been, and more, for the years had not only brought the philosophic mind, but with it

broader and sweeter sympathies, higher and deeper emotions, and the mellowness which comes from strenuous exercise of worldly wisdom and constant practice of gracious deeds. Mr. Lowell was at his best and greatest when he wrote "Under the Willows," "The Cathedral," and the "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration."

The time may not have come to fix Mr. Lowell's rank as a poet, but the time has come to fix his rank as a critic, which is a higher one than that of any and every other writer who has essayed criticism in America. He had a breadth of scholarship, obvious and recondite, and a catholicity of taste and judgment, which no one else here possessed; and whether he wrote of Milton or Dryden, Lessing or Rousseau, Dante or Shakespeare, he was alike incomparable and admirable. But this is no news to the readers of this periodical, with which he was for years connected, and which has been enriched with many of his papers. He was a great critic and a noble poet, and when he passed away he was the most eminent man of letters in America.

R. H. STODDARD.

“RECIPROCITY” AND CANADA.

BY WILLIAM HENRY HURLBERT.

THE Protectionists of the United States have not gone as far as the Protectionists of Australia, who have notified free-trade England that they will accept no federal constitution of the Australian provinces, or “states,” in which protection is not made a principle of the organic law of the land. This puzzles their friends in England, who perhaps forget that not very long ago Lord Brougham thought it “unconstitutional” to meddle with protection in England. But the American Protectionists have established a condition of “commercial belligerency” with all the world outside the Union, subject only to certain mitigations or truces which may, under the name of “treaties of reciprocity,” be proclaimed by the President.

These “treaties” are not treaties, as they need not be ratified by the Senate. They are executive arrangements which, as affecting the public revenue, Congress has authorized.

Such arrangements have already been made, not only with two independent American republics, Brazil and Santo Domingo, but with a great American dependency of Spain. It remains to be seen how they will work, and there are already murmurs both from Spain and from Cuba. Whether these arrangements were inspired or conducted or concluded by the President, or by the Secretary of State, it does not concern my present purpose to inquire. Possibly my accomplished friend, Mr. Foster, of Indiana, to whom analogous arrangements with Mexico and with Spain were entrusted ten years ago, may some day enlighten the world on this point. But be this as it may, further negotiations for a commercial truce with the Dominion of Canada were announced in April of this year. The country had hardly heard of them before it was mystified by the information that they had been interrupted by a grotesque “international episode” of cross-

telegrams and countermanded special trains between Washington and Ottawa.

It was then understood that these negotiations would be resumed during the current month of October; and the most ardent Free-Trader in America must hope, as a matter of decency, that when they are resumed the Secretary of State may be well enough to take personal control of them.

We have the word of Sir Charles Tupper for it, in a speech delivered by him—I think at Toronto—on the eve of the last Canadian elections, that he then, in March, 1891, had "every reason to believe" that Mr. Blaine then saw his way to proposing a plan of "commercial reciprocity" with Canada which would interfere neither with the autonomy of the Dominion nor with the operation by the United States of that system of protection to which, notwithstanding his pungent criticisms of the McKinley Law as originally framed, Mr. Blaine, in magnificent contempt alike of political economy and of the lessons of the American census, emphatically attributes the prosperity of the United States. If Mr. Blaine has such a plan and thinks he can see his way also to getting the new House of Representatives to confirm it, it will be interesting to see him try his hand at it. Wallis discovered the binomial theorem while he was looking for the quadrature of the circle, and it was only through persistent looking for the quadrature of the circle that pundits were brought at last to give up the hope of finding it.

"Reciprocity" is only an international form of protection. It is cutting a dike after a dike has been built at great cost "to keep the level of a nation's wealth," as an early Protectionist said, "above the surrounding element." The word is a mongrel and a bastard, like the thing. Bastards, however, are sometimes more beautiful than their legitimate brethren, and the word "reciprocity" is certainly less troublesome and cacophonous than "reciprocality." This was perhaps Franklin's reason for adopting it, if, as there is some reason to suppose, Franklin is responsible for its use in the public document in which, so far as I know, it first made its bow to the world of politics and diplomacy. The actual paternity of the word lies, I believe, between Blackstone and that wily and evasive British statesman with whom Franklin so often tried conclusions, Lord Shelburne. But it was first officially used in November, 1782, and, curiously

enough, in the provisional treaty of peace between England and the United States.

The thing "reciprocity," I need not say, is of earlier date. It is coeval with the "mercantile theory" against which Sir William Petty and Sir Dudley North made such a strenuous fight at the end of the seventeenth century. A very fair type of all the "arrangements" on which our modern Protectionists so confidently rely is to be found in the famous Methuen treaty of 1703 between England and Portugal. The political object of that treaty was to "head off" the drift of Pedro II., of Portugal, towards Louis XIV., and the policy of "abolishing the Pyrenees." Its commercial object was to tempt Portugal into admitting the textile fabrics of England on better terms than those of Germany and France, by admitting Portuguese wines into England on better terms than the wines of France and Germany. This, it will be seen, was genuine "reciprocity" "arranged" for the benefit of clothiers in England and vine-growers in Portugal, at the expense alike of every Portuguese who wore a coat and breeches, and of every Englishman who drank a glass of wine.

The Right Honorable John Methuen, who was sent out by Lord Godolphin to negotiate it, was the very man for the work. His heart was in it, for he was the son of an energetic Scotch manufacturer of woollen goods who had established himself in Wiltshire, where he drove a roaring trade and founded a noble family. He was inspired by filial piety, as Mr. Gladstone was when he began his career in Parliament by a vigorous attack upon Lord Althorp's proposition that the West Indian planters should be made to pay a small weekly wage to their negroes during the years of apprenticeship which were to precede the complete emancipation of the West Indian slaves. His treaty delighted the English manufacturers, who were then all Protectionists, at the expense of the English land-owners, who were then Free-Traders. It set Englishmen who had been getting tipsy on hock and claret under the Stuarts, to getting tipsy on port under the Guelphs. It cemented the alliance of Portugal with England, and so may be said to have led indirectly to Waterloo. But, like all "class legislation," it tended to pauperize a part of the community in both England and Portugal; and its abrogation after more than a century, in 1834, was one

of the premonitory symptoms of that great change in her fiscal policy, to which the England of the Cato Street conspiracy and the Bristol and Nottingham riots unquestionably owes so much of the unexampled prosperity she has enjoyed for the last thirty years as she does not owe to the American Civil War and to the persistent sacrifice during the same period, by successive American administrations, of the interests of “the masses” to the interests of “the classes” in the United States.

The President and his Secretary of State are welcome to such comfort as they can legitimately get out of the history of “reciprocity” in the old world.

What concerns the American people is that there should be as thorough a threshing-out as possible, during these impending negotiations at Washington, of the true bearing of “reciprocity” upon the future of the new world; and in view of this it is much to be regretted that the negotiations must now be conducted without the invaluable coöperation of the eminent statesman upon whom his Canadian countrymen have conferred the title of “Father of the Confederation.” No man now living in Canada, in Great Britain, or in the United States can pretend to such an intimate familiarity with all the issues involved in the relations of Canada with the British Empire and with the United States as fifty years of political experience had given to the late Premier of the Dominion. He presided over the establishment of the Dominion by the British Parliament in 1867. When he entered political life in Canada, the existence of the American Union was threatened by the sectional opposition of New England to the admission of the ephemeral republic of Texas. As a member of the Canadian Government ten years afterwards, he assisted Lord Elgin in carrying through a treaty of commercial reciprocity with the United States, which were then administered by public men uninfluenced by what Adam Smith calls the “mean and malignant arguments of restraint.” Under the operation of this treaty, Sir John saw the commercial movement between the United States and British North America rise in six years from a total of \$20,671,750 in 1853 to a total of \$47,881,625 in 1859. He saw the abrogation of this treaty ten years afterwards by the American party which is now in power; and he then led Canada into fighting protection with protection. What was the

result ? In 1889, after twenty years of commercial belligerency, the commercial movement between the countries amounted to \$99,891,394. So that, speaking roughly, we have an increase of only about 117 per cent. after twenty years of "commercial belligerency," against an increase of 130 per cent. in six years of commercial peace. Of the \$7,829,099 of goods exported by the United States to British North America in 1853, before the negotiation of the Elgin-Marcy treaty of June 5, 1854, nearly 50 per cent., or \$3,822,587, was of foreign production transmitted through the United States. Under the operation of the Elgin-Marcy treaty in 1859 only about 30 per cent. of the American exports, or \$5,501,125, was of foreign production, against \$13,439,667 of domestic American production. In connection with which point, by the way, it may be well to note that between 1878 and 1888 the percentage of American imports into Canada fell from 53.33 to 47.14, and the percentage of British imports from 41.04 to 38.21, while the percentage of French imports into Canada rose from 1.52 to 2.17, the percentage of Spanish (West Indian) imports from 0.46 to 2.37, and the percentage of German imports from 0.44 to 3.27 ! These figures, taken in connection with the efforts which the Canadian Pacific managers are making to accelerate steam connection between Asia and Europe, are of interest. During the last ten years the imports from Japan and China into Canada have been from 0.42 to 2.06 of the Canadian import trade. In 1889 the per-capita proportion of the Canadian foreign trade to the population amounted to \$40.27, against a like proportion of no more than \$22.88 to the population of the Union.

No one can now say how far Sir John Macdonald really believed in what is known in England as "imperial federation." Of course he knew that without the cordial coöperation of Canada "imperial federation" is not likely ever to get beyond the iridescent stage of speeches, resolutions, and banquets. But it is not easy to believe that he can ever have seriously contemplated a practical grapple with such a problem in fiscal and legislative organization as a political federation of the United Kingdom and British North America with Australasia and the Indian Empire. It is idle to speculate now as to what might have been, had the British Government of 1783 coöperated with Jay and Adams at Versailles to establish "com-

mercial reciprocity” between the thirteen new and independent American States and all parts of the British dominions excepting the territories of the chartered companies in the East Indies and on Hudson’s Bay. The whole face of the world has been changed since George III. helped Franklin and the French to spoil that plan. If even so much as a customs union is ever to be formed which shall include all branches of the English-speaking race, the analogies all indicate that such a union must follow, not precede, the development of every important branch into an independent tree, with roots struck deep into the soil of its own area. This conviction was doubtless in the mind of Lord Salisbury when he subtly put away the patriotic importunity of Lord Rosebery, Lord Brassey, and other leaders of the Federation League, by inviting them to submit a working project for a federal union. “You have stated,” he said, “a problem—I might almost call it an enigma. Let us have your notion of how it can be solved !”

The American Union could never have been framed excepting by a group of absolutely independent and autonomous sovereignties, and an “imperial federation” of colonies and dependencies with a preponderating metropolis has become less, and not more, practicable with the progress of representative institutions during the nineteenth century. Even as things now are, one of the Australian colonies has calmly nullified the unquestionable prerogative of the British crown to nominate its own representatives ; and Mr. Goldwin Smith is probably right when he tells us that if an imperial federation were formed “Her Majesty would have to choose between the British and the Pan-Britannic crown.”

But whatever may have been the views of Sir John Macdonald as to the future of the Dominion he did so much to found, he certainly looked forward to that future as involving not a divergence, but a convergence between the interests of Canada and the interests of the United States.

In 1866, not long after the repulse by Canadian volunteers of the outrageous Fenian invasion which in the summer of that year gave so much trouble not only to President Johnson and to General Grant, but to all the politicians of the United States, it was my fortune to be the guest of Sir John Macdonald at a banquet given to him by his constituents in Kingston. The occasion certainly did not invite any cordial expression of good will towards my country. In

spite of the American Government, Canadian soil had been invaded, Canadian lives had been lost in repelling the invaders, and Canada had been threatened with the horrors of war—not to avenge any wrong suffered at Canadian hands, but solely by way of “striking a blow” at a friendly government and people three thousand miles away, beyond the Atlantic. Sir John might have been pardoned if in such circumstances he had given some expression, even in the presence of an American Democrat, to the unnatural emotions of his own people. But he did nothing of the sort. He did not even allude to the Fenian “naval victory” off Eastport! On the contrary, he took that opportunity of doing full justice, and possibly a little more than justice, to the conduct of the American authorities.

We are not now emerging from, and I certainly hope we are not now entering upon, a period of “villanous saltpetre” in our relations with Canada. But we are now passing through a period of “commercial belligerency”; and it is important that, on the eve of negotiations intended, we must assume, to terminate, or at least to modify, this “belligerency,” we should rightly estimate the temper and the aims of the Dominion.

We want as little prejudice and passion as possible imported into the question of our commercial relations with the most important, the most progressive, and the most enlightened nation with which, on this continent, we have to deal—a nation with which, under the existing conditions of progress in the new world and in the old, we must count, in the not distant future, not as a mere satellite of Great Britain, but as a group of commonwealths more considerable from the American point of view than any European power of the second rank.

Canadian politics, like our own, are rather cloudy just now, but the government at Ottawa is still in the hands of public men committed to the policy of the late Premier. The negotiations at Washington will probably be conducted, as they would have been had Sir John still lived, by Sir Charles Tupper, who was associated with Mr. Chamberlain in those “fishery negotiations” at Washington, in 1888, with the results of which both Democratic and Republican public men in this country have professed at least a Platonic satisfaction, and to whose thorough fairness and good will towards the United States Mr. Phelps, the representative in London of President Cleveland’s government,

bore emphatic public witness at the “Fishmongers’” banquet not long before his return to this country.

But whoever may conduct the negotiations at Washington, those negotiations must fix public attention upon the question how far the official intromission of the Parliamentary executive of Great Britain in the commercial relations between the Union and the Dominion is an element of mischief, and how far an element of good, in the relations, not only of Canada with the United States, but of the Dominion and the Union, respectively, with Great Britain.

This is a cardinal question which seems to me likely to be the most important outcome of Mr. Blaine’s Canadian negotiations. If all of us do not soon begin to consider it temperately and judiciously, the time is not far off when it will get itself considered perhaps neither temperately nor judiciously. Everybody who has followed, even in the most cursory way, the history of the interminable fishery questions, which have been debated and discussed almost to the fighting-point between London and Washington during the last two generations, must be aware that the complication of purely Canadian and American with purely British issues has been, throughout all these discussions and debates, a permanent source of confusion and irritation. Is the “commercial belligerency” of the present moment between the Dominion and the Union anything more than an incident of the “commercial belligerency” developed by our system of protection between the United States and the United Kingdom? Doubtless it is made more acute and therefore more costly to the taxpayers, upon whom the burden of this sort, as of all sorts, of “belligerency” eventually falls, by the unwise attempt of the Canadians to seek prosperity through protection. But would not the prospect of relief from it through some diplomatic transaction be brighter than it now is were such a transaction to be carried on exclusively between Ottawa and Washington? Is not the direct and, indeed, primary participation of the British Foreign Office in any such transaction between the Dominion and the Union likely to impede rather than to further its success?

All the analogies indicate that the less Great Britain meddles with the relations between the Dominion and the Union, the better it will be for all parties concerned. There is a growing dislike in the United States to any active interference of Europe

in American questions. This may be deplored, but it cannot wisely be ignored. Why does this feeling deepen with the development of the Dominion? It is not a mere arrogant outcry of "Hands off!" to the old world. Americans object to British interference in questions between the United States and Canada, not at all because Canada chose at the time of the American Revolution to resist the natural, but rather unscrupulous, attempt of the confederated colonies to draw her, with what are now the maritime provinces of the Dominion, into the revolutionary contest; nor yet because Canada unquestionably still desires to maintain her connection with the British crown as an autonomous member of the British Empire. Theoretically, there is no more reason why friction should arise between Canada and the United States on account of the presence in Canada of a British viceroy, representing the British crown, than why friction should arise for a similar reason between the United States and the island of Jamaica, which a hundred years ago, after we had become a nation, was more important to us than Canada. But practically there is a wide difference between the two cases. The area of Canada is so enormous; it is conterminous with that of the United States throughout so long a line; the frontier is crossed and re-crossed by waterways and railway connections so extensive; the products of each country and its natural resources are so necessary to the people of the other, that the interference, in any form which practically affects their commercial relations, of a third power, lying three thousand miles away and existing under conditions entirely different from those which dominate both Canada and the United States, must inevitably give rise to difficulties and misunderstandings not only between the two great parties primarily interested, but between both of them, sooner or later, and the third party so interfering.

What reason was there, for example, in the local interests of Canada for those navigation clauses in the Anglo-American convention of 1818 out of which so much trouble has been made between England and America during the protracted discussion of the fishery questions? What reason is there now, in the commercial relations of Great Britain with the United States, for the assertion by Canada, as against the United States, of these clauses in the convention of 1818?

Is it impossible for Canada, while continuing its connection with the British Empire, and preserving in its parliamentary system, the advantages of an executive appointed by the British crown, to be left free to regulate its own commercial relations, not only with the United States, but with all the world? Why should London be required to pass on questions as to the load-line of Canadian vessels or the cattle trade of Canada with the United States? In business matters Great Britain is as much a foreign country to Canada as are the United States. No less than 40 per cent. of the amount of duties collected by Canada in 1889 was collected on goods from Great Britain, against only 32 per cent. collected on goods from the United States.

Would not the position of those Canadian statesmen who now object to "unrestricted reciprocity" between the United States and Canada be stronger than it now is if England were out of the question? Why should England herself desire, in the interest of her empire, to exercise any shadow of control through the British Parliamentary executive over the commercial relations of Canada, after abandoning, as she has abandoned, all control over the fiscal system of Canada? If Canada may lay, as she now lays, duties on British imports, either for natural and reasonable purposes of revenue or for artificial and absurd purposes of protection, why may she not form treaties with the United States, or France, or Germany, for the regulation of her commerce, by land and sea, with any and with all of these nations? In what respect would the bonds of sentiment, of political machinery, and of financial investment, which alone now really unite Canada with Great Britain, be seriously impaired by the abandonment to Canada absolutely of such a treaty-making power? Why should not Canada have a minister of her own at Washington, as Bavaria and Saxony, for example, had their own envoys at London and Paris under the old German Bund? Australia has just been framing a project for a general Australian union, and in this project Australia peremptorily demands the right to make all treaties with all powers on the Pacific; a demand which really covers France, Spain, and Germany, as well as China and Siam and Japan. If this must be conceded to Australia, why should less be conceded to Canada? Nay, why should even Newfoundland be denied what cannot be refused to Australia?

Is it not time, in other words, for the Dominion to be treated,

not by the United States only, but by Great Britain, as an American, and no longer in any entangling sense a European, nationality ?

Can it be to the interest of any European power to resist in any way the currents which are emancipating the American continents absolutely from any direct political connection with Europe ? How are the Germans taking Lord Lorne's clever suggestion that they should leave Africa to England and make the Argentine a German protectorate ?

Is it not to the interest of England, above all other European powers, to recognize the force and to facilitate the flow of these currents ? Would it not have been wiser for Spain to do this in the days of Canning and in the case of the nationalities which then began to arise out of the disintegration of the Spanish power in the new world ? Are not the elements of a new nationality stronger and more numerous in the case of Canada than they were in the case of Mexico, of Peru, of Chili, or of the Argentine Republic ?

Is it necessary to say that these considerations in no wise look to any absorption of the Dominion by the Union ?

Certainly the difficulties in the way of the absorption of the Dominion by the Union are at least as great as in the way of the absorption by the Union of Mexico. The republic of Texas was a merely transitional outcome of American emigration, enterprise, colonization, and conquest. It was organized only to be annexed. The annexation of California merely led to the occupation of a region virtually uninhabited. The problems presented to the American people by a serious attempt to absorb the Dominion into the Union would be both new and formidable ; so formidable, indeed, and so new, that the contingency of any such attempt within any immediately assignable period of time, except as an outcome of some form of "belligerency," may well be left out of the question in considering the immediate future of the relations between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.

While for many reasons any movement toward a political union of the Dominion with the United States must be, for a long time to come, as its warmest advocates in Canada admit, quite hopeless and visionary, there are considerations of the highest importance which militate against any serious attempt on the part of the

United States to promote the entrance of Canada into the Union.

Perhaps the most important of these is the certainty that out of the enormous area of the Dominion it would be found politically necessary to carve such a number of new American States as must seriously disturb the balance of power between the different sections of the Union in the more important branch of Congress. The two provinces of Ontario and Quebec are much more than equal in extent to the combined areas of New York, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Under the arbitration of 1878 Pennsylvania and Indiana might have been thrown in, into the bargain! Were Ontario and Quebec admitted to the Union, with nearly four millions of inhabitants, they would give us at the least five new States, seating ten new Senators. They would also give us the education question in its Canadian form, and the question of the French Canadian Church with its treaty rights and its vast vested interests. How could the maritime provinces be got in except as separate States? New Brunswick would balance Oregon; Nova Scotia would speak up for her apples and her mines as loudly as California and Nevada; Newfoundland, with an area equal to that of Ohio, would throw her two senatorial votes "all the time" for a great navy. And what of Manitoba with her wheat, Alberta with her horses, and British Columbia with the Pacific at her feet? It is a moderate estimate that annexation would throw into the Senate at least twenty Senators, all representing interests widely different from those of the Atlantic States, the Gulf States, and the States of the Mississippi Valley.

It may be well for any American who feels disposed to precipitate such an experiment as this in the adjustment and balance of our confederate system to look into the history of the apportionment bills of 1792 and of Washington's first veto. Have the immigration question and the labor question become simpler or more complicated since the abolition of slavery? I have great faith in the assimilative power of the American system. But the eagle has not yet given place on our escutcheon to the ostrich.

Of course it is impossible, within the limits of this article, to do more than indicate such considerations as these, though it is also impossible, without much fuller and more minute discussion of these, adequately to weigh their force. But to state them should suffice to show how absolutely foreign to the purpose of

this paper, how inconsistent even with its purpose, would be any consideration, even for a moment, of such a possibility as the absorption of Canada by the United States. On the contrary, many things go to show that, in the interest of both Canada and the United States, a very considerable development of the Dominion, as an independent power, is eminently to be desired. There is no reason why such an independent power may not be, there are scores of reasons why it must be, at once a moderating influence in the home politics and a trustworthy ally in the international relations of the United States. Its action must tend to more, not to less, friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain.

Forty years ago Sir Henry Taylor wrote to Lord Grey that, while he thought the North American colonies useful to Great Britain, he also considered any uses "not obtainable from them as independent nations no more than dust in the balance compared with the evil contingencies." The "uses" of Canada to Great Britain have perhaps increased since 1852; the "evil contingencies" have certainly not diminished. But will not England's way to India across the American continent be more secure under conditions of friendship and alliance between a commercially-independent Dominion and the American Union than is her way to India through the Suez Canal under the conditions of the existing English protectorate at Cairo?

WM. HENRY HURLBERT.

STRAWS.

BY COLONEL HENRY WATTERSON.

I.

IT IS THE UNEXPECTED THAT HAPPENS. IN nothing is the speculative predilection of the average American shown so markedly as in the field of political conjecture, where, in the event that occasion requires, it may be humored without cost or risk of any sort. We are, indeed, a nation of politicians, if not of gamblers, and he is but a poor specimen of the race who, born a sovereign, cannot serve at once as his own prime minister and prophet. Hence statesmanship with us is the reverse of an exact science; out of all relation to mathematical precision; being in a state of actual and constant war with geometrical progression, to say nothing of other forms of progress.

A surmise to-day as to the condition of parties to-morrow has nothing whatever to rest upon except the filigree of imagination, the frail and trellised but insubstantial frameories of guesswork. One man's prediction is as good as another's. Nor is this peculiar to the present moment. It has been the rule these fifty years; and it springs not less from the temperament of the people than from the exigencies which that temperament constantly forces upon the party managers.

Party platforms were long ago made only to be broken. Party nominations have long been the children of accident. From Polk to Harrison, in the national conventions, it has been the unexpected which, with a single exception, has come to pass. That exception was Buchanan, who owed his good fortune in this particular to an honorable, though an irksome, banishment to the Court of St. James's during the stormy years that, following the inauguration of Franklin Pierce, laid each of his rivals in the dust and made him the available candidate in 1856. Polk, Pierce, Lincoln, Hayes, Garfield, Cleveland, and Harrison were each a new man in the presidential arena, whose nomination was brought around by the laws of expediency, and each proved more or less a surprise to the country. In the cases of Polk, Pierce,

and Garfield the surprise was great and universal. In those of Lincoln and Cleveland it was anticipated by hardly more than a year of popular knowledge that such persons had an existence.

Among the papers of the late Justice Stanley Matthews, of the Supreme Court, may be found a very curious document partly in the handwriting of President Polk. It is a newspaper article urging the nomination of Martin Van Buren. With this the writing of Mr. Polk leaves off, and another pen takes up the theme, urging the nomination of Mr. Polk for *Vice-President*. This queer example of the eccentricities of American politics was written and printed in Mr. Polk's home organ in Tennessee less than a month before his own nomination for the Presidency. Yet at the time it appeared he was a very doubtful entry, as turfmen say, for second place.

In the organization of the Liberal movement of 1872 there was objection among a certain set of reformers to Mr. Greeley, and therefore to Mr. Whitelaw Reid, who appeared at Cincinnati as Mr. Greeley's personal representative; but it being argued with much plausibility that Mr. Greeley could in no event receive the nomination, and that the support of *The Tribune* might be needed in the coming campaign, Mr. Reid was finally admitted to full fellowship, solely to clinch Mr. Greeley and *The Tribune*. The accession of Johnson and Arthur to the Presidency baffles melodrama; whilst, except for what followed, the elevation of both Lincoln and Cleveland would rival the *grotesquerie* of comic opera.

II.

Taking up the cue of the unexpected, which so often happens,—with historic examples for a warrant,—let us make a brief survey of the political field and humour the mood both of speculation and the speculator with regard to coming events, possible and otherwise.

Suppose Governor Campbell is reëlected in Ohio and it is indicated clearly that under his leadership Ohio can be relied on in 1892 by the Democrats: is there not good reason to believe that he would enter the next Democratic National Convention with an almost irresistible prestige? Suppose Governor Boies is reëlected in Iowa by a good majority, and Governor Campbell is defeated in Ohio: would not that make Governor Boies a formidable candidate? Suppose the Republicans should carry New York in the coming

fall election : what effect would this have upon the Cleveland and Hill factions in the Empire State ? Suppose none of these things happens, but that New York comes to the next National Convention either divided in her choice or opposing outright the nomination of Mr. Cleveland : would that not force the party to quit New York altogether and to seek a candidate elsewhere, and—in this event—where ? Mr. Gorman and Mr. Carlisle live on the wrong side of the line ; and Mr. Morrison lacks the united support of Illinois. General Palmer has passed the age of promotion to party leadership. Of course Governor Pattison is possible, particularly if Pennsylvania goes Democratic in the fall elections ; whilst others, of whom we yet know nothing, may be “ hid in the bushes.” Hence it is that, unless the coming elections procure the Democrats something decisive in Ohio, Pennsylvania, or Iowa, the party will have to meet and dispose of the war between Cleveland and Hill, with a very scant margin of choice to go on when both are laid aside as unavailable ; a contingency which, under the circumstances, seems not unlikely.

These suggestions are put forward in the way of the merest speculation. Touching them, one man’s opinion is nearly as good as his neighbor’s. A few weeks more will dispose of the most of them. But the faction fight in New York will not down so easily. It seems here to stay until the next National Convention at least, if not after. It is the one stumbling-block across the Democratic highway. If the party is beaten in 1892, it will owe its defeat largely, if not mainly, to this. Thinking Democrats cannot fail to regard it with apprehension, and disinterested Democrats must feel that, if it is not disposed of in some satisfactory way, the outlook for the next National Democratic Convention will be stormy indeed. Unhappily, New York politics, and the politics of the country at large, have very little assimilation, and hence external pressure exercises less influence upon New York than upon any other State of the Union. It is, so to say, a nation unto itself.

III.

It will thus be seen that outside the State of New York the Democrats are in a complete fog for a candidate, whilst in the State of New York the contention for ascendancy between two rival leaders has lashed the elements into a gale of the most threatening description.

A TALE OF TWO
LEADERS.

It is understood that this family quarrel had its origin in matters chiefly personal and of no great import. But it may be doubted whether there was not back of these a set of irreconcilable conditions. New York is, and always has been, both strong and weak in national counsels,—strong because of her electoral vote ; weak because of her dissensions.

The events which brought Mr. Cleveland to the Presidency and Mr. Hill to the Governorship abounded in much that is picturesque in American politics. If either had, in the outset, realized the strength of the other, the succeeding antagonism, so hurtful to both, might have been averted. But in the beginning the two were wholly undeveloped ; and their development marks the date of their separation. Who could have foreseen that a man taken from the body of the people, and advanced to the Presidency without previous training in national affairs, would so soon and so firmly grasp the reins of power, seize the salient points of large ideas and current drifts of thought, and give to airy policies a definite purpose and phrasing ? On the other hand, who could foresee that the comparatively unknown politician who had been left behind to administer, *ad interim*, home affairs until a successor was chosen, would himself appear as that successor, and easily so, winning repeated victories against odds, and building up an organization unequalled since the days of Mr. Tilden in his prime ? That the Governor appreciated the President is more than likely ; but there is no evidence that the President appreciated the Governor ; and herein lies Mr. Cleveland's organic defect of character. He sets too much store by measures, too little by men.

One would hardly expect this in a man brought up in the school of the most every-day and commonplace affairs ; who had been a sheriff and a mayor, and an all-around attorney in an interior city. It is related that Mr. Cleveland made a good sheriff and a good mayor, showing great assiduity and an unusual turn for details. He brought with him to the national capital these excellent gifts ; but he soon added to them the display of an extraordinary self-confidence, particularly in one so unprepared, and a surprising taste for experimental politics, personal and practical. He cut and slashed right and left. In his hands precedents were scattered like cobwebs. His aim seemed to be to recreate the public service anew and after his own

image. He beat down opposition with a success startling to the discomfited. He made issues with a precipitation that staggered the doctrinaires. It is not denied by his enemies, partisan or personal, that he gave the country a wise, safe, and clean administration. But he lost his reelection; and the circumstances attending this loss lie at the bottom of the difference between him and Governor Hill, impairing the usefulness of both.

Governor Hill carried the State of New York as the Democratic nominee for Governor, and Mr. Cleveland lost it as the Democratic nominee for President. That is a concrete fact. If the two had been friends, it had been enough to threaten their relations; but, being upon terms, to say the least of them, not very cordial, it formed the basis for immediate and for subsequent attacks upon the loyalty of Governor Hill wholly unjust to the Governor. The simple truth is that Mr. Cleveland lost the vote of New York on account of the friends he had chilled into indifference or converted into enemies, and that Governor Hill carried it because of a vote which might have been cast as well for Mr. Cleveland. Herein Governor Hill showed himself the better politician, not an unfriendly or unfaithful colleague; for Mr. Cleveland was nowise ignorant of the situation. But whilst Governor Hill, with admirable energy and tact, pursued the methods common to all parties in the very mundane business of carrying elections, Mr. Cleveland, all unconscious of impending danger, his eye fixed upon the star of his destiny, was soaring through the clouds of great but intangible ideas.

IV.

THE COST
OF TOO MUCH
GREATNESS.

But Mr. Cleveland's loss of the Presidency, contradicting all theories about the successfulness of success, did not lose him the hold he had gained upon the confidence of the people. It strengthened it. There was a feeling among Democrats that he had, by brave and honest service to the country, earned his reelection, and that in some way he had been cheated out of it. Naturally the disappointment was general, and the coincident election of Governor Hill fell in among other things with this disappointment. In a sense, it tarnished a glory Governor Hill had fairly won, and was made to create sympathy for Mr. Cleveland

and to reflect discredit on Governor Hill ; all most wrongfully. But here, it seems to me, Governor Hill failed to take a large and luminous view of the case.

The victim of circumstance can rarely quarrel effectually with circumstance. If he cannot make his peace with it, he had better acquiesce in it, or seem to acquiesce. Evidently Governor Hill is not a doctrinaire. He is a practical politician and he is a man ; and he disputed the imputation with more or less of spirit. The result is an apparently irreconcilable conflict, in which Mr. Cleveland and Governor Hill have everything to lose, and nothing to gain, whilst the party to which both claim allegiance is the sufferer.

If Governor Hill could have seen his way to it, the Democratic party and these two eminent party leaders would stand to-day upon much higher and solidier grounds. It may not have been in human weakness, but it would have been in worldly wisdom, had the Governor recognized the fact that his election as Governor and Mr. Cleveland's defeat as President, on a common ticket, made his own succession to the Presidency uncertain. If there was between them an outstanding account, this balanced it, and Governor Hill could have afforded to make a sacrificial offer of an olive branch. Mr. Cleveland could not have refused. Indeed, it was eminently a case where sacrifice was sagacity and generosity prudence. It would have set at rest, and at once, all issues between leaders who were too strong to quarrel. It would have made them one in an irresistible movement, supported by the noblest popular enthusiasm. It might not, indeed, have ended in the election of Governor Hill to the Presidency,—though it would have taken that direction,—but it would have done more than this ; it would have made him a national leader and an unchallenged power among men. Without these attributes of popular leadership, the Presidency is the merest bauble, and, whilst Governor Hill is making himself strong in the State of New York, he is in reality doing his great talents for affairs injustice with the country at large.

In a word, these two party chiefs ought to see that they are wasting a vast amount of good fighting material. If each could take to himself a little of the other, both would be mended. As it is, the very advantages they may gain—the one in the country by the attractive side of his character and personality which he shows the masses ; the other in the State by his dextrous and

astute handling of local and muscular forces—work only evil to the cause that ought to be, and undoubtedly is, dear to them both. In the end they may find that they have lost all; for the Democratic party at large is growing very restive under New York turbulence, and it only wants a good pretext, and some one to head it, to throw off the dominion of the Empire State once and for all.

V.

THE
DEMOCRATIC
ISSUE.

Is it not, after all, the issue, and not the candidate, that counts in the election of a President? He was something more than a humorist who observed that by the time the personality of a presidential nominee was spread out over the whole country it grew rather thin! The immense popularity of Mr. Clay could not save him from defeat; and, in later times, the examples of General Hancock and Mr. Blaine point the same moral.

In the nature of things this must continue to be so, and more so; the question of availability, and not of individuality, occupying the first place in the thought of the nominating conventions. It seems to be the destiny of our republic to go on augmenting its grandeur and its power—already concentrated beyond the dreams of the most extreme federalism by the railway and the telegraph—until, a republic no longer except in name, its chief magistrates become mere types, chosen solely because of their representative character, and not because of any especial genius or fitness of their own.

The rival pretensions of Mr. Cleveland and Governor Hill, serious as they are and hard as they may be to settle, must yet be held by Democrats as of second-rate importance to the laying of the lines on which the next great political battle is to be fought.

If American statesmanship had any sequence to it, and parties were governed by any fixed, known, and reasonable laws, this question would have been determined by the defeat of Mr. Cleveland and the subsequent enactment of the McKinley Tariff Law. In 1888 the fight was made by the Democrats distinctly on the tariff. It was made, as the politicians say, "on principle." Those who made it gave reasons for the faith that was in them; and these reasons are as good now as they were then. They are better; because the McKinley Act is an intensification of all

which the advocates of revenue reform have held hurtful to the country. If its predecessor was bad, it is worse, and if it was wise and just to attack the former, it ought to be still wiser and more just to attack the latter.

In truth, the conflict between a revenue tariff and a protective tariff—between those who maintain that the government has no constitutional right of taxation except to raise the moneys needed for its own support, and those who maintain that taxation ought to be adjusted so as to favor certain classes and interests—is an irrepressible conflict. It constitutes an issue which will down at no man's bidding. Mr. Blaine's scheme of reciprocity, designed by that astute party leader at once as a flank movement against the Democrats and a bridge for free-trade Republicans, is a proclamation of weakness, a signal of distress, as notable as it is bold. Reciprocity is simply free trade in broken doses, and surrenders the whole case of protection as a dogma. But it will not serve the purpose of its author if the Democrats are equal to the emergency and to their duty. This latter is to stand by their guns and to fight it out on the line of 1888 until they have substituted a revenue tariff, on a peace footing, for the present protective tariff, with its high scale of war duties.

Just here we encounter an obstacle which ought to have no place in our party politics, and has none in the party politics of any other country. There is always from certain quarters a clamor for "more money," and at the present moment this takes the form of a demand for "more silver." The terms "free coinage" and "unlimited coinage" are trolled from stump to stump with a volubility only too significant of the absence of information, whilst resolution after resolution is passed by county meetings and district conventions from which an intelligent explanation might be sought in vain.

The question of coinage is a very complicated question. It is not national, but international. There is not, and never has been, any fixed relation between gold and silver. Our own coinage act is an experiment. Any amendment to it must be experimental. Those who talk the loudest commonly know the least. They ride the waves of popular prejudice unconscious of the depths below. A few simple, salient facts, however, are obvious. The country must have enough money to transact its business, and as the national-bank notes are withdrawn, they must be re-

placed by some form of circulating medium. Thus far silver or silver certificates have supplied this need, and the cry is "more." The debtor thinks that with "more" he can pay his debts. The creditor fears that "more" means merely a flood of debased money, and the loss or abridgement of his claim. Meanwhile the demagogue, with varying degrees of ignorance and resonance, divides his time between noisy extremism and confused hair-splitting, intelligible only to followers as ignorant and excited as himself.

During the last session of Congress the Force Bill gave a great impetus to the silver movement. By the aid of the silver Republicans in the Senate, the Democrats were enabled to defeat that obnoxious measure. Turn about proved, in this instance, fair play, and the result was that many Democrats voted for the Free-Coinage Act who could not have brought the consent of their judgment thereto as a detached or original proposition. As a consequence, we have a tolerably life-sized division of opinion on the subject within the Democratic party.

I do not believe that either side to this controversy is likely to get just what it expects. There is less to be feared by the one class, and to be hoped by the other, than they think. As usual, the mean, middle ground will be found safest, and in the end it will prevail. But, truly, if the skies should rain silver, if silver dollars should be heaped up in the valleys, so that those who are making such an ado about more money could fill their sacks and baskets, and could cart it away with them, it would, under our unequal tariff system, soon find its way back to the present custodians of the wealth of the country, leaving the tax-ridden farmer as poor as ever.

If the Democratic party allows an experimental question like this, a question on which we are not agreed, to make a breach for the Republicans to march through, and relegates to second place a great question like revenue reform, on which we have had our travail, and are at last united, it will meet defeat, and will richly deserve it.

But I do not believe anything of the sort. We shall in next year's National Convention find as to silver the same common ground that we found in 1884 as to the tariff. Then, as now, we were divided. Then, as now, we had to deal with a question for which we were not prepared, and to which the country was not edu-

cated. We shall repeat the wisdom of concession in 1892, leaving something and trusting something to the kindly offices of time. In that event we shall win ; and, as a result of our victory, we can proceed with an unbroken line of enlightened and conservative reforms. In any other we shall lose ; lose all hope of a liberal money policy and of revenue reform, gaining, as the first fruit of our folly, the Force Bill, and all the evils of another indefinite lease of power to a majority which, always domineering, will, if again triumphant, be more ruthless than ever.

HENRY WATTERSON.

"THE ECONOMIC MAN."

BY E. L. GODKIN.

WE HAVE been hearing during the past twenty years, and with greatly increased emphasis during the past ten, of the utter discredit which has overtaken the older political economy of Adam Smith, and Ricardo, and Mill, and Cairnes, and Say, and Cobden, and Bastiat. Their system, we have been told, is largely a deductive system, in which the premises are furnished by hypotheses which have no basis in the actual facts of industrial life, and are not verified either by experiment or observation. Not only are these premises not true of the world at large, but they are not true of any particular country in the world. They assume that the civilized world lives under the régime of competition, whereas there are only two or three countries which can be said, with any approach to accuracy, to do so. The "Economic Man" of Ricardo always buys in the cheapest markets, and always waits patiently until he can sell in the dearest, and he assumes that in so doing he renders the best service in his power to the community. Moral considerations do not, in any degree, affect his business transactions. There is no place in his system for brotherly kindness or charity. It is inexpedient for the state to attempt to regulate him in any way, either by keeping him out of the cheapest market or impeding his access to the dearest. All he asks of it is to be left alone to deal with his fellow men in such manner as his own natural acuteness or his command of capital may permit. His one desire is to make all the money he can by every means not illegal. *Laissez faire, laissez passer*, comprises the sole and whole duty of the state towards him.

Ricardo, who is the scapegoat who has to bear the burden of most of the sins of the old school, or who, at all events, figures most prominently in this discussion, has, it is said, built up his political economy on the desires and fears of an entirely mythical personage. For his "Economic Man" is not a real man.

This man does not represent the human race in general, or any particular part of it. He is a creature of the economist's imagination. The facts of human life have not entered into his composition. The old political economy—the "Smithianismus," as the Germans call it—has been based on the assumption that this economic man exists. It must be discarded when it is shown that he does not exist; that his assumed motives and activities are not the law of industrial communities. A new inductive political economy must, therefore, take the place of this old deductive one, and must be based on the observation and careful accumulation of the facts of industrial life in civilized countries, either as they now exist or as they are historically recorded. As the economic history of every country differs in some degree from that of every other country, it follows that every country must have its own political economy and its own staff of expounders of the local science.

This is, accordingly, what has happened. There have arisen a German school, an Austrian school, an English school, a Russian school, and an American school, which all differ in the matter of "method," but all agree in repudiating Adam Smith and his economic followers, in denouncing *laissez faire*, *laissez passer* as an economic rule, in being intensely "historical," and in endeavoring to supply morality to trade through some sort of government interference, not as yet clearly defined. The scorn of the new schools for Smith and Mill and Ricardo is indeed almost bitter, but their differences about "method"—that is, about the exact nature of the mental processes by which they reach their conclusions—are already nearly as numerous as those of the metaphysicians, and are apparently likely to prove as barren. If Comte, who first flouted the pretensions of political economy to be considered a science, were now living, these differences would please him hugely as illustrations of the soundness of his position. A little volume on "The Scope and Method of Political Economy," recently published by Mr. Keynes, the Lecturer on Moral Science in Cambridge University (England), should be read by any one who wishes to get an adequate idea not so much of economical methodology as of the methodological confusion which reigns among the economists. He remarks truly:

"Economic science deals with phenomena which are more complex and less uniform than those with which the natural sciences are concerned; and

its conclusions, except in their most abstract form, lack both the certainty and precision that pertain to physical laws. There is a corresponding difficulty in regard to the proper method of economic study, and the problem of defining the conditions and limits of the validity of economic reasoning becomes one of exceptional complexity. It is, moreover, impossible to establish the right of any one method to hold the field to the exclusion of others. Different methods are appropriate according to the materials available, the stage of investigation reached, and the object in view; hence arises the special task of assigning to each its legitimate place and relative importance." (P. 6.)

Still more pertinent is the following :

"The sharp distinctions drawn by opposing schools, and their narrow dogmatism, have unnecessarily complicated the whole problem. The subject has become involved in heated controversies that have not only made it wearisome to unprejudiced persons, but have also done injury to the credit of political economy itself. Outsiders are naturally suspicious of a science in the treatment of which a new departure is so often and so loudly proclaimed essential." (P. 8.)

This contempt for the "Economic Man" is the more remarkable because the members of the historic school themselves perforce make use of him. Roscher, who may be called the chief of it, relies on him fully as much as Ricardo. Such phrases as these abound in him :

"The systematic effort of *every* rational individual in his household management is directed towards the obtaining by a minimum of sacrifice of pleasure and energy a maximum satisfaction of his wants." (Vol. I, pp. 60-66.) "The incentive to ameliorate one's condition is common to *all* men, no matter how varied the form, or how different the intensity of its imagination. It follows us *all* from the cradle to the grave. It may be restricted within certain limits, but is never *entirely* extinguished." "All normal economy aims at securing a maximum of personal advantage with a minimum of cost or outlay." (P. 73.) "Self-interest causes *every one* to choose the course in life in which he shall meet with least competition and the most abundant patronage." (P. 75.) "The abstraction according to which *all* men are by nature the same, different only in consequence of a difference of education, position in life, etc., *all* equally well equipped, skilful, and free in the matter of economic production and consumption, is one which, as Ricardo and Von Thunen have shown, must pass as an *indispensable stage* in the preparatory labors of political economists." (P. 105.) "The mathematical laws of motion operate in a hypothetical vacuum, and when applied are subject to important modifications in consequence of atmospheric resistances. Something similar is true of most of the laws of our science; as, for instance, those in accordance with which the price of a commodity is fixed by the buyer and seller. It also *always* supposes the parties to the contract to be guided *only* by a sense of 'their own best interest, and not to be influenced by secondary considerations.' (P. 103.)*

The comparison of Ricardo's Economic Man to the first law of motion is an old one, but it is as good to-day as

* These quotations are all made from Lalor's translation.

when it was first made. It is quite true, as far as human knowledge goes, that no body actually continues for an indefinite period in rectilinear and uniform motion. But it is also true that no real progress would ever have been made in astronomy or mechanics without the assumption that if a body were set in motion in a vacuum this is the way in which it would move. It is no less true that political economy, no matter how defined, cannot be taught without assuming the existence of an Economic Man who desires above all things, and without reference to ethical considerations, to get as much of the world's goods as he can with the least possible expenditure of effort or energy on his own part. The fact that he is not humane or God-fearing no more affects his usefulness for scientific purposes than the fact that the first law of motion would carry a cannon ball through a poor man's cottage. The theory of production, of value, and of exchange, all rests on his assumed existence. He supplies the *raison d'être* of the whole criminal law and of a large part of the civil law of all civilized countries. Ethics, and religion in so far as it furnishes a sanction for ethics, exist for the purpose of deflecting him from his normal course. The well-known "Gresham's Law," which declares that the less valuable of two kinds of legal-tender money will drive the more valuable out of circulation, has been understood by some of our more ignorant bimetallicists as meaning that one will exert some kind of mechanical pressure or chemical repulsion on the other. But "Gresham's Law" is simply a deduction from observation of the working of the Economic Man's mind when brought into contact with two kinds of currency of unequal value, and through our knowledge of the Economic Man we can predict its operation with almost as much certainty as the operation of a law of chemistry or physics.

Ethics and religion, in fact, constitute the disturbing forces which make possible the organization and prosperous existence of civilized states. They have to be calculated and allowed for and their working observed, just as the disturbing force of gravity, or atmospheric or other resistance, has to be calculated, allowed for, and its working observed, in astronomy or mechanics. But this calculation would be impossible if the constant tendency were known. If the Economic Man were blotted out of existence, nearly all the discussions of the economists would be as empty log-

machinery as the attempts to reconcile fixed fate and free will. That I am not here fighting a shadow is shown by the fact that General Francis A. Walker, himself an economist of eminence, in a recent address before the American Economic Association, on "The Tide of Economic Thought," gives the following as one of the reasons for the currency at this juncture of "the vaguest and wildest schemes for human regeneration upon an economic basis":

"First. The economists themselves are largely responsible for this state of things, on account of the arbitrary and unreal character of their assumptions and the haughty and contemptuous spirit in which they have too often chosen to deliver their precepts. Especially are our American economists sinners above the rest in these respects. Long after even the English economists, who have been lordly enough, Heaven knows! had *importantly modified the traditional premises of the science to meet the facts of human nature*, and had, with a wider outlook, admitted many extensive qualifications of the doctrine of *laissez faire*, the professors of political economy in the leading American colleges continued to write about the economic man of Ricardo and James Mill as if he was worth all the real men who ever lived; and the editors of the journals and reviews which especially affected to exercise authority in economics, greeted with contumely every suggestion of an exception to the rule of individualism, from whatever source proceeding, for whatever reason proposed. Even the complete establishment of such an exception in the policy of half a dozen nations, and its triumphant vindication in practical working to the satisfaction of all publicists, all men of affairs, and even of those who had once been selfishly interested to oppose it, constituted no reason why these high priests of economic orthodoxy should accept it."

I might, if I had space, take serious exception to these allegations about the teachings of professors in American colleges, on the score of exaggeration, and also to the proposition touching the satisfaction of "*all publicists and all men of affairs*," on the score of accuracy. But I am not concerned about this so much as about the statement that the English and other economists have "*importantly modified the traditional premises of the science*." We are sure that were General Walker debating any topic but political economy, in discussing which no man ever gets fully outside of his subject, he would at once recognize the fact that the premises of "*a science*" cannot be altered to suit any one's fancy or convenience. Science means the law which regulates the succession of phenomena. Scientific investigation means an attempt by observation or experiment, or both, to get at this law. But it is only in theology or metaphysics that the scientific investigator creates his own premises, and makes hypotheses which account for nothing. In all other fields, political economy in-

cluded,—if it be a science,—the premises are furnished not by the logician, but by the phenomena of nature. Human society furnishes the economist with his phenomena, and therefore with his premises. He can, if he be a scientific man, no more modify them “importantly” or otherwise than he can by taking thought add a cubit to his stature. He can, of course, as in any line of investigation, frame hypotheses, but the hypotheses have to be verifiable by observation or experiment. But under all circumstances, and for all purposes, there is no getting away from the phenomena. You may dislike them, or wish they were otherwise, but accept them you must. You may approach them inductively by collecting on them for your premises, or you may approach them deductively by concocting a hypothesis or theory to explain them, but you must still apply them promptly to your conclusion to see whether they fit. I venture to assert that there is not a single economist of the old school, beginning with Adam Smith, who, as a scientific man, has not used both these methods with such success as his diligence and skill permitted. But in all economic investigation the first inquiry is, and, so far as it is economical, must forever remain: What will the Economic Man do when brought in contact with certain selected phenomena of the physical or social world? And the more complicated the facts of the industrial and social world are, the more necessary to the economist the Economic Man is, in order to enable him to steer his way through the maze.

The existing confusion in the economic world, which General Walker’s charge, quoted above, well illustrates, is due, apparently, to difficulty in getting the members of the new or historical schools to tell us in what character they appear. One can never tell, in listening to them, whether they are addressing us as scientific men or statesmen. Their air of authority is that of scientists, but the eager philanthropy of their utterances indicates that they are really would-be legislators. Their clothes are economical, but their talk is ethical. To take Roscher again as an example of the best-known and most moderate of them, one finds that what he has added to the work of the older economists, besides the illustrations supplied by an enormous erudition, consists mainly of theology and metaphysics. The new schools profess to know far more about the will of God, and about duty and the moral sources of happiness, and the ethical foundations of the state,

than the older economists ; but they have not contributed anything of practical importance to our knowledge of the laws of value, of production, or of exchange, as extracted from the mind of the producer and purchaser. The test of science is that it enables one to predict consequences. Until our researches have enabled us to foresee exactly what will happen if something else happens, although we may have discovered valuable and interesting facts, we have not discovered a law. That the historical school have laid before us a large mass of interesting information about the industrial condition of various countries at various periods cannot be denied, but I am unable to see in what their contributions to economical literature differ from the books of intelligent and observant travellers. Their great objection to the policy of *laissez faire*—that it permits a considerable amount of cruelty, oppression, and suffering, and that, in spite of its teachings, poverty exists on a great scale among the laboring classes—is an ethical or political, not a scientific, objection. It is simply saying to the rich what "the Society for the Abolition of Poverty" says—that they are cruel or unjust. It does not suggest any economical mode, in the scientific sense of the term, for improving the condition of the poor.

Take as an example of our meaning General Walker's announcement, in the passage we have just quoted, of "the complete establishment" of "an exception to the rule of individualism" (we presume the regulation of factory labor) "in the policy of half a dozen nations" "to the satisfaction of all publicists, all men of affairs," etc. This exception, let us observe, was first made in the country which has been supposed to be most influenced by the individualists. But no matter what its merits, or what its results, the fact remains that it is not an exception in the economic sense. It is a political or social measure, not an economic one. It is not a conclusion of economic science. It is a dictate of humanity or physiology or religion. It is a police regulation, to which the Economic Man is no more opposed than to the restrictions on the use of public water or the municipal prohibition of the storing of gunpowder. It was opposed in the beginning not by economists, but by manufacturers who happened to be at the time strongly combating the kind of government interference with production which had been the rule in Europe ever since the middle ages. There is no foundation for the suggestion that in any six countries in the world the Economic Man has offered any se-

rious impediment to the kind of special interference with distribution for the benefit of the race which is known as socialistic legislation. The legislation has, as a matter of fact, begun earliest in England, where individualism has been supposed to be most powerful, and has gone on *pari passu* with the spread of the opinions associated with the name of Smith and Ricardo and Cobden. The only effect of these opinions on English legislation has been to abolish the former hindrances to exchange with foreign countries; and those who advocated this have certainly not been brought to shame by the resulting effect on the national industry and on the condition of the working classes.

In short, the new school of economists are rather politicians, using the word in its good sense, than scientific men. What mainly occupies them is legislation for taking away money from capitalists and distributing it among laborers. The earlier school may have paid too much attention to the problem of production. The later ones can hardly be said to pay any attention at all to production. With the effect of their plans on production—that is, on the dividend which the earth yields every year to the labor of its inhabitants—they hardly seem to concern themselves. To talk of their championship of the working classes as being in any sense scientific would be an abuse of language.

And I cannot help thinking that General Walker's ascription of the existing currency "of the vaguest and wildest schemes for human regeneration on an economic basis" to the economists—meaning by that the followers of Ricardo and Mill—is a curious misapprehension. It reads very like the criticism of the wolf on the lamb's pollution of the water. If dates throw any light on the matter, "the wild and vague schemes for human regeneration upon an economic basis" did not begin to spread or take hold of any civilized community with marked force or effect until after the convention of the "Katheder Socialisten" in Germany in 1877, and the appearance of the historical school in Germany, England, and America. Professor Ingram's attack on political economy in general in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" undoubtedly gave somewhat of a blow to "Smithianism," but he only repeated what Comte had already said of the absurdity of supposing that there could be any such thing as economical science apart from the general science of sociology. He, however, greatly diminished the apparent value of the Economic Man, and helped

to start crowds of young professors and labor agitators and politicians in search of a new economy which would shorten hours of labor, raise wages, humble the employer, give the laborer a fair share in the luxuries of life, and eventually abolish poverty.

The progress of this *quasi*-scientific movement towards social regeneration through government interference, of the discredit of the older economists, and of the resulting economic confusion of which General Walker speaks, has been hastened by two other agencies of which he takes no notice. The charge that this confusion has been brought about through the bad manners of the old economists, and the hard-and-fast way in which they presented their theories to the multitude, shows that it is not science but politics which has been expected of them. The fact—if it be a fact—that the multitude refuses to listen to them any longer, and has gone off to worship new gods, does not prove that they have reasoned wrongly on the facts of society. It simply proves that their conclusions are unpopular. That a certain number of persons have gone into "the vaguest and wildest schemes for human regeneration on an economic basis" does not show that the assumptions of the old economists have been "arbitrary and unreal," although it may show that their precepts have been delivered in a "haughty and contemptuous spirit." But judging these economists as legislators, which is really what the new school does, it is impossible to decide, on any data now in our possession, whether the *laissez-faire* system, as it is called, has been, or will be, successful or not. There is, unhappily, no absolute test of success in economic legislation. All that the wisest legislator can look for as a sign of his success in dealing with economic problems is a reduction in the amount of discontent among the poor. To abolish discontent among the poor completely, in any country, is as hopeless a task as to abolish poverty, and no statesman attempts it. Whether he has succeeded in lessening discontent he can only ascertain approximately, by means of an inference from the increase of consumption as shown in statistics collected from various sources. He concludes, *à priori*, that the poor are less discontented when they consume more of the necessities and luxuries, because he has observed that, as a rule, physical comfort among the great bulk of mankind tends to produce happiness; but no economist can say with certainty that any particular kind of economical

legislation is the best possible, or has produced effects which no other kind would or will produce. It is here that the complexity of all sociological problems comes in to baffle the politician, and compels him, in the vast majority of cases, to legislate simply for the Economic Man, with whose needs and tendencies he is, as a rule, far more familiar than he is with the needs of the ethical man. So that if the new schools of political economy enter the field, as they are apparently doing, not as scientists, but as legislators, their attacks on the old one as politicians cannot have any better basis than pride of opinion. It remains to be seen whether their plans for the promotion of human happiness are in any way superior to those of the old school or not.

It seems to be forgotten that the paternal system of government, in which what is called "the state" plays the part of an earthly parent to the individual, has been tried on an extensive scale in various communities and at various periods of the world's history, and with very poor success. I grant that it has not been tried under conditions as favorable as those which now exist. The experiment may now be made with greatly improved administrative machinery, with minute as well as wide knowledge of economic facts and tendencies, and under the watch of a powerful public opinion. But, on the other hand, the state has lost completely, in the eyes of the multitude, the moral and intellectual authority it once possessed. It does not any longer represent God on earth. In democratic countries it represents the party which secured most votes at the last election, and is, in many cases, administered by men whom no one would make guardians of his children or trustees of his property. When I read the accounts given by the young lions of the historical school of the glorious future which awaits us as soon as we get the proper amount of state interference with our private concerns for the benefit of the masses, and remember that in New York "the state" consists of the Albany Legislature under the guidance of Governor Hill, and in New York city of the little Tammany junta known as "the Big Four," I confess I am lost in amazement. I ask myself, How can anybody who attacks the old school with such vigor for its indifference to the facts of daily life be so completely oblivious of that most patent fact, that the capacity of the state

for interfering with people profitably has not grown in anything like the same ratio as the popular intelligence, and that there is nothing in which modern democracy is showing itself so deficient as in the provision of inspecting machinery—that is, in securing the faithful execution of its plans for the promotion of popular comfort?

The agencies which have really done most to discredit the older political economy with the masses, and to produce an efflorescence of wild schemes of social regeneration on an economic basis, are, as I have said, two in number. The first is the extravagant expectations about the powers of the state in the solution of economical problems raised by the historical school since its appearance in 1877. Its promises and denunciations have been flung into democratic communities in which, as in France, Germany, and England, the poorer classes were just becoming aware of the extent of the power over the government which universal suffrage had put into their hands. In no country have "the masses," in the modern sense of that term, ever been greatly concerned about political liberty, as the men of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in this country and England understood it and fought for it; that is, about the division of the sovereignty between different bodies so as to prevent the growth of arbitrary power. The greatest political interest of that vast majority of the human race which is in but a small degree removed from want always has been, and probably always will be, the power of legislation over distribution. A good government always has been to them a government under which trade is brisk, wages are high, and food is cheap. The reason why the older political economy has seemed to them "a dismal science" has been that its teachings, in so far as it attempted to teach, discouraged reliance on the state for these things, and made the attainment of them dependent on individual character. I am not now discussing whether this doctrine was or was not pushed too far; I simply say that it was the most natural thing in the world for the working classes of England, for example, which had been so long familiar with legislation for the direct benefit of the middle and upper classes, to receive with anger or suspicion the announcement that the care of any class by the state was a mistake, and that individual independence was the true rule of industrial life. When these classes, there-

fore, found themselves invested through the suffrage with political power, it was inevitable that they should seek at once to improve their condition through legislation, and should receive with acclamation the news that a new school of political economy had been founded which taught as "science" that the politicians were the true fathers of their country, and would, on application, put an end to unjust distribution. In short, the new departure which the new schools are all calling for is a new departure in politics, not in political economy. There is hardly a trace of science in their talk any more than in that of city missionaries. What they are asking us to do is simply to try a hazardous experiment in popular government.

The second agency in producing the existing economic confusion, which, as it appears to me, General Walker overlooks, is the substitution in nearly all the churches of the "gospel of social endeavor," as it has been called, for the old theological gospel. There are very few clergymen to-day who venture to expound in their pulpits what was formerly called the "Queen of the Sciences," the science of Christian theology. This used to be their chief business. Of this science they were the acknowledged masters. They were supposed to have the key to the greatest of all earthly problems, and their contentions with each other over the proper solution of it furnished the chief interest of the intellectual world in all countries. When Dr. Lyman Beecher took the charge of a group of "anxious inquirers" out of the hands of Judge Gould at Litchfield, he did so as a professional man, just as a physician would have taken a case of typhoid fever out of the hands of an apothecary, and the church saw clearly the overwhelming necessity of the judge's deposition. Probably nine out of ten of the members to-day would smile over the good doctor's notion that his skill in dealing with spiritual suffering was, *ex officio*, any greater than the judge's. In fact, authority has departed from the pulpit as a profession. Everybody nowadays acknowledges this, and clergymen feel it. They feel especially that they have failed in obtaining influence for revealed religion over the great masses of population congregated in modern cities, and yet it is these masses which have raised what is called the "labor problem," and have produced the prodigious economic tumult which the historical school is trying to allay.

That ministers who feel that the old gospel has lost its power

to soothe discontent and to account for social evils, should endeavor to get at the point of view of the laboring poor, and should in a large number of cases, through force of sympathy, come to share in their illusions touching the power of government over distribution, is surely very natural. The socialist view of what social arrangements ought to be is very much like that of the early Christians, and the clergyman's imagination is naturally touched by finding it held by large bodies of his contemporaries. Moreover, was not the world once conquered by an ethical idea, and what is easier than for an ardent preacher to believe that it is not too late to do it over again? It has been maintained in this city in a clerical convention within twenty years, in all seriousness, that the whole world might be, and probably would be, with proper effort, "converted," in the technical sense of that term, within thirty years. What is there very wonderful in the opinion that this conversion might be hastened by a rearrangement, under government superintendence, of the relations of labor and capital?

Moreover, the notion that the economists are to blame for the aberrations of "the benevolent clergymen, ecstatic ladies," and other "prophets and disciples of an industrial millennium," would be more plausible if an industrial millennium were anything new, or if, from the days of Hesiod to our own, the evils of man's condition had not been laid on the greed of the rich, on the pride of the wise and learned, and on the inhumanity of the great, by a long catena of poets, sages, and prophets. That the volume of social discontent is now greater than in former ages is due mainly to the multitude of new problems we have to face, to the immensely improved means of spreading ideas, to the wonderful economic changes effected by science and invention, and, though last not least, to the appearance on the scene of the new schools of political economy to preach the limitlessness of the province of government. But the labor problem remains very much what it has been ever since agriculture was substituted for hunting and fishing—a problem which, in the main, each man must solve for himself.

E. L. GODKIN.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

FREAKS OF LAW.

THE absurdities of special legislation may prove its disintegrating force quite as much as the earnestness with which its errors are combated. The self-confident ease with which the panacea of special laws is invoked for a multitude of ills has such a sublime effrontery that it becomes ludicrous ; and as Americans contrive loopholes of escape from obedience, reformers now not only ask for new laws, but demand that a penalty shall be attached to each law to insure its efficacy.

Special legislation is the Mecca of philanthropy. On its behalf the lobby is employed with edifying zeal. Churches, societies, monopolies, boards, officials, tinker legislation. Organizations multiply, on the ground that if such a noble body of men and women as each society considers itself determines upon or even approves certain legislation, such surely will be enacted. Annual reports teem with congratulation upon the legal improvements effected at the suggestion of secretaries and presidents, and ministers in their legislative prayers become as embarrassed as old Dr. Ezra Ripley, who prayed that the Lord would overrule every one of the decisions of the court, when he merely wished that in a general way God would rule over the hearts of the people.

Individuals cheat themselves with the delusion that they are patriotic because they offer their misfortunes as indications of the need for special laws. Therefore Mrs. Royle and Mrs. Lucas sought for divorce, each premising that a new law should be framed for her case, as her contribution to the cause of womanhood ; and when informed that the general laws of Massachusetts were sufficient for their purpose, each returned to her husband and continued to bake pies for him.

Petitions for legislation are as astounding in number as they are varied in scope. Last winter an extraordinary one was introduced into the Indiana Legislature—that chairmen of the committee on bills in third reading should be rewarded by a double salary. What a slur it involved upon other members, who, if it had passed, would have been stigmatized as not doing their duty ! Illinois has always been famous for its peculiar statutes. It offers bounties as encouragement to agricultural fairs and other industries. Its legislature was besought to incorporate a company for the detection of horse-thieves, when the usual processes of law were adequate for the discovery of such thefts and the conviction of the offenders. In emulation of the West, Maine asked Congress for \$100,000 with which to build a breakwater at Bar Harbor, which, if granted, would have been of notable benefit to yachtsmen

and the wealthy cottagers of Mount Desert. As atonement Maine granted a bounty of ten cents per head for dead crows, to the delight of the small boys, who were aggrieved at the penalty imposed upon the sale of cigarettes to them.

A few of the late bills in the Massachusetts Legislature show to what extent special measures might have been carried, and though "inexpedient to legislate" was reported on many of them, the people's money and the members' time were given to earnest debates upon them. An act was reported compelling idle persons to work for those dependent on them. If it had passed, the proverbial Satan and the State would have been rival employers. Another act was offered for the arrest of transgressors by the Fish Commissioners without a warrant. If enacted, the act would have been of flagrant injustice to all other commissioners and an insult to the general law. An act was on the calendar providing a fine for catching trout less than six inches in length. The act should have been differently drawn; for how could boys tell how long the trout were until they were hooked? Philadelphia and Massachusetts farmers are at constant war with each other concerning "the removal of heads, entrails, and feathers of poultry exposed for sale." Apart from the sanitary aspect of the matter, if Philadelphia market-men take them out, they will have to charge so much more per pound, that people may then be willing to buy the inferior Bay State fowl.

A curious instance of unnecessary (!) beneficent special legislation was the passing of a bill by which the travelling expenses of deaf pupils attending the schools or institutions for the deaf shall be paid by the Commonwealth, though voluntary payment of the whole or any part of them is graciously permitted. Why should not the travelling expenses of the blind, and also of their guides, likewise be paid? Consequently other charitable persons attempted to pass a bill exempting from taxation the property of blind persons to the amount of \$5,000!

The Weavers' Fine Bill has long been a contest between the manufacturer's clemency and his employees' capacity. If the imposition of fines had continued, lady customers might have followed suit, revenging themselves for their ill-fitting dresses by withholding the amount due on a dressmaker's bill until the suits were worthy of their approval. The State also was requested not to vie with the powers of nature in permitting the pursuit of wild fowl by aid of a sailboat or steam-launch.

Discontent and envy have much to do with the eight-hour movement. A genuine American always wants to be as well off as his neighbor. Failing therein, he would reduce to a common standard all the varied applications of ability and labor. When the eight-hour law is turned upon domestic service, he may then regret its agitation. If laws are necessary for the protection of children, there should be no interference by law with the greater or less capacity for labor by adult men or women. Few women desire protection, though those connected with certain organizations are forced to accept it; but surely any eight-hour bill should guarantee the rights of freemen to individual contract.

Legislation in regard to education veers from state socialism to local individualism. Wisconsin would make its Board of Education autocratic, but in Massachusetts the Committee on Education reported against establishing a new board of examiners to supervise all schools, because such a bill savored of centralization. Snobbish ignorance might rejoice in seeing Harvard College supervised, but Boston culture would regret it. Other persons

want the State to sign contracts for the publication of certain text-books. If the bill making cities and towns liable for injuries received by pupils attending the public schools had passed, private schools would have labored under greater disadvantages than at present. A jealous regard for the authority of town and county school committees and superintendents also prevented the passage of a bill by which any teacher, on voluntarily presenting herself for examination, as prescribed by the State Board of Education, and passing it, could receive a corresponding diploma.

No legislative freaks are queerer than those which undertake to settle by the permanence of law that which should be left to the development of personal good will and forbearance; but as railroads feared the economic loss involved in the principle of *noblesse oblige*, a law was enacted to prevent the letting-down of upper berths when not in use.

Appeals are also made to law to settle the social status of people. An Italian society in Boston protested against "wealthy Italians being permitted to collect garbage," arguing that the business should be restricted to poor persons. America, however, is outranked by the "English United Chimney-Sweeps' Protective Association," which complained to Parliament that any man of bad character or "without experience" might be employed as a sweep, and requested that no one should sweep a chimney without being registered or certificated. Because there is to be a bill before the German Reichstag to abolish bachelorhood in the interest of unmarried women, should not our Eastern States, on behalf of our Western men, enact laws to avert spinsterhood in New England? The logic of state socialism is pitiless; marriage conditions dictated, regulation of birth follows. Suicide will next be forbidden, with a penalty attached to its practice, which absent-minded people will believe in with sincerity equal to that of the lawyer who, on going to his office, read his own notice that he would soon return and sat down and waited for himself!

The abolition of bad statutes, not the enactment of beneficiary ones, is needed. Reformers ask for special laws which handicap the development of character into national strength. Paternalism is not the highest attitude of the State. It is proposed to stop by law the early closing of shops. That checks business. No matter, perhaps, for the dealer in boots and shoes, but bad for the cobbler. It is hoped to destroy by law the sweating system. It will take more than Pinkerton's detectives to do that. Yet why look to legislation for reforms which should be accomplished by personal energy and chivalry in a country where each man should have the fullest liberty compatible with the liberties of others? We owe ourselves to the State, which owes us no reward in turn unless we earn it, while the line in legislation can only be drawn by an historic study of sequences, by classification of broad human interests, and by prophetic insight into results of present action.

KATE GANNETT WELLS.

"APOLLEIA"—A PROPHECY.

THE group of asteroids which seem to fill the place in the solar system between Mars and Jupiter suggested to an ingenious modern writer the fanciful tale of an exploded world (Apolleia), of which those "pocket-planets," as Herschel calls them, are the fragments.

In intellectual development the inhabitants of that hapless world had advanced far beyond the inhabitants of our earth. Their mastery over the forces of nature was not confined to harnessing steam and lightning, producing what practically amount to new species of both plants and animals, bringing down the rain at pleasure, or such small matters. They sailed the air as we sail the ocean; they made rivers, seas, harbors, islands, mountains, valleys, when and where they pleased; if a coast-line was not to their fancy, they changed it; if a continent was too large, they reduced it; if too small, they enlarged it; deserts, steppes, and vast marshes they transformed to blooming gardens and fruitful fields. In short, they dethroned nature and usurped her proud sovereignty. But at last their vaulting ambition o'erleapt itself.

Some daring De-Lesseps-and-Edison-in-one, of that highly-developed race, conceived the magnificent project of tunnelling the planet, and thus achieving the *ne plus ultra* of rapid transit between the antipodes. In Apolleia no scheme was so daring, so impious, as to be "ahead of the times." The new idea was welcomed with enthusiasm and delight. The grand engineering operations began. Gigantic machines ripped and tore into the bowels of the planet; floods of chemicals dissolved soil and rock with equal potency. The work was rapidly approaching completion when—

Apolleia was no more!

Now, though plain, matter-of-fact science repudiates the fascinating theory that the asteroids are the fragments of an exploded planet, the pretty story built upon that theory is not without its practical suggestions.

Rapid progress involves a corresponding shortening of processes. The child who ardently wishes he were lifted at once to the plane of full manhood simply yearns for a closer proximity to death.

For long years the century-plant grows slowly, unfolding frond by frond with monotonous regularity. All at once it awakens to tremendous action. The vitality which has been accumulating during all those decades suddenly leaps forth. Hours do the work of years. A tree-like stalk shoots up into the air, blossoms luxuriantly, and—presto—the splendid plant is dead! That green tower was its Babel: after it the deluge.

For unknown ages the earth was a seed unplanted. For unknown ages it germinated and grew. For a few short hundreds or thousands of centuries mankind, its tower of strength and vitality, has been rising. These last years are outdoing the work of previous ages.

Is the earth approaching the period of its luxuriant blossoming?

Is the story of Apolleia a prophecy?

EDWARD P. JACKSON.

ARITHMETIC AND THE BACCARAT CASE.

I SEE it announced that Sir William Gordon Cumming may be expected to visit the United States shortly. Doubtless this will revive the interest of Americans in a recent trial as to the results of which no slight differences of opinion seem to exist in England. Permit me, therefore, to point out one aspect of this curious case which seems to have escaped attention. I mean the coldly arithmetical aspect of the now historic game of baccarat played at Tranby Croft.

These games were played for money. The surest way—indeed, the only sure way—to ascertain whether they were fairly or unfairly played, obviously

was to look into the financial results of the games. If an arithmetical inquiry shows that one or another player left off with more or less winnings than for the number and amount of his stakes he was honestly entitled to have, fraud would have to be inferred; but it could only be proved after it had been defined, and it could only be defined after a rigid analysis of the games, stakes, and winnings. The tableaux (or statements of each player's operations) of the two nights alone could make this analysis possible, with the number of events (an "event" being a completed "hand"), the surplus of winnings, and the average stakes of the players. Applying to these tableaux this analysis, we should have had the *corpus delicti*. As it was, the whole proceedings from beginning to end were like an inquiry as to the guilt of a murderer before the fact was fully established that a murder had been committed! What is the tale of Tranby Croft as it was actually worked out and left at the close of the trial from the point of view of arithmetic and of the laws of evidence?

Sir William Gordon Cumming, playing baccarat at the same table with young Mr. Wilson for two consecutive nights (the Prince of Wales being dealer, and therefore playing against Wilson and Sir William), left off, after a series of thirteen events, with £225 of winnings, of which £75, we are told, was due, not to winnings on the table of Sir William and Wilson, but to "by-bets" on the other tables. This gives £150 as the amount won and held by Sir William as the outcome of thirteen "events" at the Wilson-Cumming table. Five reputable persons, out of a larger number present and looking on, state, and, it is admitted, sincerely believe, that during these games they, among them, saw Sir William on thirteen occasions, by four different methods, add to his stake after an event. They also state that these additions amounted in all to £105. No two of these five persons, however, state that they saw the same act of addition on his part. The Prince, who was the banker throughout, and therefore held to protect his own stakes, does not state that he saw any fraud on any one of these thirteen occasions; nor does any other person present, except the afore-mentioned five, state that he or she saw any.

Mr. Wilson, one of the five persons who state that they saw Sir William add to his stakes, staked on the same cards with Sir William at the same table. He states that, playing low, he left off with £50 or £60 to the good. He states that Sir William, playing higher, left off—honestly or dishonestly—with £150 to the good.

Therefore the proportion between the stakes of Mr. Wilson and Sir William must be the proportion between their winnings, and there must be for each an average stake. This is not a question of eyesight, but of arithmetic. If in the thirteen instances of alleged cheating the original stake of Sir William was £5, he must have honestly won £65. But by adding £105 of alleged fraudulent additions to £65 we do not get £150; and if we accept Mr. Wilson's statement that *his* winnings were from £50 to £60, it is impossible to work out an average stake for him from £1 up to £5 which will avoid the discrepancy. Nor are we helped by Mr. Wilson's further statement that he "saw but cannot specify" other cheating. If he did, every counter added would make the discrepancy wider between what Sir William on the hypothesis of cheating must have had and what upon the evidence he did have. In a play of three or four hours a certain number of events must have happened with a surplus of winnings for Sir William and Mr. Wilson to put Mr. Wilson from £50 to £60 to the good.

If the average stake of Wilson was £2, the surplus of winnings was £26. If the average stake of Sir William was £5, he could not, as we find he said to the Prince, showing his tableau, help winning. He must have won from £125 to £150. The known winnings of Sir William, £65, must be reduced to £45 to make the allegation that he fraudulently added £105 tally with the £150 we are told he actually had. To reduce the £65 to £45, the times the table won must be reduced from thirteen, as testified by Wilson, to nine. But then nine surplus winnings will not account for the £50 to £60 which, we are told, Wilson had! If before or after the thirteen specified instances Sir William played the *coup de trois*, he either lost or won on the aggregate of the *coups*. If he lost, Mr. Wilson could not win, nor could his £50 to £60 be accounted for. If he won, Sir William must have had more than £65. If he stood even, the position was unchanged. Given Mr. Wilson with a lower stake, who comes out with from £50 to £60, Sir William with a higher stake, who comes out with £150, and given Sir William's thirteen admitted stakes of £5 each admittedly winning £65, it is arithmetically impossible so to construct the game as that £105 out of £150 shall be the product of cheating, because the surplus winnings of the table must be exactly thirteen, or more or less. If more, Sir William honestly wins more; if exactly thirteen, or less, Wilson cannot win from £50 to £60.

These are the arithmetical difficulties which have occurred to me in connection with this strange story, and which I give for what they are worth.

ARITHMETICIAN.

THE FALLACY OF PATRIOTISM.

BY POPULAR judgment, patriotism is considered a primary virtue, of the same value as truth and honesty; and so well is this view established that few attempt to reason on the subject, and to doubt it is generally to invite contempt or abuse.

The virtue is asserted, not proved. The child is taught to shout with delight when the flag is raised, to exalt the form of government under which he was born, and to overlook serious faults both in its formation and in its administration. The peculiar genius of our people also causes the bosom to swell with patriotic pride; and we exult in the contemplation of our natural resources and beauties. Foreign nations may well be despised, their people graded as parvenus or trash, their government held in contempt; and while it may not be possible to dispute that they have some natural beauties, it must not be admitted that nature elsewhere can compare with the domestic article. That would be unpatriotic.

Patriotism is like dogmatism in religion. The latter claims absolute truth, with none existing apart from its teachings; while patriotism is a blind admiration for one's own surroundings, and a denial of the possibility of equal good existing elsewhere.

The claim that patriotism is a virtue would be difficult to maintain. Virtue is moral excellence, and while it might, perhaps, be shown that patriotism, under certain conditions, has some merit, it would be hard to satisfy a thinking man that the love of one's native land has any connection with the practice of goodness or the possession of morality. If it were possible, it would be still more difficult to show how an Englishman could display any particular morality by being a patriotic Briton one year, and display the

same virtue by renouncing his allegiance to Queen Victoria and becoming a patriotic American the succeeding year. Virtue should be the study of every man. He should aim to live a life of moral excellence, and in this study all assumed or pretended virtues should be closely examined. If patriotism is found wanting, it should be unhesitatingly repudiated.

The boundary lines of nations are of human invention, and are not set by the Creator. They are matters of agreement, either by councils or by force of the conqueror, and, in consequence, the patriotic soul is sometimes at a loss—without a thorough geographical knowledge, or the presence of a custom-house official to remind him that he is crossing the line—to know where his love shall end and perfect indifference begin.

Alsace and Lorraine have alternately been French and German, requiring the citizen to change the object of his love. The map of Europe is constantly being altered, and the changed map of North America may yet impose upon the patriotic Canadian the duty of transferring the exercise of this so-called virtue to another government. One who is really seeking to know virtue becomes bewildered at the quality of the moral excellence, directing the emotions of transplanted patriots in the exercise of patriotic feelings towards their latest government.

Virtue is not climatic, nor can that passion be properly designated a virtue which fills the mind with feelings of love to everything on one side of an imaginary line, and perfect indifference to everything on the other side, solely because of different existing forms of government. Spencer says that "patriotism is nationally what egoism is individually." Every one can recall instances in which self-glorification has marred characters which otherwise would have been exemplary. But how much greater is the evil when the people of a nation collectively indulge in it! Our admirable qualities should not be constantly announced. Let them be seen without advertisement. Local conceit, so much admired at home, so admirable in one's own country, cannot be successfully transplanted.

The man who proclaims his patriotism away from home, where national love is for another flag, another government, makes himself a nuisance, both by the announcement of his country's excellences and by his enthusiastic appreciation of them. Yet his appreciation is patriotism, the great virtue. The cultivated man, however, though he may be a slave of this time-honored and musty habit, is silent on his country's greatness when abroad, be he English or American. If patriotism is a virtue, it is the only one that becomes a noxious fungus by change of scene and climate. Justifiable wars (if such there be) have been commenced solely because injustice or wrong was being done. They have too often been needlessly protracted by the patriotic spirit, and the memory of them, which should have been blotted out, has been kept alive to keep patriotism at the boiling-point. One would think that not only were nations made great and the people made happy by fighting, but that it was more important for nations to be great than for the people to be happy.

The popular orator, when fully primed with patriotism, revives the recollection of carnage and slaughter, the acts of the perpetrators, and the sufferings of the victims. Dean Swift's aphorism, that "the real benefactor is the man who makes two blades of grass to grow where but one grew before," is ignored unless the hearers happen to be voting agriculturists. Count Tolstoi, whose early life was spent in war, says: "When I think of all the evils I have endured and seen, arising from national animosities, I see

that it is all due to that gross imposture, love of one's native land." Macaulay says: "An exclusive attachment to a particular society, though a natural and under certain restrictions a useful sentiment, implies no extraordinary attainment in wisdom or virtue." The admirer of peace finds little in patriotism to arouse his best emotions. He is content to do justice and love mercy.

Few sentences have become so hackneyed as Webster's words, "Our country, may she always be right; but our country, right or wrong!" When the virtue under consideration calls for such immoral support as these lines teach us to give, it is time to examine it closely and see if there is any virtue in a sentiment that demands the support of the wrong. Herbert Spencer gives a gentle reproof to the indorser of Webster's view: "Whoever entertains such an opinion has not that moral equilibrium of feeling required for dealing scientifically with social phenomena." In fact, the unequivocal patriot must be blind.

The persistent claim is that patriotism is not only an admirable virtue, but a necessity for the nation's welfare; that without it governments would have but poor support, and, lacking the enthusiastic admiration of the citizens, would be unstable. The support given anything by enthusiasm is uncertain. Really strong support is that given by the cool, clear-headed man who seeks justice and desires peace and plenty for all. The Declaration of Independence was the demand of men who simply wanted justice done, much less concerned about building up a strong government than securing to citizens their rights. The idea of a strong government drawing its support from the bubbling patriotism of the people runs counter to the declaration that government derives its powers from consent of the governed. Government should have no strength that the people do not willingly allow it to have.

A proclaimed virtue should in our day draw some support from the teachings of Christianity; but in patriotism one looks for it in vain. In fact, Christianity appealed to the world with power because it broke down the partition between Jew and Gentile, and proclaimed that God had made all men of one blood to dwell on the earth, and that all men were brethren. This thought clashes with patriotism, and, when accepted as Christian teachings should be, raises a barrier to patriotism; for men of one blood, brethren, should have no jealousies or animosities towards each other. Greatness, too, knows no national lines. The world claims the great of all nations; their place of nativity is a mere accident. Goodness is apart from sectionalism. To quote Spencer again, "The moral law is cosmopolite, and no respecter of nationalities, and between men who are the antipodes of each other in locality or anything else, there must still exist the same balance of rights as though they were next-door neighbors."

It would follow that the man who admires greatness, and seeks the attainment of goodness and virtue, cannot find any place for patriotism. He cannot concentrate his love on the place where he happens to be born, or the government that he found preserving order and guarding his natural rights. To be in sympathy with the world's great minds, the seeker after truth must not be hampered by an imaginary line. Emerson says the story of Robinson Crusoe is untrue, because neither religion nor virtue could govern the life of the isolated man. So the people who isolate themselves from full intercourse and fellow feeling with the world restrict their mental and moral growth. Patriotism drags them down. One of our great men, a signer of

the Declaration of Independence, very nobly, but perhaps very unpatriotically, said, a hundred years ago: "The world is my country; to do good my religion." Patriotism is now needless, and it is time to abandon it. None can assert that the man who loves justice, mercy, and truth can be bettered by loving a national flag or wasting love on a form of government. He may well admire and approve the government that successfully preserves peace and sees that justice is done to rich and poor alike; but love should be for truth, beauty, art, and for our fellow men. The nationality of the writer who instructs, the artist who delights, or our brother who suffers, should not be considered for a moment.

Patriotism is a fallacy. It makes men national bigots, without either making them better men or better citizens. It fosters sectionalism, and calls for unreasonable admiration and an unreasoning love for our native or adopted land and all its belongings, without appealing to the judgment. It has long enough masqueraded as a virtue, and may well be put aside with other débris of the past and be superseded by philanthropy. This change in popular feeling may not come immediately, but, looking forward, we can dream of the time when patriotic exhortations will cease, and mankind be governed by the "parliament of man" and nations be joined in the "federation of the world."

JAMES LEEDOM.